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sshd-session.c
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/* $OpenBSD: sshd-session.c,v 1.9 2024/09/09 02:39:57 djm Exp $ */
/*
* SSH2 implementation:
* Privilege Separation:
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
#include <sys/security.h>
#include <prot.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
#include "srclimit.h"
#include "dh.h"
/* Re-exec fds */
#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
extern char *__progname;
/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;
/* Name of the server configuration file. */
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
/*
* Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
* mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
* log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
* the first connection.
*/
int debug_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
static int inetd_flag = 0;
/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
static int log_stderr = 0;
/* Saved arguments to main(). */
static char **saved_argv;
static int saved_argc;
/* Daemon's agent connection */
int auth_sock = -1;
static int have_agent = 0;
/*
* Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
* structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
* that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
* problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
* have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
* not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
*/
struct {
u_int num_hostkeys;
struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
} sensitive_data;
/* record remote hostname or ip */
u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */
/* variables used for privilege separation */
struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
static int privsep_chroot = 1;
/* Unprivileged user */
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* global connection state and authentication contexts */
Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
struct ssh *the_active_state;
/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
/* sshd_config buffer */
struct sshbuf *cfg;
/* Included files from the configuration file */
struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
/* message to be displayed after login */
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
/*
* Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
* As usual, this may only take signal-safe actions, even though it is
* terminal.
*/
static void
grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
{
/*
* Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
* keys command helpers or privsep children.
*/
if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
struct sigaction sa;
/* mask all other signals while in handler */
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
sigfillset(&sa.sa_mask);
#if defined(SA_RESTART)
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
#endif
(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL);
kill(0, SIGTERM);
}
_exit(EXIT_LOGIN_GRACE);
}
/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
void
destroy_sensitive_data(void)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
}
if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
}
}
}
/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
void
demote_sensitive_data(void)
{
struct sshkey *tmp;
u_int i;
int r;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key",
sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]));
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
}
/* Certs do not need demotion */
}
}
static void
reseed_prngs(void)
{
u_int32_t rnd[256];
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_poll();
#endif
arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */
if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}
static void
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
gid_t gidset[1];
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
privsep_challenge_enable();
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
#endif
reseed_prngs();
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
/* Demote the child */
if (privsep_chroot) {
/* Change our root directory */
if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* Drop our privileges */
debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
(u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
}
}
static int
privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int status, r;
pid_t pid;
struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
pmonitor = monitor_init();
/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
} else if (pid != 0) {
debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
if (have_agent) {
r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
if (r != 0) {
error_r(r, "Could not get agent socket");
have_agent = 0;
}
}
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Wait for the child's exit status */
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
}
privsep_is_preauth = 0;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
fatal_f("preauth child exited with status %d",
WEXITSTATUS(status));
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
fatal_f("preauth child terminated by signal %d",
WTERMSIG(status));
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
return 1;
} else {
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
privsep_preauth_child();
setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_child(box);
return 0;
}
}
static void
privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
int skip_privdrop = 0;
/*
* Hack for systems that don't support FD passing: retain privileges
* in the post-auth privsep process so it can allocate PTYs directly.
* This is basically equivalent to what we did <= 9.7, which was to
* disable post-auth privsep entriely.
* Cygwin doesn't need to drop privs here although it doesn't support
* fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
* special privileges to begin with.
*/
#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
skip_privdrop = 1;
#endif
/* New socket pair */
monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
exit(0);
}
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
reseed_prngs();
/* Drop privileges */
if (!skip_privdrop)
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
/*
* Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
* this information is not part of the key state.
*/
ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
}
static void
append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
{
int r;
if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s);
return;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
}
static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key;
char *ret;
u_int i;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
/* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b,
append_hostkey_type(b,
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
debug_f("%s", ret);
return ret;
}
static struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
struct sshkey *key;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
break;
default:
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL && !need_private)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
break;
}
if (key == NULL || key->type != type)
continue;
switch (type) {
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
continue;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
return need_private ?
