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cred.c
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cred.c
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/* Task credentials management - see Documentation/credentials.txt
*
* Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells ([email protected])
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include "cred-internals.h"
static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
/*
* The common credentials for the initial task's thread group
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
.tgid = 0,
.lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED,
};
#endif
/*
* The initial credentials for the initial task
*/
struct cred init_cred = {
.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
.securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
.cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET,
.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET,
.cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET,
.cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET,
.user = INIT_USER,
.group_info = &init_groups,
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
.tgcred = &init_tgcred,
#endif
};
/*
* Dispose of the shared task group credentials
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static void release_tgcred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred =
container_of(rcu, struct thread_group_cred, rcu);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&tgcred->usage) != 0);
key_put(tgcred->session_keyring);
key_put(tgcred->process_keyring);
kfree(tgcred);
}
#endif
/*
* Release a set of thread group credentials.
*/
static void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = cred->tgcred;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tgcred->usage))
call_rcu(&tgcred->rcu, release_tgcred_rcu);
#endif
}
/*
* The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials
*/
static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
security_cred_free(cred);
key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
release_tgcred(cred);
put_group_info(cred->group_info);
free_uid(cred->user);
kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
}
/**
* __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
* @cred: The record to release
*
* Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
*/
void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
{
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
/**
* prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
*
* Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds
* shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
* prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
* calling commit_creds().
*
* Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
*
* Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
*
* Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
*/
struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 1);
new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;
old = task->cred;
memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
get_uid(new->user);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
key_get(new->thread_keyring);
key_get(new->request_key_auth);
atomic_inc(&new->tgcred->usage);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
new->security = NULL;
#endif
if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
goto error;
return new;
error:
abort_creds(new);
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
/*
* Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
* - The caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex
*/
struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
{
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
struct cred *new;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tgcred)
return NULL;
#endif
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new) {
kfree(tgcred);
return new;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
key_put(new->thread_keyring);
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
/* create a new per-thread-group creds for all this set of threads to
* share */
memcpy(tgcred, new->tgcred, sizeof(struct thread_group_cred));
atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
/* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
key_get(tgcred->session_keyring);
tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
release_tgcred(new);
new->tgcred = tgcred;
#endif
return new;
}
/*
* prepare new credentials for the usermode helper dispatcher
*/
struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
#endif
struct cred *new;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tgcred)
return NULL;
#endif
new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new)
return NULL;
memcpy(new, &init_cred, sizeof(struct cred));
atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
get_uid(new->user);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
new->request_key_auth = NULL;
new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT;
atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
new->tgcred = tgcred;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
new->security = NULL;
#endif
if (security_prepare_creds(new, &init_cred, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
goto error;
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) != 1);
return new;
error:
put_cred(new);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
*
* We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
* set.
*
* The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
* objective and subjective credentials
*/
int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
#endif
struct cred *new;
int ret;
mutex_init(&p->cred_guard_mutex);
if (
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
!p->cred->thread_keyring &&
#endif
clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
) {
p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
get_cred(p->cred);
atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
return 0;
}
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
ret = create_user_ns(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_put;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
* had one */
if (new->thread_keyring) {
key_put(new->thread_keyring);
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
}
/* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
* a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
* bit */
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tgcred) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error_put;
}
atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
release_tgcred(new);
new->tgcred = tgcred;
}
#endif
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
return 0;
error_put:
put_cred(new);
return ret;
}
/**
* commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
* @new: The credentials to be assigned
*
* Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
* the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
* updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
* in an overridden state.
*
* This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
*
* Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
* of, say, sys_setgid().
*/
int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
const struct cred *old;
BUG_ON(task->cred != task->real_cred);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 2);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
old = task->real_cred;
security_commit_creds(new, old);
get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
/* dumpability changes */
if (old->euid != new->euid ||
old->egid != new->egid ||
old->fsuid != new->fsuid ||
old->fsgid != new->fsgid ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) {
if (task->mm)
set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
task->pdeath_signal = 0;
smp_wmb();
}
/* alter the thread keyring */
if (new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
key_fsuid_changed(task);
if (new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
key_fsgid_changed(task);
/* do it
* - What if a process setreuid()'s and this brings the
* new uid over his NPROC rlimit? We can check this now
* cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
* we should be checking for it. -DaveM
*/
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
sched_switch_user(task);
/* send notifications */
if (new->uid != old->uid ||
new->euid != old->euid ||
new->suid != old->suid ||
new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
if (new->gid != old->gid ||
new->egid != old->egid ||
new->sgid != old->sgid ||
new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
/* release the old obj and subj refs both */
put_cred(old);
put_cred(old);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
/**
* abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
* @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
*
* Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
* current task.
*/
void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
{
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
put_cred(new);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
/**
* override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
* @new: The credentials to be assigned
*
* Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
* process, returning the old set for later reversion.
*/
const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
const struct cred *old = current->cred;
rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, get_cred(new));
return old;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
/**
* revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
* @old: The credentials to be restored
*
* Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
* discarding the override set.
*/
void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
{
const struct cred *override = current->cred;
rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
put_cred(override);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
/*
* initialise the credentials stuff
*/
void __init cred_init(void)
{
/* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
/**
* prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
* @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
*
* Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service. This can then be used to
* override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that
* task that requires a different subjective context.
*
* @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL.
* If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that;
* otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys.
*
* The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
*
* Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
*
* Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex.
*/
struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
{
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;
if (daemon)
old = get_task_cred(daemon);
else
old = get_cred(&init_cred);
*new = *old;
get_uid(new->user);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
atomic_inc(&init_tgcred.usage);
new->tgcred = &init_tgcred;
new->request_key_auth = NULL;
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
new->security = NULL;
#endif
if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
goto error;
atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
put_cred(old);
return new;
error:
put_cred(new);
put_cred(old);
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
* @secid: The LSM security ID to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
/**
* set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
* @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from.
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. The
* security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be
* interpreted by the LSM.
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
u32 secid;
int ret;
ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return set_security_override(new, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
/**
* set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
* @inode: The inode to take the context from
*
* Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same
* as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have
* the same MAC context as that inode.
*/
int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
new->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
new->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);