The tpm_futurepcr script allows guessing what the future PCR[4] value will be after a kernel upgrade, before you reboot. This is useful when your rootfs is LUKS-encrypted with a key sealed by the TPM against PCR[4] (among others).
This script only recognizes measurements done by native UEFI LoadImage() – i.e. hashes of PE/COFF executables such as vmlinuz.efi. (Although it does parse the TPM 1.2 event log, it does not (yet) recognize measurements done by TrustedGRUB on BIOS systems, and in fact I'm not entirely sure whether the entire premise of sealing data against user-specified PCR values is even possible in the TPM 1.2 API.)
As an additional hack, this script also recognizes systemd-boot and updates PCR[8] according to the future kernel command line.
This script will understand the event log in both SHA1-only (TPM 1.2) and Crypto-Agile (TPM 2.0, Linux kernel 5.3+) formats.
Neither systemd-boot nor EFISTUB currently measure the initramfs images. It is not safe to rely on PCR[4] unless you are using a combined kernel+initramfs file (such as the one produced by mksignkernels), or you are using a bootloader which measures the initramfs separately.
- python-signify (for calculating Authenticode digests)
- tpm2-tools (for reading current PCR values)
python setup.py install
Normally sealing data against PCRs starts by creating a "policy" which specifies the PCR values. In the Intel TPM 2.0 stack, this is done with tpm2_createpolicy:
tpm2_createpolicy -P -L sha256:0,2,4,7 -f policy.bin
This automatically uses current PCR values, and can be written to do so explicitly:
tpm2_pcrlist -L sha256:0,2,4,7 -Q -o pcrvalues.bin
tpm2_createpolicy -P -L sha256:0,2,4,7 -F pcrvalues.bin -f policy.bin
To do the same with future PCR values, use tpm_futurepcr:
tpm_futurepcr -L 0,2,4,7 -o pcrvalues.bin
tpm2_createpolicy -P -L sha256:0,2,4,7 -F pcrvalues.bin -f policy.bin