Fix typos reported by codespell (ethereum#5534)

* assets/eip-3448/MetaProxyFactory.sol typos

* assets/eip-4886/contracts/ProxyRegister.sol typos

* EIPS/eip-3000.md fixes

* eip-2494.md fixes

* eip-2470.md fixes

* eip-3584.md fixes

* eip-1967.md fixes

* eip-3368.md fixes

* eip-5345.md fixes

* eip-225.md fixes

* eip969.md fixes

* eip-3156.md fixes

* eip-3607.md fixes

* eip-5484.md fixes

EIPS/eip-1967.md

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ contract ERC1967Proxy is Proxy, ERC1967Upgrade {
      * @dev Initializes the upgradeable proxy with an initial implementation specified by `_logic`.
      *
      * If `_data` is nonempty, it's used as data in a delegate call to `_logic`. This will typically be an encoded
-     * function call, and allows initializating the storage of the proxy like a Solidity constructor.
+     * function call, and allows initializing the storage of the proxy like a Solidity constructor.
      */
     constructor(address _logic, bytes memory _data) payable {
         assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("eip1967.proxy.implementation")) - 1));

EIPS/eip-225.md

@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ tests := []struct {
     },
     failure: errUnauthorizedSigner,
   }, {
-    // An authorized signer that signed recenty should not be able to sign again
+    // An authorized signer that signed recently should not be able to sign again
     signers: []string{"A", "B"},
   blocks []block{
       {signer: "A"},

EIPS/eip-2470.md

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ This contract is going to be deployed using the keyless deployment method---also
 
 5. Broadcast the deployment transaction.
 
-    > Note: 247000 is the double of gas needed to deploy the smart contract, this ensures that future changes in OPCODE pricing are unlikely to cause this deploy transction to fail out of gas. A left over will sit in the address of about 0.01 ETH will be forever locked in the single use address. 
+    > Note: 247000 is the double of gas needed to deploy the smart contract, this ensures that future changes in OPCODE pricing are unlikely to cause this deploy transaction to fail out of gas. A left over will sit in the address of about 0.01 ETH will be forever locked in the single use address. 
 
 The resulting transaction hash is `0x803351deb6d745e91545a6a3e1c0ea3e9a6a02a1a4193b70edfcd2f40f71a01c`.
 

EIPS/eip-2494.md

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ Baby Jubjub was generated by running the algorithm with the prime
 
 `r =  21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617`, 
 
-which is the order of alt_bn128, the curve used to verfiy zk-SNARK proofs in Ethereum. The output of the algorithm was `A=168698`. Afterwards, the corresponding Montgomery curve was transformed into twisted Edwards form. Using SAGE libraries for curves, the order `n` of the curve and its factorization `n = 8*l` was calculated.
+which is the order of alt_bn128, the curve used to verify zk-SNARK proofs in Ethereum. The output of the algorithm was `A=168698`. Afterwards, the corresponding Montgomery curve was transformed into twisted Edwards form. Using SAGE libraries for curves, the order `n` of the curve and its factorization `n = 8*l` was calculated.
 
 - **Choice of generator** : the generator point `G` is the point of order `n` with smallest positive `x`-coordinate in `F_r`. 
 - **Choice of base point**: the base point `B` is chosen to be `B = 8*G`, which has order `l`. 

EIPS/eip-3000.md

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ abstract contract IERC3000 {
      * @dev OPTIONAL
      * @notice Apply arbitrator's ruling over a challenge once it has come to a final ruling
      * @param payloadHash Hash of the payload being vetoed
-     * @param config A ERC3000Data.Config struct holding the config attached to the payload being vetod
+     * @param config A ERC3000Data.Config struct holding the config attached to the payload being vetoed
      */
     function veto(bytes32 payloadHash, ERC3000Data.Config memory config, bytes memory reason) virtual public;
     event Vetoed(bytes32 indexed containerHash, address indexed actor, bytes reason, ERC3000Data.Collateral collateral);

EIPS/eip-3156.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Flash loans allow smart contracts to lend an amount of tokens without a requirem
 
 Early adopters of the flash loan pattern have produced different interfaces and different use patterns. The diversification is expected to intensify, and with it the technical debt required to integrate with diverse flash lending patterns.
 
-Some of the high level diferences in the approaches across the protocols include:
+Some of the high level differences in the approaches across the protocols include:
 - Repayment approaches at the end of the transaction, where some pull the principal plus the fee from the loan receiver, and others where the loan receiver needs to manually return the principal and the fee to the lender.
 - Some lenders offer the ability to repay the loan using a token that is different to what was originally borrowed, which can reduce the overall complexity of the flash transaction and gas fees.
 - Some lenders offer a single entry point into the protocol regardless of whether you're buying, selling, depositing or chaining them together as a flash loan, whereas other protocols offer discrete entry points.

