From 10430364ebb562311ba6a6efa74e0c2298007912 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bhumika Goyal Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 23:47:11 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 01/11] x86/numachip: Add const and __initconst to numachip2_clockevent Make this const as it is only used during a copy operation and add __initconst as this usage is during the initialization phase. Signed-off-by: Bhumika Goyal Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: julia.lawall@lip6.fr Cc: daniel.lezcano@linaro.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1504030631-10812-1-git-send-email-bhumirks@gmail.com --- drivers/clocksource/numachip.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/numachip.c b/drivers/clocksource/numachip.c index 6a20dc8b253f4c..9a7d7f0f23feae 100644 --- a/drivers/clocksource/numachip.c +++ b/drivers/clocksource/numachip.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static int numachip2_set_next_event(unsigned long delta, struct clock_event_devi return 0; } -static struct clock_event_device numachip2_clockevent = { +static const struct clock_event_device numachip2_clockevent __initconst = { .name = "numachip2", .rating = 400, .set_next_event = numachip2_set_next_event, From a3c4fb7c9c2ebfd50b8c60f6c069932bb319bc37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Laurent Dufour Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 10:32:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/11] x86/mm: Fix fault error path using unsafe vma pointer commit 7b2d0dbac489 ("x86/mm/pkeys: Pass VMA down in to fault signal generation code") passes down a vma pointer to the error path, but that is done once the mmap_sem is released when calling mm_fault_error() from __do_page_fault(). This is dangerous as the vma structure is no more safe to be used once the mmap_sem has been released. As only the protection key value is required in the error processing, we could just pass down this value. Fix it by passing a pointer to a protection key value down to the fault signal generation code. The use of a pointer allows to keep the check generating a warning message in fill_sig_info_pkey() when the vma was not known. If the pointer is valid, the protection value can be accessed by deferencing the pointer. [ tglx: Made *pkey u32 as that's the type which is passed in siginfo ] Fixes: 7b2d0dbac489 ("x86/mm/pkeys: Pass VMA down in to fault signal generation code") Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1504513935-12742-1-git-send-email-ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com --- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 39567b5c33da3b..e2baeaa053a5b9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -192,8 +192,7 @@ is_prefetch(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long addr) * 6. T1 : reaches here, sees vma_pkey(vma)=5, when we really * faulted on a pte with its pkey=4. */ -static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_code, siginfo_t *info, - struct vm_area_struct *vma) +static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_code, siginfo_t *info, u32 *pkey) { /* This is effectively an #ifdef */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) @@ -209,7 +208,7 @@ static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_code, siginfo_t *info, * valid VMA, so we should never reach this without a * valid VMA. */ - if (!vma) { + if (!pkey) { WARN_ONCE(1, "PKU fault with no VMA passed in"); info->si_pkey = 0; return; @@ -219,13 +218,12 @@ static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_code, siginfo_t *info, * absolutely guranteed to be 100% accurate because of * the race explained above. */ - info->si_pkey = vma_pkey(vma); + info->si_pkey = *pkey; } static void force_sig_info_fault(int si_signo, int si_code, unsigned long address, - struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct *vma, - int fault) + struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *pkey, int fault) { unsigned lsb = 0; siginfo_t info; @@ -240,7 +238,7 @@ force_sig_info_fault(int si_signo, int si_code, unsigned long address, lsb = PAGE_SHIFT; info.si_addr_lsb = lsb; - fill_sig_info_pkey(si_code, &info, vma); + fill_sig_info_pkey(si_code, &info, pkey); force_sig_info(si_signo, &info, tsk); } @@ -762,8 +760,6 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, struct task_struct *tsk = current; unsigned long flags; int sig; - /* No context means no VMA to pass down */ - struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL; /* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */ if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF)) { @@ -788,7 +784,7 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, /* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */ force_sig_info_fault(signal, si_code, address, - tsk, vma, 0); + tsk, NULL, 0); } /* @@ -896,8 +892,7 @@ show_signal_msg(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, static void __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long address, struct vm_area_struct *vma, - int si_code) + unsigned long address, u32 *pkey, int si_code) { struct task_struct *tsk = current; @@ -945,7 +940,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF; - force_sig_info_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code, address, tsk, vma, 0); + force_sig_info_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code, address, tsk, pkey, 0); return; } @@ -958,9 +953,9 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, static noinline void bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long address, struct vm_area_struct *vma) + unsigned long address, u32 *pkey) { - __bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, vma, SEGV_MAPERR); + __bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, pkey, SEGV_MAPERR); } static void @@ -968,6 +963,10 @@ __bad_area(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, struct vm_area_struct *vma, int si_code) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + u32 pkey; + + if (vma) + pkey = vma_pkey(vma); /* * Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map.. @@ -975,7 +974,8 @@ __bad_area(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, */ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); - __bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, vma, si_code); + __bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, + (vma) ? &pkey : NULL, si_code); } static noinline void @@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ bad_area_access_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, static void do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, - struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int fault) + u32 *pkey, unsigned int fault) { struct task_struct *tsk = current; int code = BUS_ADRERR; @@ -1045,13 +1045,12 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, code = BUS_MCEERR_AR; } #endif - force_sig_info_fault(SIGBUS, code, address, tsk, vma, fault); + force_sig_info_fault(SIGBUS, code, address, tsk, pkey, fault); } static noinline void mm_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long address, struct vm_area_struct *vma, - unsigned int fault) + unsigned long address, u32 *pkey, unsigned int fault) { if (fatal_signal_pending(current) && !(error_code & PF_USER)) { no_context(regs, error_code, address, 0, 0); @@ -1075,9 +1074,9 @@ mm_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, } else { if (fault & (VM_FAULT_SIGBUS|VM_FAULT_HWPOISON| VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE)) - do_sigbus(regs, error_code, address, vma, fault); + do_sigbus(regs, error_code, address, pkey, fault); else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV) - bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, vma); + bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, pkey); else BUG(); } @@ -1267,6 +1266,7 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, struct mm_struct *mm; int fault, major = 0; unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE; + u32 pkey; tsk = current; mm = tsk->mm; @@ -1467,9 +1467,10 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, return; } + pkey = vma_pkey(vma); up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) { - mm_fault_error(regs, error_code, address, vma, fault); + mm_fault_error(regs, error_code, address, &pkey, fault); return; } From 7d7099433d9eaaa5a989a55f1fa354c16a3ad297 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Fu Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2017 08:33:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/11] x86/sysfs: Fix off-by-one error in loop termination An off-by-one error in loop terminantion conditions in create_setup_data_nodes() will lead to memory leak when create_setup_data_node() failed. Signed-off-by: Sean Fu Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1505090001-1157-1-git-send-email-fxinrong@gmail.com --- arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c index 4b0592ca9e47b3..8c1cc08f514f43 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct kobject *parent) return 0; out_clean_nodes: - for (j = i - 1; j > 0; j--) + for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) cleanup_setup_data_node(*(kobjp + j)); kfree(kobjp); out_setup_data_kobj: From 5ac751d9e6b187c4a0000879d6598eb2292db949 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ville=20Syrj=C3=A4l=C3=A4?= Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2017 19:40:00 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 04/11] x86: Don't cast away the __user in __get_user_asm_u64() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Don't cast away the __user in __get_user_asm_u64() on x86-32. Prevents sparse getting upset. Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Benjamin LaHaise Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912164000.13745-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 78e8fcc87d4c62..4b892917edeb78 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ do { \ _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b) \ _ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 4b) \ : "=r" (retval), "=&A"(x) \ - : "m" (__m(__ptr)), "m" __m(((u32 *)(__ptr)) + 1), \ + : "m" (__m(__ptr)), "m" __m(((u32 __user *)(__ptr)) + 1), \ "i" (errret), "0" (retval)); \ }) From b09c146f8f63c0e03adba74df76bf9c2be466fec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kan Liang Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 17:34:47 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 05/11] perf/x86/intel/cstate: Add missing CPU IDs Skylake server uses the same C-state residency events as Sandy Bridge. Denverton and Gemini lake use the same C-state residency events as Apollo Lake. Signed-off-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: piotr.luc@intel.com Cc: harry.pan@intel.com Cc: srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170908213449.6224-1-kan.liang@intel.com --- arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c index 4cf100ff2a3746..72db0664a53dfd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c @@ -552,6 +552,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cstates_match[] __initconst = { X86_CSTATES_MODEL(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, snb_cstates), X86_CSTATES_MODEL(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, snb_cstates), + X86_CSTATES_MODEL(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, snb_cstates), X86_CSTATES_MODEL(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, snb_cstates), X86_CSTATES_MODEL(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, snb_cstates), @@ -560,6 +561,9 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cstates_match[] __initconst = { X86_CSTATES_MODEL(INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM, knl_cstates), X86_CSTATES_MODEL(INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT, glm_cstates), + X86_CSTATES_MODEL(INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON, glm_cstates), + + X86_CSTATES_MODEL(INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, glm_cstates), { }, }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, intel_cstates_match); From 1aaccc40a1864053da26605b0297be16dd52641e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kan Liang Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 17:34:48 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 06/11] perf/x86/msr: Add missing CPU IDs Goldmont, Glodmont plus and Xeon Phi have MSR_SMI_COUNT as well. Signed-off-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: piotr.luc@intel.com Cc: harry.pan@intel.com Cc: srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170908213449.6224-2-kan.liang@intel.com --- arch/x86/events/msr.