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nsCSPContext.cpp
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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include <string>
#include <unordered_set>
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsCSPContext.h"
#include "nsCSPParser.h"
#include "nsCSPService.h"
#include "nsGlobalWindowOuter.h"
#include "nsError.h"
#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
#include "nsIClassInfoImpl.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
#include "nsIObjectInputStream.h"
#include "nsIObjectOutputStream.h"
#include "nsIObserver.h"
#include "nsIObserverService.h"
#include "nsIStringStream.h"
#include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h"
#include "nsIUploadChannel.h"
#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
#include "nsMimeTypes.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsIContentPolicy.h"
#include "nsSupportsPrimitives.h"
#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
#include "nsString.h"
#include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsStringStream.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CSPReportBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CSPDictionariesBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundSharedTypes.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h"
#include "nsINetworkInterceptController.h"
#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
#include "nsIScriptElement.h"
#include "nsIEventTarget.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/DocGroup.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
#include "nsXULAppAPI.h"
#include "nsJSUtils.h"
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::dom;
using namespace mozilla::ipc;
static LogModule* GetCspContextLog() {
static LazyLogModule gCspContextPRLog("CSPContext");
return gCspContextPRLog;
}
#define CSPCONTEXTLOG(args) \
MOZ_LOG(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
#define CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED() \
MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
static LogModule* GetCspOriginLogLog() {
static LazyLogModule gCspOriginPRLog("CSPOrigin");
return gCspOriginPRLog;
}
#define CSPORIGINLOG(args) \
MOZ_LOG(GetCspOriginLogLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
#define CSPORIGINLOGENABLED() \
MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspOriginLogLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
#ifdef DEBUG
/**
* This function is only used for verification purposes within
* GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData.
*/
static bool ValidateDirectiveName(const nsAString& aDirective) {
static const auto directives = []() {
std::unordered_set<std::string> directives;
constexpr size_t dirLen =
sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < dirLen; ++i) {
directives.insert(CSPStrDirectives[i]);
}
return directives;
}();
nsAutoString directive(aDirective);
auto itr = directives.find(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(directive).get());
return itr != directives.end();
}
#endif // DEBUG
static void BlockedContentSourceToString(
nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource aSource, nsACString& aString) {
switch (aSource) {
case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eUnknown:
aString.Truncate();
break;
case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eInline:
aString.AssignLiteral("inline");
break;
case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eEval:
aString.AssignLiteral("eval");
break;
case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eSelf:
aString.AssignLiteral("self");
break;
}
}
/* ===== nsIContentSecurityPolicy impl ====== */
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
nsIURI* aContentLocation,
nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect,
bool aSendViolationReports, const nsAString& aNonce,
bool aParserCreated, int16_t* outDecision) {
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, aContentLocation: %s",
aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
CSPCONTEXTLOG((">>>> aContentType: %d", aContentType));
}
// This ShouldLoad function is called from nsCSPService::ShouldLoad,
// which already checked a number of things, including:
// * aContentLocation is not null; we can consume this without further checks
// * scheme is not a allowlisted scheme (about: chrome:, etc).
// * CSP is enabled
// * Content Type is not allowlisted (CSP Reports, TYPE_DOCUMENT, etc).
// * Fast Path for Apps
// Default decision, CSP can revise it if there's a policy to enforce
*outDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
// If the content type doesn't map to a CSP directive, there's nothing for
// CSP to do.
CSPDirective dir = CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType);
if (dir == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE) {
return NS_OK;
}
bool permitted = permitsInternal(
dir,
nullptr, // aTriggeringElement
aCSPEventListener, aContentLocation, aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aNonce,
false, // allow fallback to default-src
aSendViolationReports,
true, // send blocked URI in violation reports
aParserCreated);
*outDecision =
permitted ? nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT : nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_SERVER;
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(
("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, decision: %s, "
"aContentLocation: %s",
*outDecision > 0 ? "load" : "deny",
aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
}
return NS_OK;
}
bool nsCSPContext::permitsInternal(
CSPDirective aDir, Element* aTriggeringElement,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aContentLocation,
nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aSpecific,
bool aSendViolationReports, bool aSendContentLocationInViolationReports,
bool aParserCreated) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
bool permits = true;
nsAutoString violatedDirective;
for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
if (!mPolicies[p]->permits(aDir, aContentLocation, aNonce,
!!aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aSpecific,
aParserCreated, violatedDirective)) {
// If the policy is violated and not report-only, reject the load and
// report to the console
if (!mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::permitsInternal, false"));
permits = false;
}
// Callers should set |aSendViolationReports| to false if this is a
// preload - the decision may be wrong due to the inability to get the
// nonce, and will incorrectly fail the unit tests.
if (aSendViolationReports) {
uint32_t lineNumber = 0;
uint32_t columnNumber = 0;
nsAutoString spec;
JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
if (cx) {
nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, spec, &lineNumber, &columnNumber);
// If GetCallingLocation fails linenumber & columnNumber are set to 0
// anyway so we can skip checking if that is the case.
