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sshdh.c
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sshdh.c
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/*
* Diffie-Hellman implementation for PuTTY.
*/
#include "ssh.h"
/*
* The primes used in the group1 and group14 key exchange.
*/
static const unsigned char P1[] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
static const unsigned char P14[] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36,
0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56,
0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08,
0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2,
0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C,
0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
/*
* The generator g = 2 (used for both group1 and group14).
*/
static const unsigned char G[] = { 2 };
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group1_sha1 = {
"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1", "group1",
KEXTYPE_DH, P1, G, lenof(P1), lenof(G), &ssh_sha1
};
static const struct ssh_kex *const group1_list[] = {
&ssh_diffiehellman_group1_sha1
};
const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group1 = {
sizeof(group1_list) / sizeof(*group1_list),
group1_list
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha1 = {
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1", "group14",
KEXTYPE_DH, P14, G, lenof(P14), lenof(G), &ssh_sha1
};
static const struct ssh_kex *const group14_list[] = {
&ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha1
};
const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group14 = {
sizeof(group14_list) / sizeof(*group14_list),
group14_list
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha256 = {
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256", NULL,
KEXTYPE_DH, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, &ssh_sha256
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha1 = {
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1", NULL,
KEXTYPE_DH, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, &ssh_sha1
};
static const struct ssh_kex *const gex_list[] = {
&ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha256,
&ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha1
};
const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_gex = {
sizeof(gex_list) / sizeof(*gex_list),
gex_list
};
/*
* Variables.
*/
struct dh_ctx {
Bignum x, e, p, q, qmask, g;
};
/*
* Common DH initialisation.
*/
static void dh_init(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
{
ctx->q = bignum_rshift(ctx->p, 1);
ctx->qmask = bignum_bitmask(ctx->q);
ctx->x = ctx->e = NULL;
}
/*
* Initialise DH for a standard group.
*/
void *dh_setup_group(const struct ssh_kex *kex)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
ctx->p = bignum_from_bytes(kex->pdata, kex->plen);
ctx->g = bignum_from_bytes(kex->gdata, kex->glen);
dh_init(ctx);
return ctx;
}
/*
* Initialise DH for a server-supplied group.
*/
void *dh_setup_gex(Bignum pval, Bignum gval)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
ctx->p = copybn(pval);
ctx->g = copybn(gval);
dh_init(ctx);
return ctx;
}
/*
* Clean up and free a context.
*/
void dh_cleanup(void *handle)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
freebn(ctx->x);
freebn(ctx->e);
freebn(ctx->p);
freebn(ctx->g);
freebn(ctx->q);
freebn(ctx->qmask);
sfree(ctx);
}
/*
* DH stage 1: invent a number x between 1 and q, and compute e =
* g^x mod p. Return e.
*
* If `nbits' is greater than zero, it is used as an upper limit
* for the number of bits in x. This is safe provided that (a) you
* use twice as many bits in x as the number of bits you expect to
* use in your session key, and (b) the DH group is a safe prime
* (which SSH demands that it must be).
*
* P. C. van Oorschot, M. J. Wiener
* "On Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement with Short Exponents".
* Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurocrypt '96
* Springer-Verlag, May 1996.
*/
Bignum dh_create_e(void *handle, int nbits)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
int i;
int nbytes;
unsigned char *buf;
nbytes = ssh1_bignum_length(ctx->qmask);
buf = snewn(nbytes, unsigned char);
do {
/*
* Create a potential x, by ANDing a string of random bytes
* with qmask.
*/
if (ctx->x)
freebn(ctx->x);
if (nbits == 0 || nbits > bignum_bitcount(ctx->qmask)) {
ssh1_write_bignum(buf, ctx->qmask);
for (i = 2; i < nbytes; i++)
buf[i] &= random_byte();
ssh1_read_bignum(buf, nbytes, &ctx->x); /* can't fail */
} else {
int b, nb;
ctx->x = bn_power_2(nbits);
b = nb = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
if (nb == 0) {
nb = 8;
b = random_byte();
}
bignum_set_bit(ctx->x, i, b & 1);
b >>= 1;
nb--;
}
}
} while (bignum_cmp(ctx->x, One) <= 0 || bignum_cmp(ctx->x, ctx->q) >= 0);
sfree(buf);
/*
* Done. Now compute e = g^x mod p.
*/
ctx->e = modpow(ctx->g, ctx->x, ctx->p);
return ctx->e;
}
/*
* DH stage 2: given a number f, compute K = f^x mod p.
*/
Bignum dh_find_K(void *handle, Bignum f)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
Bignum ret;
ret = modpow(f, ctx->x, ctx->p);
return ret;
}