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/msr.c b/arch/x86/events/msr.c index 4bb3ec69e8ea10..06723671ae4e91 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/msr.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/msr.c @@ -63,6 +63,14 @@ static bool test_intel(int idx) case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1: case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2: case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT: + + case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT: + case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON: + + case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE: + + case INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL: + case INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM: if (idx == PERF_MSR_SMI) return true; break; From 450a97893559354b927c935f39ee11126f01f520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kan Liang Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 17:34:49 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 07/11] perf/x86/intel/rapl: Add missing CPU IDs DENVERTON and GEMINI_LAKE support same RAPL counters as Apollo Lake. Signed-off-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: piotr.luc@intel.com Cc: harry.pan@intel.com Cc: srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170908213449.6224-3-kan.liang@intel.com --- arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c index 8e2457cb6b4a41..005908ee9333f0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c @@ -775,6 +775,9 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id rapl_cpu_match[] __initconst = { X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, skl_rapl_init), X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT, hsw_rapl_init), + X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON, hsw_rapl_init), + + X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, hsw_rapl_init), {}, }; From 29b46dfb136cdbeece542b3f01115237e43f2855 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kan Liang Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2017 10:10:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 08/11] perf/x86/intel/uncore: Correct num_boxes for IIO and IRP There are 6 IIO/IRP boxes for CBDMA, PCIe0-2, MCP 0 and MCP 1 separately. Correct the num_boxes. Signed-off-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: eranian@google.com Cc: acme@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1505149816-12580-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@intel.com --- arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c index db1fe377e6dd9d..a7196818416a57 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c @@ -3462,7 +3462,7 @@ static struct intel_uncore_ops skx_uncore_iio_ops = { static struct intel_uncore_type skx_uncore_iio = { .name = "iio", .num_counters = 4, - .num_boxes = 5, + .num_boxes = 6, .perf_ctr_bits = 48, .event_ctl = SKX_IIO0_MSR_PMON_CTL0, .perf_ctr = SKX_IIO0_MSR_PMON_CTR0, @@ -3492,7 +3492,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group skx_uncore_format_group = { static struct intel_uncore_type skx_uncore_irp = { .name = "irp", .num_counters = 2, - .num_boxes = 5, + .num_boxes = 6, .perf_ctr_bits = 48, .event_ctl = SKX_IRP0_MSR_PMON_CTL0, .perf_ctr = SKX_IRP0_MSR_PMON_CTR0, From 520a13c530aeb5f63e011d668c42db1af19ed349 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 16:58:26 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 09/11] x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4 The kernel test bot (run by Xiaolong Ye) reported that the following commit: f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang") is causing double faults in a kernel compiled with GCC 4.4. Linus subsequently diagnosed the crash pattern and the buggy commit and found that the issue is with this code: register unsigned int __asm_call_sp asm("esp"); #define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (__asm_call_sp) Even on a 64-bit kernel, it's using ESP instead of RSP. That causes GCC to produce the following bogus code: ffffffff8147461d: 89 e0 mov %esp,%eax ffffffff8147461f: 4c 89 f7 mov %r14,%rdi ffffffff81474622: 4c 89 fe mov %r15,%rsi ffffffff81474625: ba 20 00 00 00 mov $0x20,%edx ffffffff8147462a: 89 c4 mov %eax,%esp ffffffff8147462c: e8 bf 52 05 00 callq ffffffff814c98f0 Despite the absurdity of it backing up and restoring the stack pointer for no reason, the bug is actually the fact that it's only backing up and restoring the lower 32 bits of the stack pointer. The upper 32 bits are getting cleared out, corrupting the stack pointer. So change the '__asm_call_sp' register variable to be associated with the actual full-size stack pointer. This also requires changing the __ASM_SEL() macro to be based on the actual compiled arch size, rather than the CONFIG value, because CONFIG_X86_64 compiles some files with '-m32' (e.g., realmode and vdso). Otherwise Clang fails to build the kernel because it complains about the use of a 64-bit register (RSP) in a 32-bit file. Reported-and-Bisected-and-Tested-by: kernel test robot Diagnosed-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov Cc: LKP Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Fixes: f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170928215826.6sdpmwtkiydiytim@treble Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h index c1eadbaf1115a4..30c3c9ac784a6c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h @@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ # define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) " " #x "," #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +#ifndef __x86_64__ +/* 32 bit */ # define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(a) # define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(a) #else +/* 64 bit */ # define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(b) # define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(b) #endif @@ -139,7 +141,7 @@ * gets set up by the containing function. If you forget to do this, objtool * may print a "call without frame pointer save/setup" warning. */ -register unsigned int __asm_call_sp asm("esp"); +register unsigned long __asm_call_sp asm(_ASM_SP); #define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (__asm_call_sp) #endif From bc829ee36e0ec92383c9d9b88fe08f00d4d592f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Lendacky Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 11:24:19 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 10/11] x86/mm: Disable branch profiling in mem_encrypt.c Some routines in mem_encrypt.c are called very early in the boot process, e.g. sme_encrypt_kernel(). When CONFIG_TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING=y is defined the resulting branch profiling associated with the check to see if SME is active results in a kernel crash. Disable branch profiling for mem_encrypt.c by defining DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING before including any header files. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Acked-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929162419.6016.53390.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 3fcc8e01683bef..16c5f37933a2ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ * published by the Free Software Foundation. */ +#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING + #include #include #include From 196bd485ee4f03ce4c690bfcf38138abfcd0a4bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrey Ryabinin Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 17:15:36 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 11/11] x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value Currently we use current_stack_pointer() function to get the value of the stack pointer register. Since commit: f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang") ... we have a stack register variable declared. It can be used instead of current_stack_pointer() function which allows to optimize away some excessive "mov %rsp, %" instructions: -mov %rsp,%rdx -sub %rdx,%rax -cmp $0x3fff,%rax -ja ffffffff810722fd +sub %rsp,%rax +cmp $0x3fff,%rax +ja ffffffff810722fa Remove current_stack_pointer(), rename __asm_call_sp to current_stack_pointer and use it instead of the removed function. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929141537.29167-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 11 ----------- arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h index 30c3c9ac784a6c..b0dc91f4bedc68 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h @@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ * gets set up by the containing function. If you forget to do this, objtool * may print a "call without frame pointer save/setup" warning. */ -register unsigned long __asm_call_sp asm(_ASM_SP); -#define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (__asm_call_sp) +register unsigned long current_stack_pointer asm(_ASM_SP); +#define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (current_stack_pointer) #endif #endif /* _ASM_X86_ASM_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index 5161da1a0fa0a5..89e7eeb5cec1df 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -158,17 +158,6 @@ struct thread_info { */ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ -static inline unsigned long current_stack_pointer(void) -{ - unsigned long sp; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - asm("mov %%rsp,%0" : "=g" (sp)); -#else - asm("mov %%esp,%0" : "=g" (sp)); -#endif - return sp; -} - /* * Walks up the stack frames to make sure that the specified object is * entirely contained by a single stack frame. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c index 1f38d9a4d9deaf..d4eb450144fdb4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void call_on_stack(void *func, void *stack) static inline void *current_stack(void) { - return (void *)(current_stack_pointer() & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)); + return (void *)(current_stack_pointer & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)); } static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(int overflow, struct irq_desc *desc) @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(int overflow, struct irq_desc *desc) /* Save the next esp at the bottom of the stack */ prev_esp = (u32 *)irqstk; - *prev_esp = current_stack_pointer(); + *prev_esp = current_stack_pointer; if (unlikely(overflow)) call_on_stack(print_stack_overflow, isp); @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ void do_softirq_own_stack(void) /* Push the previous esp onto the stack */ prev_esp = (u32 *)irqstk; - *prev_esp = current_stack_pointer(); + *prev_esp = current_stack_pointer; call_on_stack(__do_softirq, isp); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 34ea3651362ef8..67db4f43309eca 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ void ist_begin_non_atomic(struct pt_regs *regs) * from double_fault. */ BUG_ON((unsigned long)(current_top_of_stack() - - current_stack_pointer()) >= THREAD_SIZE); + current_stack_pointer) >= THREAD_SIZE); preempt_enable_no_resched(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 93fe97cce5819f..49d9778376d774 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, * mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly * map it. */ - unsigned int index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer()); + unsigned int index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer); pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + index; if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd)))