}
AsyncReportViolation(
aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
(aSendContentLocationInViolationReports ? aContentLocation
: nullptr),
BlockedContentSource::eUnknown, /* a BlockedContentSource */
aOriginalURIIfRedirect, /* in case of redirect originalURI is not
null */
violatedDirective, p, /* policy index */
u""_ns, /* no observer subject */
spec, /* source file */
u""_ns, /* no script sample */
lineNumber, /* line number */
columnNumber); /* column number */
}
}
}
return permits;
}
/* ===== nsISupports implementation ========== */
NS_IMPL_CLASSINFO(nsCSPContext, nullptr, nsIClassInfo::MAIN_THREAD_ONLY,
NS_CSPCONTEXT_CID)
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_CI(nsCSPContext, nsIContentSecurityPolicy, nsISerializable)
nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext()
: mInnerWindowID(0),
mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck(false),
mLoadingContext(nullptr),
mLoadingPrincipal(nullptr),
mQueueUpMessages(true) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext"));
}
nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext() {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext"));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
delete mPolicies[i];
}
}
/* static */
bool nsCSPContext::Equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCSP,
nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aOtherCSP) {
if (aCSP == aOtherCSP) {
// fast path for pointer equality
return true;
}
uint32_t policyCount = 0;
if (aCSP) {
aCSP->GetPolicyCount(&policyCount);
}
uint32_t otherPolicyCount = 0;
if (aOtherCSP) {
aOtherCSP->GetPolicyCount(&otherPolicyCount);
}
if (policyCount != otherPolicyCount) {
return false;
}
nsAutoString policyStr, otherPolicyStr;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < policyCount; ++i) {
aCSP->GetPolicyString(i, policyStr);
aOtherCSP->GetPolicyString(i, otherPolicyStr);
if (!policyStr.Equals(otherPolicyStr)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
nsresult nsCSPContext::InitFromOther(nsCSPContext* aOtherContext) {
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aOtherContext);
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(aOtherContext->mLoadingContext);
if (doc) {
rv = SetRequestContextWithDocument(doc);
} else {
rv = SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(
aOtherContext->mLoadingPrincipal, aOtherContext->mSelfURI,
aOtherContext->mReferrer, aOtherContext->mInnerWindowID);
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck = aOtherContext->mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;
for (auto policy : aOtherContext->mPolicies) {
nsAutoString policyStr;
policy->toString(policyStr);
AppendPolicy(policyStr, policy->getReportOnlyFlag(),
policy->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
}
mIPCPolicies = aOtherContext->mIPCPolicies.Clone();
return NS_OK;
}
void nsCSPContext::EnsureIPCPoliciesRead() {
if (mIPCPolicies.Length() > 0) {
nsresult rv;
for (auto& policy : mIPCPolicies) {
rv = AppendPolicy(policy.policy(), policy.reportOnlyFlag(),
policy.deliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
}
mIPCPolicies.Clear();
}
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetPolicyString(uint32_t aIndex, nsAString& outStr) {
outStr.Truncate();
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) {
return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
}
mPolicies[aIndex]->toString(outStr);
return NS_OK;
}
const nsCSPPolicy* nsCSPContext::GetPolicy(uint32_t aIndex) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) {
return nullptr;
}
return mPolicies[aIndex];
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetPolicyCount(uint32_t* outPolicyCount) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outPolicyCount = mPolicies.Length();
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(bool* outUpgradeRequest) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outUpgradeRequest = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) {
*outUpgradeRequest = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetBlockAllMixedContent(bool* outBlockAllMixedContent) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outBlockAllMixedContent = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() &&
mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT)) {
*outBlockAllMixedContent = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetEnforcesFrameAncestors(bool* outEnforcesFrameAncestors) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outEnforcesFrameAncestors = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() &&
mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE)) {
*outEnforcesFrameAncestors = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy(const nsAString& aPolicyString, bool aReportOnly,
bool aDeliveredViaMetaTag) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy: %s",
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get()));
// Use mSelfURI from setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal} (bug 991474)
MOZ_ASSERT(
mLoadingPrincipal,
"did you forget to call setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal}?");
MOZ_ASSERT(
mSelfURI,
"did you forget to call setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal}?");
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mLoadingPrincipal, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mSelfURI, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
if (CSPORIGINLOGENABLED()) {
nsAutoCString selfURISpec;
mSelfURI->GetSpec(selfURISpec);
