The jailer is designed to work only with statically linked binaries (with the default musl toolchain) and will not work with experimental gnu builds.
The jailer is invoked in this manner:
jailer --id <id> \
--node <numa_node>\
--exec-file <exec_file> \
--uid <uid> \
--gid <gid>
[--cgroup <cgroup>]
[--chroot-base-dir <chroot_base>]
[--netns <netns>]
[--daemonize]
[--...extra arguments for Firecracker]
id
is the unique VM identification string, which may contain alphanumeric characters and hyphens. The maximumid
length is currently 64 characters.numa_node
represents the NUMA node the process gets assigned to. More details are available below.exec_file
is the path to the Firecracker binary that will be exec-ed by the jailer. The user can provide a path to any binary, but the interaction with the jailer is mostly Firecracker specific.uid
andgid
are the uid and gid the jailer switches to as it execs the target binary.cgroup
cgroups can be passed to the jailer to let it set the values when the microVM process is spawned. The--cgroup
argument must follow this format:<cgroup_file>=<value>
(e.g cpuset.cpus=0). This argument can be used multiple times to set multiple cgroups. This is useful to avoid providing privileged permissions to another process for setting the cgroups before or after the jailer is executed. The--cgroup
flag can help as well to set Firecracker process cgroups before the VM starts running, with no need to create the entire cgroup hierarchy manually (which requires privileged permissions).chroot_base
represents the base folder where chroot jails are built. The default is/srv/jailer
.netns
represents the path to a network namespace handle. If present, the jailer will use this to join the associated network namespace.- When present, the
--daemonize
flag causes the jailer to calsetsid()
and redirect all three standard I/O file descriptors to/dev/null
. - The jailer adheres to the "end of command options" convention, meaning
all parameters specified after
--
are forwarded to Firecracker. For example, this can be paired with the--config-file
Firecracker argument to specify a configuration file when starting Firecracker via the jailer (the file path and the resources referenced within must be valid relative to a jailed Firecracker). Another argument that can be passed in this way is--seccomp-level
, which specifies whether seccomp filters should be installed and how restrictive they should be. Possible values are:- 0 : disabled.
- 1 : basic filtering. This prohibits syscalls not whitelisted by Firecracker.
- 2 (default): advanced filtering. This adds further checks on some of the
parameters of the allowed syscalls.
Please note the jailer already passes
--id
parameter to the Firecracker process.
After starting, the Jailer goes through the following operations:
- Validate all provided paths and the VM
id
. - Close all open file descriptors based on
/proc/<jailer-pid>/fd
except input, output and error. - Create the
<chroot_base>/<exec_file_name>/<id>/root
folder, which will be henceforth referred to aschroot_dir
.exec_file_name
is the last path component ofexec_file
(for example, that would befirecracker
for/usr/bin/firecracker
). Nothing is done if the path already exists (it should not, sinceid
is supposed to be unique). - Copy
exec_file
to<chroot_base>/<exec_file_name>/<id>/root/<exec_file_name>
. - Create the
cgroup
sub-folders. At the moment, the jailer usescgroup v1
. On most systems, this is mounted by default in/sys/fs/cgroup
(should be mounted by the user otherwise). The jailer will parse/proc/mounts
to detect where each of the controllers required in--cgroup
can be found (multiple controllers may share the same path). For each identified location (referred to as<cgroup_base>
), the jailer creates the<cgroup_base>/<exec_file_name>/<id>
subfolder, and writes the current pid to<cgroup_base>/<exec_file_name>/<id>/tasks
. Also, the value passed for each<cgroup_file>
is written to the file. If--node
is used the corresponding values are written to the appropriatecpuset.mems
andcpuset.cpus
files. - Call
unshare()
into a new mount namespace, usepivot_root()
to switch the old system root mount point with a new one base inchroot_dir
, switch the current working directory to the new root, unmount the old root mount point, and callchroot
into the current directory. - Use
mknod
to create a/dev/net/tun
equivalent inside the jail. - Use
mknod
to create a/dev/kvm
equivalent inside the jail. - Use
chown
to change ownership of thechroot_dir
(root path/
as seen by the jailed firecracker),/dev/net/tun
,/dev/kvm
. The ownership is changed to the provideduid:gid
. - If
--netns <netns>
is present, attempt to join the specified network namespace. - If
--daemonize
is specified, callsetsid()
and redirectSTDIN
,STDOUT
, andSTDERR
to/dev/null
. - Drop privileges via setting the provided
uid
andgid
. - Exec into
<exec_file_name> --id=<id> --start-time-us=<opaque> --start-time-cpu-us=<opaque>
(and also forward any extra arguments provided to the jailer after--
, as mentioned in the Jailer Usage section), where:id
: (string
) - Theid
argument provided to jailer.opaque
: (number
) time calculated by the jailer that it spent doing its work.
Let’s assume Firecracker is available as /usr/bin/firecracker
, and the jailer
can be found at /usr/bin/jailer
. We pick the unique id
551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234, and we choose to run on NUMA node
0 (in order to isolate the process in the 0th NUMA node we need to set cpuset.mems=0
and cpuset.cpus
equals to the CPUs of that NUMA node), using uid 123,
and gid 100. For this example, we are content with the default /srv/jailer
chroot base dir.
