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ssh-agent.c
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/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.278 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* The authentication agent program.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
# include <sys/un.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
# include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
#ifndef DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS
# define DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
#endif
/* Maximum accepted message length */
#define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024)
/* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */
#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN (4096)
typedef enum {
AUTH_UNUSED = 0,
AUTH_SOCKET = 1,
AUTH_CONNECTION = 2,
} sock_type;
typedef struct socket_entry {
int fd;
sock_type type;
struct sshbuf *input;
struct sshbuf *output;
struct sshbuf *request;
} SocketEntry;
u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
typedef struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
struct sshkey *key;
char *comment;
char *provider;
time_t death;
u_int confirm;
char *sk_provider;
} Identity;
struct idtable {
int nentries;
TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
};
/* private key table */
struct idtable *idtab;
int max_fd = 0;
/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
pid_t parent_pid = -1;
time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
/* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
static char *allowed_providers;
/* locking */
#define LOCK_SIZE 32
#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16
#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1
int locked = 0;
u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE];
u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
extern char *__progname;
/* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */
static int lifetime = 0;
static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
/* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */
static int restrict_websafe = 1;
static void
close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
{
close(e->fd);
sshbuf_free(e->input);
sshbuf_free(e->output);
sshbuf_free(e->request);
memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e));
e->fd = -1;
e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
}
static void
idtab_init(void)
{
idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab));
TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist);
idtab->nentries = 0;
}
static void
free_identity(Identity *id)
{
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->provider);
free(id->comment);
free(id->sk_provider);
free(id);
}
/* return matching private key for given public key */
static Identity *
lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key)
{
Identity *id;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key))
return (id);
}
return (NULL);
}
/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
static int
confirm_key(Identity *id, const char *extra)
{
char *p;
int ret = -1;
p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (p != NULL &&
ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.%s%s",
id->comment, p,
extra == NULL ? "" : "\n", extra == NULL ? "" : extra))
ret = 0;
free(p);
return (ret);
}
static void
send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ?
SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "compose");
}
/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
static void
process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
debug2_f("entering");
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, idtab->nentries)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "compose");
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, msg,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "compose key/comment");
continue;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static char *
agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
{
if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
return "rsa-sha2-256";
else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
return "rsa-sha2-512";
} else if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
return "[email protected]";
else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
return "[email protected]";
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSH publickey userauth
* request, checking its contents for consistency and matching the embedded
* key against the one that is being used for signing.
* Note: does not modify msg buffer.
* Optionally extract the username and session ID from the request.
*/
static int
parse_userauth_request(struct sshbuf *msg, const struct sshkey *expected_key,
char **userp, struct sshbuf **sess_idp)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sess_id = NULL;
char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
int r;
u_char t, sig_follows;
struct sshkey *mkey = NULL;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (sess_idp != NULL)
*sess_idp = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");
/* SSH userauth request */
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(b, &sess_id)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshbuf_len(sess_id) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &t)) != 0 || /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0 || /* server user */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &service, NULL)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &method, NULL)) != 0 || /* method */
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_follows)) != 0 || /* sig-follows */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
(r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) != 0) /* key */
goto out;
if (t != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST ||
sig_follows != 1 ||
strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0 ||
!sshkey_equal(expected_key, mkey) ||
sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg) != expected_key->type) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(method, "publickey") != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
debug3_f("well formed userauth");
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (sess_idp != NULL) {
*sess_idp = sess_id;
sess_id = NULL;
}
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
sshbuf_free(sess_id);
free(user);
free(service);
free(method);
free(pkalg);
sshkey_free(mkey);
return r;
}
/*
* Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSHSIG signature request.
* Note: does not modify buffer.
*/
static int
parse_sshsig_request(struct sshbuf *msg)
{
int r;
struct sshbuf *b;
if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");
if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* namespace */
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* hashalg */
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) /* H(msg) */
goto out;
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/*
* This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a
* web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:".
* It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations
* (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges
* for the web.
*/
static int
check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data)
{
if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, NULL, NULL) == 0) {
debug_f("signed data matches public key userauth request");
return 1;
}
if (parse_sshsig_request(data) == 0) {
debug_f("signed data matches SSHSIG signature request");
return 1;
}
/* XXX check CA signature operation */
error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message");
return 0;
}
/* ssh2 only */
static void
process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
{
u_char *signature = NULL;
size_t slen = 0;
u_int compat = 0, flags;
int r, ok = -1;
char *fp = NULL;
struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct identity *id;
struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
debug_f("entering");
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (data = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->request, data)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse");
goto send;
}
if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
verbose_f("%s key not found", sshkey_type(key));
goto send;
}
if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, NULL) != 0) {
verbose_f("user refused key");
goto send;
}
if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) {
if (strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 &&
!check_websafe_message_contents(key, data)) {
/* error already logged */
goto send;
}
if ((id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
notifier = notify_start(0,
"Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
}
}
/* XXX support PIN required FIDO keys */
if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(data), sshbuf_len(data), agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
id->sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "sshkey_sign");
goto send;
}
/* Success */
ok = 0;
send:
notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed");
if (ok == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "compose");
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "compose failure");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
sshbuf_free(data);
sshbuf_free(msg);
sshkey_free(key);
free(fp);
free(signature);
}
/* shared */
static void
process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e)
{
int r, success = 0;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
Identity *id;
debug2_f("entering");
if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse key");
goto done;
}
if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