CSPORIGINLOG(("CSP - AppendPolicy"));
CSPORIGINLOG((" * selfURI: %s", selfURISpec.get()));
CSPORIGINLOG((" * reportOnly: %s", aReportOnly ? "yes" : "no"));
CSPORIGINLOG(
(" * deliveredViaMetaTag: %s", aDeliveredViaMetaTag ? "yes" : "no"));
CSPORIGINLOG(
(" * policy: %s\n", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get()));
}
nsCSPPolicy* policy = nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy(
aPolicyString, mSelfURI, aReportOnly, this, aDeliveredViaMetaTag);
if (policy) {
if (policy->hasDirective(
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) {
nsAutoCString selfURIspec, referrer;
if (mSelfURI) {
mSelfURI->GetAsciiSpec(selfURIspec);
}
CopyUTF16toUTF8(mReferrer, referrer);
CSPCONTEXTLOG(
("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy added UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE "
"self-uri=%s referrer=%s",
selfURIspec.get(), referrer.get()));
}
mPolicies.AppendElement(policy);
// set the flag on the document for CSP telemetry
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
if (doc) {
doc->SetHasCSP(true);
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetAllowsEval(bool* outShouldReportViolation,
bool* outAllowsEval) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outShouldReportViolation = false;
*outAllowsEval = true;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (!mPolicies[i]->allows(SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL, u""_ns,
false)) {
// policy is violated: must report the violation and allow the inline
// script if the policy is report-only.
*outShouldReportViolation = true;
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
*outAllowsEval = false;
}
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Helper function to report inline violations
void nsCSPContext::reportInlineViolation(
CSPDirective aDirective, Element* aTriggeringElement,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aNonce,
const nsAString& aContent, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective,
uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, // TODO, use report only flag for that
uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber) {
nsString observerSubject;
// if the nonce is non empty, then we report the nonce error, otherwise
// let's report the hash error; no need to report the unsafe-inline error
// anymore.
if (!aNonce.IsEmpty()) {
observerSubject = (aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE)
? NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC)
: NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
} else {
observerSubject = (aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE)
? NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC)
: NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
}
nsAutoString sourceFile;
uint32_t lineNumber;
uint32_t columnNumber;
JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
if (!cx || !nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, sourceFile, &lineNumber,
&columnNumber)) {
// use selfURI as the sourceFile
if (mSelfURI) {
nsAutoCString cSourceFile;
mSelfURI->GetSpec(cSourceFile);
sourceFile.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(cSourceFile));
}
lineNumber = aLineNumber;
columnNumber = aColumnNumber;
}
AsyncReportViolation(aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
nullptr, // aBlockedURI
BlockedContentSource::eInline, // aBlockedSource
mSelfURI, // aOriginalURI
aViolatedDirective, // aViolatedDirective
aViolatedPolicyIndex, // aViolatedPolicyIndex
observerSubject, // aObserverSubject
sourceFile, // aSourceFile
aContent, // aScriptSample
lineNumber, // aLineNum
columnNumber); // aColumnNum
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetAllowsInline(CSPDirective aDirective, const nsAString& aNonce,
bool aParserCreated, Element* aTriggeringElement,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
const nsAString& aContentOfPseudoScript,
uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber,
bool* outAllowsInline) {
*outAllowsInline = true;
if (aDirective != SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE && aDirective != STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can only allow inline for script or style");
return NS_OK;
}
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
nsAutoString content(u""_ns);
// always iterate all policies, otherwise we might not send out all reports
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
bool allowed =
mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, u""_ns,
aParserCreated) ||
mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_NONCE, aNonce, aParserCreated);
// If the inlined script or style is allowed by either unsafe-inline or the
// nonce, go ahead and shortcut this loop so we can avoid allocating
// unecessary strings
if (allowed) {
continue;
}
// Check the content length to ensure the content is not allocated more than
// once. Even though we are in a for loop, it is probable that there is only
// one policy, so this check may be unnecessary.
if (content.IsEmpty() && aTriggeringElement) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptElement> element =
do_QueryInterface(aTriggeringElement);
if (element) {
element->GetScriptText(content);
}
}
if (content.IsEmpty()) {
content = aContentOfPseudoScript;
}
allowed =
mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_HASH, content, aParserCreated);
if (!allowed) {
// policy is violoated: deny the load unless policy is report only and
// report the violation.
