This document describes the steps involved to build Core Lightning in a reproducible way. Reproducible builds close the final gap in the lifecycle of open-source projects by allowing maintainers to verify and certify that a given binary was indeed produced by compiling an unmodified version of the publicly available source. In particular the maintainer certifies that the binary corresponds a) to the exact version of the and b) that no malicious changes have been applied before or after the compilation.
Core Lightning has provided a manifest of the binaries included in a release, along with signatures from the maintainers since version 0.6.2.
The steps involved in creating reproducible builds are:
- Creation of a known environment in which to build the source code
- Removal of variance during the compilation (randomness, timestamps, etc)
- Packaging of binaries
- Creation of a manifest (
SHA256SUMS
file containing the crytographic hashes of the binaries and packages) - Signing of the manifest by maintainers and volunteers that have reproduced the files in the manifest starting from the source.
The bulk of these operations is handled by the repro-build.sh
script, but some manual operations are required to setup the build
environment. Since a binary is built against platorm specific libraries we
also need to replicate the steps once for each OS distribution and
architecture, so the majority of this guide will describe how to set up those
starting from a minimal trusted base. This minimal trusted base in most cases
is the official installation medium from the OS provider.
Note: Since your signature certifies the integrity of the resulting binaries,
please familiarize youself with both the repro-build.sh
script, as
well as with the setup instructions for the build environments before signing
anything.
The build environments are a set of docker images that are created directly from the installation mediums and repositories from the OS provider. The following sections describe how to create those images. Don't worry, you only have to create each image once and can then reuse the images for future builds.
Depending on the distribution that we want to build for the instructions to create a base image can vary. In the following sections we discuss the specific instructions for each distribution, whereas the instructions are identical again once we have the base image.
For operating systems derived from Debian we can use the debootstrap
tool to
build a minimal OS image, that can then be transformed into a docker
image. The packages for the minimal OS image are directly downloaded from the
installation repositories operated by the OS provider.
We cannot really use the debian
and ubuntu
images from the docker hub,
mainly because it'd be yet another trusted third party, but it is also
complicated by the fact that the images have some of the packages updated. The
latter means that if we disable the updates
and security
repositories for
apt
we find ourselves in a situation where we can't install any additional
packages (wrongly updated packages depending on the versions not available in
the non-updated repos).
The following table lists the codenames of distributions that we currently support:
Distribution Version | Codename |
---|---|
Ubuntu 18.04 | bionic |
Ubuntu 20.04 | focal |
Ubuntu 22.04 | jammy |
Depending on your host OS release you migh not have debootstrap
manifests for versions newer than your host OS. Due to this we run the
debootstrap
commands in a container of the latest version itself:
for v in bionic focal jammy; do
echo "Building base image for $v"
sudo docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/build ubuntu:22.04 \
bash -c "apt-get update && apt-get install -y debootstrap && debootstrap $v /build/$v"
sudo tar -C $v -c . | sudo docker import - $v
done
Verify that the image corresponds to our expectation and is runnable:
sudo docker run bionic cat /etc/lsb-release
Which should result in the following output for bionic
:
DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu
DISTRIB_RELEASE=18.04
DISTRIB_CODENAME=bionic
DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 18.04 LTS"
Once we have the clean base image we need to customize it to be able to build Core Lightning. This includes disabling the update repositories, downloading the build dependencies and specifying the steps required to perform the build.
For this purpose we have a number of Dockerfiles in the
contrib/reprobuild
directory that have the specific
instructions for each base image.
We can then build the builder image by calling docker build
and passing it
the Dockerfile
:
sudo docker build -t cl-repro-bionic - < contrib/reprobuild/Dockerfile.bionic
sudo docker build -t cl-repro-focal - < contrib/reprobuild/Dockerfile.focal
sudo docker build -t cl-repro-jammy - < contrib/reprobuild/Dockerfile.jammy
Since we pass the Dockerfile
through stdin
the build command will not
create a context, i.e., the current directory is not passed to docker
and
it'll be independent of the currently checked out version. This also means
that you will be able to reuse the docker image for future builds, and don't
have to repeat this dance every time. Verifying the Dockerfile
therefore is
sufficient to ensure that the resulting cl-repro-<codename>
image is
reproducible.
The dockerfiles assume that the base image has the codename as its image name.