debug_f("key not found");
goto done;
}
/* We have this key, free it. */
if (idtab->nentries < 1)
fatal_f("internal error: nentries %d", idtab->nentries);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
success = 1;
done:
sshkey_free(key);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
debug2_f("entering");
/* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
}
/* Mark that there are no identities. */
idtab->nentries = 0;
/* Send success. */
send_status(e, 1);
}
/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
static time_t
reaper(void)
{
time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime();
Identity *id, *nxt;
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
if (id->death == 0)
continue;
if (now >= id->death) {
debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
} else
deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
MINIMUM(deadline, id->death);
}
if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
return 0;
else
return (deadline - now);
}
static int
parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp)
{
char *ext_name = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &ext_name, NULL)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse constraint extension");
goto out;
}
debug_f("constraint ext %s", ext_name);
if (strcmp(ext_name, "[email protected]") == 0) {
if (sk_providerp == NULL) {
error_f("%s not valid here", ext_name);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (*sk_providerp != NULL) {
error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, sk_providerp, NULL)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse %s", ext_name);
goto out;
}
} else {
error_f("unsupported constraint \"%s\"", ext_name);
r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(ext_name);
return r;
}
static int
parse_key_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey *k, time_t *deathp,
u_int *secondsp, int *confirmp, char **sk_providerp)
{
u_char ctype;
int r;
u_int seconds, maxsign = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(m)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ctype)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse constraint type");
goto out;
}
switch (ctype) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if (*deathp != 0) {
error_f("lifetime already set");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &seconds)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse lifetime constraint");
goto out;
}
*deathp = monotime() + seconds;
*secondsp = seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
if (*confirmp != 0) {
error_f("confirm already set");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
*confirmp = 1;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN:
if (k == NULL) {
error_f("maxsign not valid here");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (maxsign != 0) {
error_f("maxsign already set");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxsign)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse maxsign constraint");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "enable maxsign");
goto out;
}
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION:
if ((r = parse_key_constraint_extension(m,
sk_providerp)) != 0)
goto out; /* error already logged */
break;
default:
error_f("Unknown constraint %d", ctype);
r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
static void
process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
int success = 0, confirm = 0;
char *fp, *comment = NULL, *sk_provider = NULL;
char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
time_t death = 0;
u_int seconds = 0;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
debug2_f("entering");
if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
k == NULL ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse");
goto out;
}
if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, k, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
&sk_provider) != 0) {
error_f("failed to parse constraints");
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
goto out;
}
if (sk_provider != NULL) {
if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) {
error("Cannot add provider: %s is not an "
"authenticator-hosted key", sshkey_type(k));
goto out;
}
if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
debug_f("internal provider");
} else {
if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
"realpath: %s", sk_provider,
strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
free(sk_provider);
sk_provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
if (match_pattern_list(sk_provider,
allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
error("Refusing add key: "
"provider %s not allowed", sk_provider);
goto out;
}
}
}
if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "shield private");
goto out;
}
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
/* Increment the number of identities. */
idtab->nentries++;
} else {
/* key state might have been updated */
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->comment);
free(id->sk_provider);
}
/* success */
id->key = k;
id->comment = comment;
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
id->sk_provider = sk_provider;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
debug_f("add %s %s \"%.100s\" (life: %u) (confirm: %u) "
"(provider: %s)", sshkey_ssh_name(k), fp, comment, seconds,
confirm, sk_provider == NULL ? "none" : sk_provider);
free(fp);
/* transferred */
k = NULL;
comment = NULL;
sk_provider = NULL;
success = 1;
out:
free(sk_provider);
free(comment);
sshkey_free(k);
send_status(e, success);
}
/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
static void
process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
{
int r, success = 0, delay;
char *passwd;
u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
static u_int fail_count = 0;
size_t pwlen;
debug2_f("entering");
/*
* This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock,
* but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to
* do is abort.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (pwlen == 0) {
debug("empty password not supported");
} else if (locked && !lock) {
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
debug("agent unlocked");
locked = 0;
fail_count = 0;
explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash));
success = 1;
} else {
/* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
if (fail_count < 100)
fail_count++;
delay = 100000 * fail_count;
debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
(double)delay/1000000);
usleep(delay);
}
explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
} else if (!locked && lock) {
debug("agent locked");
locked = 1;
arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
success = 1;
}
freezero(passwd, pwlen);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "compose");
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
static void
process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
char **comments = NULL;
int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds = 0;
time_t death = 0;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
debug2_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse");
goto send;
}
if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, NULL, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
NULL) != 0) {
error_f("failed to parse constraints");
goto send;
}
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
"provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
goto send;
}
debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider);
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
if (*comments[i] != '\0') {
id->comment = comments[i];
comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
} else {
id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
}
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
idtab->nentries++;
success = 1;
}
/* XXX update constraints for existing keys */
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
free(comments[i]);
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
free(comments);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
int r, success = 0;
Identity *id, *nxt;
debug2_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "parse");
goto send;
}
free(pin);
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
debug_f("remove %.100s", canonical_provider);
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
/* Skip file--based keys */
if (id->provider == NULL)
continue;
if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
}
}
if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
success = 1;
else
error_f("pkcs11_del_provider failed");
send:
free(provider);
send_status(e, success);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
/*
* dispatch incoming message.
* returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error.
*/
static int
process_message(u_int socknum)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_char type;
const u_char *cp;
int r;
SocketEntry *e;
if (socknum >= sockets_alloc)
fatal_f("sock %u >= allocated %u", socknum, sockets_alloc);
e = &sockets[socknum];
if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5)
return 0; /* Incomplete message header. */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input);
msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp);
if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) {
debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u",
socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN);
return -1;
}
if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4)
return 0; /* Incomplete message body. */
/* move the current input to e->request */
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE ||
r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) {
error_fr(r, "parse");
return -1;
}
fatal_fr(r, "parse");
}