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
*outAllowsInline = false;
}
nsAutoString violatedDirective;
bool reportSample = false;
mPolicies[i]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType(
aDirective, violatedDirective, &reportSample);
reportInlineViolation(aDirective, aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
aNonce, reportSample ? content : EmptyString(),
violatedDirective, i, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber);
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetAllowsNavigateTo(nsIURI* aURI, bool aIsFormSubmission,
bool aWasRedirected, bool aEnforceAllowlist,
bool* outAllowsNavigateTo) {
/*
* The matrix below shows the different values of (aWasRedirect,
* aEnforceAllowlist) for the three different checks we do.
*
* Navigation | Start Loading | Initiate Redirect | Document
* | (nsDocShell) | (nsCSPService) |
* -----------------------------------------------------------------
* A -> B (false,false) - (false,true)
* A -> ... -> B (false,false) (true,false) (true,true)
*/
*outAllowsNavigateTo = false;
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
// The 'form-action' directive overrules 'navigate-to' for form submissions.
// So in case this is a form submission and the directive 'form-action' is
// present then there is nothing for us to do here, see: 6.3.3.1.2
// https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#navigate-to-pre-navigate
if (aIsFormSubmission) {
for (unsigned long i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE)) {
*outAllowsNavigateTo = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
bool atLeastOneBlock = false;
for (unsigned long i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (!mPolicies[i]->allowsNavigateTo(aURI, aWasRedirected,
aEnforceAllowlist)) {
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
atLeastOneBlock = true;
}
// If the load encountered a server side redirect, the spec suggests to
// remove the path component from the URI, see:
// https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#source-list-paths-and-redirects
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> blockedURIForReporting = aURI;
if (aWasRedirected) {
nsAutoCString prePathStr;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> prePathURI;
nsresult rv = aURI->GetPrePath(prePathStr);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(blockedURIForReporting), prePathStr);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
// Lines numbers and source file for the violation report
uint32_t lineNumber = 0;
uint32_t columnNumber = 0;
nsAutoCString spec;
JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
if (cx) {
nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, spec, &lineNumber, &columnNumber);
// If GetCallingLocation fails linenumber & columnNumber are set to 0
// anyway so we can skip checking if that is the case.
}
// Report the violation
nsresult rv = AsyncReportViolation(
nullptr, // aTriggeringElement
nullptr, // aCSPEventListener
blockedURIForReporting, // aBlockedURI
nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eSelf, // aBlockedSource
nullptr, // aOriginalURI
u"navigate-to"_ns, // aViolatedDirective
i, // aViolatedPolicyIndex
u""_ns, // aObserverSubject
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec), // aSourceFile
u""_ns, // aScriptSample
lineNumber, // aLineNum
columnNumber); // aColumnNum
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
}
*outAllowsNavigateTo = !atLeastOneBlock;
return NS_OK;
}
/**
* Reduces some code repetition for the various logging situations in
* LogViolationDetails.
*
* Call-sites for the eval/inline checks recieve two return values: allows
* and violates. Based on those, they must choose whether to call
* LogViolationDetails or not. Policies that are report-only allow the
* loads/compilations but violations should still be reported. Not all
* policies in this nsIContentSecurityPolicy instance will be violated,
* which is why we must check allows() again here.
*
* Note: This macro uses some parameters from its caller's context:
* p, mPolicies, this, aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, aColumnNum,
* blockedContentSource
*
* @param violationType: the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constant (partial symbol)
* such as INLINE_SCRIPT
* @param contentPolicyType: a constant from nsIContentPolicy such as
* TYPE_STYLESHEET
* @param nonceOrHash: for NONCE and HASH violations, it's the nonce or content
* string. For other violations, it is an empty string.
* @param keyword: the keyword corresponding to violation (UNSAFE_INLINE for
* most)
* @param observerTopic: the observer topic string to send with the CSP
* observer notifications.
*
* Please note that inline violations for scripts are reported within
* GetAllowsInline() and do not call this macro, hence we can pass 'false'
* as the argument _aParserCreated_ to allows().