We start by running:
/usr/bin/jailer --id 551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234
--cgroup cpuset.mems=0 --cgroup cpuset.cpus=$(cat /sys/devices/system/node/node0/cpulist)
--exec-file /usr/bin/firecracker --uid 123 --gid 100 \
--netns /var/run/netns/my_netns --daemonize
After opening the file descriptors mentioned in the previous section, the jailer will create the following resources (and all their prerequisites, such as the path which contains them):
/srv/jailer/firecracker/551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234/root/firecracker
(copied from/usr/bin/firecracker
)
We are going to refer to
/srv/jailer/firecracker/551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234/root
as <chroot_dir>
.
Let’s also assume the, cpuset cgroups are mounted at
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset
. The jailer will create the following subfolder
(which will inherit settings from the parent cgroup):
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset/firecracker/551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234
It’s worth noting that, whenever a folder already exists, nothing will be done,
and we move on to the next directory that needs to be created. This should only
happen for the common firecracker
subfolder (but, as for creating the chroot
path before, we do not issue an error if folders directly associated with the
supposedly unique id
already exist).
The jailer then writes the current pid to
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset/firecracker/551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234/tasks
,
It also writes 0
to
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset/firecracker/551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234/cpuset.mems
,
And the corresponding CPUs to
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset/firecracker/551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234/cpuset.cpus
.
Since the --netns
parameter is specified in our example, the jailer opens
/var/run/netns/my_netns
to get a file descriptor fd
, uses
setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNET)
to join the associated network namespace, and then
closes fd
.
The --daemonize
flag is also present, so the jailers opens /dev/null
as
RW and keeps the associate file descriptor as dev_null_fd
(we do this
before going inside the jail), to be used later.
Build the chroot jail. First, the jailer uses unshare()
to enter a new mount
namespace, and changes the propagation of all mount points in the new namespace
to private using mount(NULL, “/”, NULL, MS_PRIVATE | MS_REC, NULL)
, as a
prerequisite to pivot_root()
. Another required operation is to bind mount
<chroot_dir>
on top of itself using mount(<chroot_dir>, <chroot_dir>, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL)
. At this point, the jailer creates the folder
<chroot_dir>/old_root
, changes the current directory to <chroot_dir>
,
and calls syscall(SYS_pivot_root, “.”, “old_root”)
. The final steps of
building the jail are unmounting old_root
using umount2(“old_root”, MNT_DETACH)
, deleting old_root
with rmdir
, and finally calling
chroot(“.”)
for good measure. From now, the process is jailed in
<chroot_dir>
.
Create the special file /dev/net/tun
, using mknod(“/dev/net/tun”, S_IFCHR | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, makedev(10, 200))
, and then call chown(“/dev/net/tun”, 123, 100)
, so Firecracker can use it after dropping privileges. This is
required to use multiple TAP interfaces when running jailed. Do the same for
/dev/kvm
.
Change ownership of <chroot_dir>
to uid:gid
so that Firecracker can create
its API socket there.
Since the --daemonize
flag is present, call setsid()
to join a new
session, a new process group, and to detach from the controlling terminal.
Then, redirect standard file descriptors to /dev/null
by calling
dup2(dev_null_fd, STDIN)
, dup2(dev_null_fd, STDOUT)
, and dup2(dev_null_fd, STDERR)
. Close dev_null_fd
, because it is no longer necessary.
Finally, the jailer switches the uid
to 123
, and gid
to 100
, and execs
./firecracker \
--id="551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234" \
--start-time-us=<opaque> \
--start-time-cpu-us=<opaque>
Now firecracker creates the socket at
/srv/jailer/firecracker/551e7604-e35c-42b3-b825-416853441234/root/<api-sock>
to interact with the VM.
Note: default value for is /run/firecracker.socket
- The user must create hard links for (or copy) any resources which will be provided to the VM via the API (disk images, kernel images, named pipes, etc) inside the jailed root folder. Also, permissions must be properly managed for these resources; for example the user which Firecracker runs as must have both read and write permissions to the backing file for a RW block device.
- By default the VMs are not asigned to any NUMA node or pinned to any CPU.
The user must manage any fine tuning of resource partitioning via
cgroups, by using the
--cgroup
command line argument or by using the--node
argument. - It’s up to the user to handle cleanup after running the jailer. One way to do
this involves registering handlers with the cgroup
notify_on_release
mechanism, while being wary about potential race conditions (the instance crashing before the subscription process is complete, for example). - For extra resilience, the jailer expects to be spawned by the user in a new
PID namespace, most likely via a combination of
clone()
with theCLONE_NEWPID
flag andexec()
. A process must be created in a new PID namespace in order to become a pseudo-init process, and the other option is to use aclone()
in the jailer, which seems unnecessary. - When running with
--daemonize
, the jailer will fail to start if it's a process group leader, becausesetsid()
returns an error in this case. Spawning the jailer viaclone()
andexec()
also ensures it cannot be a process group leader. - We run the jailer as the
root
user; it actually requires a more restricted set of capabilities, but that's to be determined as features stabilize. - The jailer can only log messages to stdout/err for now, which is why the
logic associated with
--daemonize
runs towards the end, instead of the very beginning. We are working on adding better logging capabilities.
- If all the cgroup controllers are bunched up on a single mount point using the "all" option, our current program logic will complain it cannot detect individual controller mount points.