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
}
}
return NULL;
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
{
if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
}
int
get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key,
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
return (i);
} else {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
return (i);
if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
return (i);
}
}
return (-1);
}
/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
static void
notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *buf;
struct sshkey *key;
u_int i, nkeys;
int r;
char *fp;
/* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
return;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
sshkey_is_cert(key))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
debug3_f("key %d: %s %s", i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
free(fp);
if (nkeys == 0) {
/*
* Start building the request when we find the
* first usable key.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "[email protected]")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__);
}
/* Append the key to the request */
sshbuf_reset(buf);
if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "couldn't put hostkey %d", i);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__);
nkeys++;
}
debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
if (nkeys == 0)
fatal_f("no hostkeys");
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: sshd [-46DdeGiqTtV] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
" [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
);
exit(1);
}
static void
parse_hostkeys(struct sshbuf *hostkeys)
{
int r;
u_int num_keys = 0;
struct sshkey *k;
struct sshbuf *kbuf;
const u_char *cp;
size_t len;
while (sshbuf_len(hostkeys) != 0) {
if (num_keys > 2048)
fatal_f("too many hostkeys");
sensitive_data.host_keys = xrecallocarray(
sensitive_data.host_keys, num_keys, num_keys + 1,
sizeof(*sensitive_data.host_pubkeys));
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xrecallocarray(
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys, num_keys, num_keys + 1,
sizeof(*sensitive_data.host_pubkeys));
sensitive_data.host_certificates = xrecallocarray(
sensitive_data.host_certificates, num_keys, num_keys + 1,
sizeof(*sensitive_data.host_certificates));
/* private key */
k = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(hostkeys, &kbuf)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "extract privkey");
if (sshbuf_len(kbuf) != 0 &&
(r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &k)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
sensitive_data.host_keys[num_keys] = k;
sshbuf_free(kbuf);
if (k)
debug2_f("privkey %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
/* public key */
k = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(hostkeys, &cp, &len)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "extract pubkey");
if (len != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(cp, len, &k)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[num_keys] = k;
if (k)
debug2_f("pubkey %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
/* certificate */
k = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(hostkeys, &cp, &len)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "extract pubkey");
if (len != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(cp, len, &k)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
sensitive_data.host_certificates[num_keys] = k;
if (k)
debug2_f("cert %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
num_keys++;
}
sensitive_data.num_hostkeys = num_keys;
}
static void
recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf, uint64_t *timing_secretp)
{
struct sshbuf *m, *inc, *hostkeys;
u_char *cp, ver;
size_t len;
int r;
struct include_item *item;
debug3_f("entering fd = %d", fd);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
fatal_f("ssh_msg_recv failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse version");
if (ver != 0)
fatal_f("rexec version mismatch");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 || /* XXX _direct */
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, timing_secretp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(m, &hostkeys)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse config");
if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse includes");
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
}
parse_hostkeys(hostkeys);
free(cp);
sshbuf_free(m);
sshbuf_free(hostkeys);
sshbuf_free(inc);
debug3_f("done");
}
/*
* If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
* return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
* source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
* (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
* under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
* if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
* source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
* rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
* exit here if we detect any IP options.
*/
static void
check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
{
#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
struct sockaddr_storage from;
u_char opts[200];
socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from);
char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
&fromlen) == -1)
return;
if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
return;
/* XXX IPv6 options? */
if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
&option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
text[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
" %2.2x", opts[i]);
fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
}
#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
}
/* Set the routing domain for this process */
static void
set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
if (name == NULL)
return; /* default */
if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
return;
}
/* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */
return sys_set_process_rdomain(name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable, ortable = getrtable();
const char *errstr;
if (name == NULL)
return; /* default */
if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
return;
}
rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */
fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0)
fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s",
rtable, strerror(errno));
debug_f("set routing domain %d (was %d)", rtable, ortable);
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform");
#endif
}
/*
* Main program for the daemon.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int r, opt, on = 1, remote_port;
int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, rexeced_flag = 0, have_key = 0;
const char *remote_ip, *rdomain;
char *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
u_int i;
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
mode_t new_umask;
Authctxt *authctxt;
struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
sigset_t sigmask;
uint64_t timing_secret = 0;
struct itimerval itv;
sigemptyset(&sigmask);
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++)
saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_argv[i] = NULL;
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
av = saved_argv;
#endif
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
"C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DGQRTdeiqrtV")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '4':
options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'f':
config_file_name = optarg;
break;
case 'c':
servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0,
&options, optarg);
break;
case 'd':
if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
options.log_level++;
break;
case 'D':
/* ignore */
break;
case 'E':
logfile = optarg;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'e':
log_stderr = 1;
break;
case 'i':
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
/* ignore */
break;
case 'R':
rexeced_flag = 1;
break;
case 'Q':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'q':
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'b':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'p':
options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
exit(1);
}
options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'g':
if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'k':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'h':
servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0,
&options, optarg, 1);
break;
case 't':
case 'T':
case 'G':
fatal("test/dump modes not supported");
break;
case 'C':
connection_info = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
optarg) == -1)
exit(1);
break;