-- import "github.com/rogpeppe/macaroon"
The macaroon package implements macaroons as described in the paper "Macaroons: Cookies with Contextual Caveats for Decentralized Authorization in the Cloud" (http://theory.stanford.edu/~ataly/Papers/macaroons.pdf)
type Caveat struct {
}Caveat holds a first person or third party caveat.
func (cav *Caveat) IsThirdParty() boolIsThirdParty reports whether the caveat must be satisfied by some third party (if not, it's a first person caveat).
func (cav *Caveat) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)MarshalJSON implements json.Marshaler.
func (cav *Caveat) UnmarshalJSON(jsonData []byte) errorunmarshalJSON implements json.Unmarshaler.
type Macaroon struct {
}Macaroon holds a macaroon. See Fig. 7 of http://theory.stanford.edu/~ataly/Papers/macaroons.pdf for a description of the data contained within. Macaroons are mutable objects - use Clone as appropriate to avoid unwanted mutation.
func New(rootKey []byte, id, loc string) *MacaroonNew returns a new macaroon with the given root key, identifier and location.
func (m *Macaroon) AddFirstPartyCaveat(caveatId string)AddFirstPartyCaveat adds a caveat that will be verified by the target service.
func (m *Macaroon) AddThirdPartyCaveat(rootKey []byte, caveatId string, loc string) errorAddThirdPartyCaveat adds a third-party caveat to the macaroon, using the given shared root key, caveat id and location hint. The caveat id should encode the root key in some way, either by encrypting it with a key known to the third party or by holding a reference to it stored in the third party's storage.
func (m *Macaroon) Bind(rootSig []byte)Bind prepares the macaroon for being used to discharge the macaroon with the given rootSig. This must be used before it is used in the discharges argument to Verify.
func (m *Macaroon) Caveats() []CaveatCaveats returns the macaroon's caveats. This method will probably change, and it's important not to change the returned caveat.
func (m *Macaroon) Clone() *MacaroonClone returns a copy of the receiving macaroon.
func (m *Macaroon) Id() stringId returns the id of the macaroon. This can hold arbitrary information.
func (m *Macaroon) Location() stringLocation returns the macaroon's location hint. This is not verified as part of the macaroon.
func (m *Macaroon) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)MarshalJSON implements json.Marshaler.
func (m *Macaroon) Signature() []byteSignature returns the macaroon's signature.
func (m *Macaroon) UnmarshalJSON(jsonData []byte) errorUnmarshalJSON implements json.Unmarshaler.
func (m *Macaroon) Verify(rootKey []byte, check func(caveat string) error, discharges []*Macaroon) errorVerify verifies that the receiving macaroon is valid. The root key must be the same that the macaroon was originally minted with. The check function is called to verify each first-party caveat - it should return an error if the condition is not met.
The discharge macaroons should be provided in discharges.
Verify returns true if the verification succeeds; if returns (false, nil) if the verification fails, and (false, err) if the verification cannot be asserted (but may not be false).
TODO(rog) is there a possible DOS attack that can cause this function to infinitely recurse?
type Verifier interface {
Verify(m *Macaroon, rootKey []byte) (bool, error)
}