*/
#define CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(violationType, directive, nonceOrHash, keyword, \
observerTopic) \
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_##violationType: \
PR_BEGIN_MACRO \
static_assert(directive##_SRC_DIRECTIVE == SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE || \
directive##_SRC_DIRECTIVE == STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE); \
if (!mPolicies[p]->allows(directive##_SRC_DIRECTIVE, keyword, nonceOrHash, \
false)) { \
nsAutoString violatedDirective; \
bool reportSample = false; \
mPolicies[p]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType( \
directive##_SRC_DIRECTIVE, violatedDirective, &reportSample); \
AsyncReportViolation(aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, nullptr, \
blockedContentSource, nullptr, violatedDirective, \
p, NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(observerTopic), \
aSourceFile, reportSample ? aScriptSample : u""_ns, \
aLineNum, aColumnNum); \
} \
PR_END_MACRO; \
break
/**
* For each policy, log any violation on the Error Console and send a report
* if a report-uri is present in the policy
*
* @param aViolationType
* one of the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constants, e.g. inline-script or eval
* @param aSourceFile
* name of the source file containing the violation (if available)
* @param aContentSample
* sample of the violating content (to aid debugging)
* @param aLineNum
* source line number of the violation (if available)
* @param aColumnNum
* source column number of the violation (if available)
* @param aNonce
* (optional) If this is a nonce violation, include the nonce so we can
* recheck to determine which policies were violated and send the
* appropriate reports.
* @param aContent
* (optional) If this is a hash violation, include contents of the inline
* resource in the question so we can recheck the hash in order to
* determine which policies were violated and send the appropriate
* reports.
*/
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::LogViolationDetails(
uint16_t aViolationType, Element* aTriggeringElement,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aSourceFile,
const nsAString& aScriptSample, int32_t aLineNum, int32_t aColumnNum,
const nsAString& aNonce, const nsAString& aContent) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
NS_ASSERTION(mPolicies[p], "null pointer in nsTArray<nsCSPPolicy>");
BlockedContentSource blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eUnknown;
if (aViolationType == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL) {
blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eEval;
} else if (aViolationType ==
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_SCRIPT ||
aViolationType ==
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_STYLE) {
blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eInline;
} else {
// All the other types should have a URL, but just in case, let's use
// 'self' here.
blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eSelf;
}
switch (aViolationType) {
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(EVAL, SCRIPT, u""_ns, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL,
EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(INLINE_STYLE, STYLE, u""_ns, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
INLINE_STYLE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(INLINE_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, u""_ns, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
INLINE_SCRIPT_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(NONCE_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, aNonce, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(NONCE_STYLE, STYLE, aNonce, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(HASH_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, aContent, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(HASH_STYLE, STYLE, aContent, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
default:
NS_ASSERTION(false, "LogViolationDetails with invalid type");
break;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
#undef CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::SetRequestContextWithDocument(Document* aDocument) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument, "Can't set context without doc");
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aDocument);
mLoadingContext = do_GetWeakReference(aDocument);
mSelfURI = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
mLoadingPrincipal = aDocument->NodePrincipal();
aDocument->GetReferrer(mReferrer);
mInnerWindowID = aDocument->InnerWindowID();
// the innerWindowID is not available for CSPs delivered through the
// header at the time setReqeustContext is called - let's queue up
// console messages until it becomes available, see flushConsoleMessages
mQueueUpMessages = !mInnerWindowID;
mCallingChannelLoadGroup = aDocument->GetDocumentLoadGroup();
// set the flag on the document for CSP telemetry
mEventTarget = aDocument->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other);
MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a valid requestPrincipal");
MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need mSelfURI to translate 'self' into actual URI");
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal,
nsIURI* aSelfURI,
const nsAString& aReferrer,
uint64_t aInnerWindowId) {
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aRequestPrincipal);
mLoadingPrincipal = aRequestPrincipal;
mSelfURI = aSelfURI;
mReferrer = aReferrer;
mInnerWindowID = aInnerWindowId;
// if no document is available, then it also does not make sense to queue
// console messages sending messages to the browser console instead of the web
// console in that case.