Finally, after this rather lengthy setup we can perform the actual build. At
this point we have a container image that has been prepared to build
reproducibly. As you can see from the Dockerfile
above we assume the source
git repository gets mounted as /repo
in the docker container. The container
will clone the repository to an internal path, in order to keep the repository
clean, build the artifacts there, and then copy them back to
/repo/release
. We can simply execute the following command inside the git
repository (remember to checkout the tag you are trying to build):
sudo docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/repo -ti cl-repro-bionic
sudo docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/repo -ti cl-repro-focal
sudo docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/repo -ti cl-repro-jammy
The last few lines of output also contain the sha256sum
hashes of all
artifacts, so if you're just verifying the build those are the lines that are
of interest to you:
ee83cf4948228ab1f644dbd9d28541fd8ef7c453a3fec90462b08371a8686df8 /repo/release/clightning-v0.9.0rc1-Ubuntu-18.04.tar.xz
94bd77f400c332ac7571532c9f85b141a266941057e8fe1bfa04f054918d8c33 /repo/release/clightning-v0.9.0rc1.zip
Repeat this step for each distribution and each architecture you wish to
sign. Once all the binaries are in the release/
subdirectory we can sign the
hashes:
The release captain is in charge of creating the manifest, whereas contributors and interested bystanders may contribute their signatures to further increase trust in the binaries.
The release captain creates the manifest as follows:
cd release/
sha256sum *v0.9.0* > SHA256SUMS
gpg -sb --armor SHA256SUMS
Co-maintainers and contributors wishing to add their own signature verify that
the SHA256SUMS
and SHA256SUMS.asc
files created by the release captain
matches their binaries before also signing the manifest:
cd release/
gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
cat SHA256SUMS | gpg -sb --armor > SHA256SUMS.new
Then send the resulting SHA256SUMS.new
file to the release captain so it can
be merged with the other signatures into SHASUMS.asc
.
You can verify the reproducible build in two ways:
- Repeating the entire reproducible build, making sure from scratch that the binaries match. Just follow the instructions above for this.
- Verifying that the downloaded binaries match match the hashes in
SHA256SUMS
and that the signatures inSHA256SUMS.asc
are valid.
Assuming you have downloaded the binaries, the manifest and the signatures into the same directory, you can verify the signatures with the following:
gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc
And you should see a list of messages like the following:
gpg: assuming signed data in 'SHA256SUMS'
gpg: Signature made Fr 08 Mai 2020 07:46:38 CEST
gpg: using RSA key 15EE8D6CAB0E7F0CF999BFCBD9200E6CD1ADB8F1
gpg: Good signature from "Rusty Russell <[email protected]>" [full]
gpg: Signature made Fr 08 Mai 2020 12:30:10 CEST
gpg: using RSA key B7C4BE81184FC203D52C35C51416D83DC4F0E86D
gpg: Good signature from "Christian Decker <[email protected]>" [ultimate]
gpg: Signature made Fr 08 Mai 2020 21:35:28 CEST
gpg: using RSA key 30DE693AE0DE9E37B3E7EB6BBFF0F67810C1EED1
gpg: Good signature from "Lisa Neigut <[email protected]>" [full]
If there are any issues gpg
will print Bad signature
, it might be because
the signatures in SHA256SUMS.asc
do not match the SHA256SUMS
file, and
could be the result of a filename change. Do not continue using the binaries,
and contact the maintainers, if this is not the case, a failure here means
that the verification failed.
Next we verify that the binaries match the ones in the manifest:
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
Producing output similar to the following:
sha256sum: clightning-v0.9.0-Fedora-28-amd64.tar.gz: No such file or directory
clightning-v0.9.0-Fedora-28-amd64.tar.gz: FAILED open or read
clightning-v0.9.0-Ubuntu-18.04.tar.xz: OK
clightning-v0.9.0.zip: OK
sha256sum: WARNING: 1 listed file could not be read
Notice that the two files we downloaded are marked as OK
, but we're missing
one file. If you didn't download that file this is to be expected, and is
nothing to worry about. A failure to verify the hash would give a warning like
the following:
sha256sum: WARNING: 1 computed checksum did NOT match
If both the signature verification and the manifest checksum verification succeeded, then you have just successfully verified a reproducible build and, assuming you trust the maintainers, are good to install and use the binaries. Congratulations! 🎉🥳