mQueueUpMessages = false;
mCallingChannelLoadGroup = nullptr;
mEventTarget = nullptr;
MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a valid requestPrincipal");
MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need mSelfURI to translate 'self' into actual URI");
return NS_OK;
}
nsIPrincipal* nsCSPContext::GetRequestPrincipal() { return mLoadingPrincipal; }
nsIURI* nsCSPContext::GetSelfURI() { return mSelfURI; }
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetReferrer(nsAString& outReferrer) {
outReferrer.Truncate();
outReferrer.Append(mReferrer);
return NS_OK;
}
uint64_t nsCSPContext::GetInnerWindowID() { return mInnerWindowID; }
bool nsCSPContext::GetSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck() {
return mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;
}
void nsCSPContext::SetSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck(
bool aSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck) {
mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck = aSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::EnsureEventTarget(nsIEventTarget* aEventTarget) {
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aEventTarget);
// Don't bother if we did have a valid event target (if the csp object is
// tied to a document in SetRequestContextWithDocument)
if (mEventTarget) {
return NS_OK;
}
mEventTarget = aEventTarget;
return NS_OK;
}
struct ConsoleMsgQueueElem {
nsString mMsg;
nsString mSourceName;
nsString mSourceLine;
uint32_t mLineNumber;
uint32_t mColumnNumber;
uint32_t mSeverityFlag;
nsCString mCategory;
};
void nsCSPContext::flushConsoleMessages() {
bool privateWindow = false;
// should flush messages even if doc is not available
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
if (doc) {
mInnerWindowID = doc->InnerWindowID();
privateWindow =
!!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId;
}
mQueueUpMessages = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mConsoleMsgQueue.Length(); i++) {
ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = mConsoleMsgQueue[i];
CSP_LogMessage(elem.mMsg, elem.mSourceName, elem.mSourceLine,
elem.mLineNumber, elem.mColumnNumber, elem.mSeverityFlag,
elem.mCategory, mInnerWindowID, privateWindow);
}
mConsoleMsgQueue.Clear();
}
void nsCSPContext::logToConsole(const char* aName,
const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
const nsAString& aSourceName,
const nsAString& aSourceLine,
uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber,
uint32_t aSeverityFlag) {
// we are passing aName as the category so we can link to the
// appropriate MDN docs depending on the specific error.
nsDependentCString category(aName);
// let's check if we have to queue up console messages
if (mQueueUpMessages) {
nsAutoString msg;
CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, msg);
ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = *mConsoleMsgQueue.AppendElement();
elem.mMsg = msg;
elem.mSourceName = PromiseFlatString(aSourceName);
elem.mSourceLine = PromiseFlatString(aSourceLine);
elem.mLineNumber = aLineNumber;
elem.mColumnNumber = aColumnNumber;
elem.mSeverityFlag = aSeverityFlag;
elem.mCategory = category;
return;
}
bool privateWindow = false;
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
if (doc) {
privateWindow =
!!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId;
}
CSP_LogLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
aColumnNumber, aSeverityFlag, category, mInnerWindowID,
privateWindow);
}
/**
* Strip URI for reporting according to:
* https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#security-violation-reports
*
* @param aURI
* The URI of the blocked resource. In case of a redirect, this it the
* initial URI the request started out with, not the redirected URI.
* @return The ASCII serialization of the uri to be reported ignoring
* the ref part of the URI.
*/
void StripURIForReporting(nsIURI* aURI, nsACString& outStrippedURI) {
// If the origin of aURI is a globally unique identifier (for example,
// aURI has a scheme of data, blob, or filesystem), then
// return the ASCII serialization of uri’s scheme.
bool isHttpFtpOrWs =
(aURI->SchemeIs("http") || aURI->SchemeIs("https") ||
aURI->SchemeIs("ftp") || aURI->SchemeIs("ws") || aURI->SchemeIs("wss"));
if (!isHttpFtpOrWs) {
// not strictly spec compliant, but what we really care about is
// http/https and also ftp. If it's not http/https or ftp, then treat aURI
// as if it's a globally unique identifier and just return the scheme.
aURI->GetScheme(outStrippedURI);
return;
}
// Return aURI, with any fragment component removed.
aURI->GetSpecIgnoringRef(outStrippedURI);
}
nsresult nsCSPContext::GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
nsIURI* aBlockedURI, const nsACString& aBlockedString, nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
nsAString& aViolatedDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex,
nsAString& aSourceFile, nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum,
uint32_t aColumnNum,
mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
MOZ_ASSERT(ValidateDirectiveName(aViolatedDirective),
"Invalid directive name");
nsresult rv;
// document-uri
nsAutoCString reportDocumentURI;