EIPS/eip-3368.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ elif block.number > TRANSITION_START_BLOCK_NUMBER:
 ```
 
 ## Rationale
-2 years was chosen because it gives miners sufficient time to find alternative uses for their hardware and/or get their hardware back out onto the open market (e.g., in the form of gaming GPUs) without flooding the market suddenly. This proposal should ONLY be considered as a last resort as something we have in our pocket should the "network need to attract hashing power quickly and then bleed it off over time" rather than "something that is scheduled to be included in X hard fork" ; Recomendation to have in a fast track state, but NOT deployed to mainnet unless needed.
+2 years was chosen because it gives miners sufficient time to find alternative uses for their hardware and/or get their hardware back out onto the open market (e.g., in the form of gaming GPUs) without flooding the market suddenly. This proposal should ONLY be considered as a last resort as something we have in our pocket should the "network need to attract hashing power quickly and then bleed it off over time" rather than "something that is scheduled to be included in X hard fork" ; Recommendation to have in a fast track state, but NOT deployed to mainnet unless needed.
 
 ## Backwards Compatibility
 There are no known backward compatibility issues with the introduction of this EIP.

EIPS/eip-3584.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This proposal is to collate these *transaction* `access_list`s for all the trans
 
 ## Motivation
 Motivation for collating the *transaction* `access_list`s for all the transactions in a **block**’s `access_list` is to have an *access index* of the block with following benefits:
-1. Block execution/validation optimizations/parallelization/cache warmup by enabling construction of *a partial order* for access and hence execution (hint: *chains* in this *poset* can be parallelized).
+1. Block execution/validation optimizations/parallelization/cache warm-up by enabling construction of *a partial order* for access and hence execution (hint: *chains* in this *poset* can be parallelized).
 2. Enabling partial inspection and fetching/serving of a block data/state by *light sync* or *fast sync* protocols concerned with a subset of addresses.
 3. Possible future extension of this list to serve as index for bundling, serving and fetching witness data for *stateless* protocols.
 

EIPS/eip-3607.md

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ A block containing such a transaction MUST be considered invalid.
 
 ## Rationale
 
-We note that it was always the expected that a contract account's behaviour is constrainted by the code in that contract -- which means that the account's funds should not suddenly be spendable by some private key. It was just implicitly assumed in the past that a 160 bit address length is enough to provide collision resistance, and thus that this case could never occur. In that sense, this EIP should be seen as a clarification of protocol behaviour in a previously undefined case rather than an explicit upgrade of consensus rules.
+We note that it was always the expected that a contract account's behaviour is constrained by the code in that contract -- which means that the account's funds should not suddenly be spendable by some private key. It was just implicitly assumed in the past that a 160 bit address length is enough to provide collision resistance, and thus that this case could never occur. In that sense, this EIP should be seen as a clarification of protocol behaviour in a previously undefined case rather than an explicit upgrade of consensus rules.
 
 This does not exclude all possible attack vectors, only the most serious one. Further possible attack vectors via address collisions between contracts and EOAs are:
 1. An attacker can convince a user to send funds to an account before it is deployed. Some applications require this behaviour (e.g. state channels).

EIPS/eip-5345.md

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Returns
 
 ### Application and Wallet Communication
 
-Sending RPC requests between application and wallet can be as usual. For example browser extension wallets can use these new methods easly. Even hardware wallets can implement this too. But for mobile wallets extra communication techniques should be considered. Because mobile wallets can be inactive when it is not in use.
+Sending RPC requests between application and wallet can be as usual. For example browser extension wallets can use these new methods easily. Even hardware wallets can implement this too. But for mobile wallets extra communication techniques should be considered. Because mobile wallets can be inactive when it is not in use.
 
 Mobile wallets mostly use Walletconnect protocol. The application closed or active in the background can't connect to the Bridge server via WebSocket. Therefore, we have to trigger the wallet to connect to the Bridge and to start waiting for requests. For this purpose, push notifications are to be used. That means that only the wallets supporting push notifications can implement the feature.
 

EIPS/eip-5484.md

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ interface IERC5484 {
 We believe that soulbound token serves as a specialized subset of the existing EIP-721 tokens. The advantage of such design is seamless compatibility of soulbound token with existing NFT services. Service providers can treat SBTs like NFTs and do not need to make drastic changes to their existing codebase. 
 
 ### Non-Transferable 
-One problem with current soulbound token implementations that extend from [EIP-721](./eip-721.md) is that all transfer implementations throw errors. A much cleaner approach would be for transfer functions to still throw, but also enable thrid parties to check beforehand if the contract implements the soulbound interface to avoid calling transfer. 
+One problem with current soulbound token implementations that extend from [EIP-721](./eip-721.md) is that all transfer implementations throw errors. A much cleaner approach would be for transfer functions to still throw, but also enable third parties to check beforehand if the contract implements the soulbound interface to avoid calling transfer. 
 
 ### Burn Authorization
 We want maximum freedom when it comes to interface usage. A flexible and predetermined rule to burn is crucial. Here are some sample scenarios for different burn authorizations:

EIPS/eip-969.md

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ASIC developers.
 It is further understood that this change will not prevent redesign of existing
 dedicated hardware with new ASIC chips. The intention of this change is only
 to disable currently active or mid-production hardware and provide time for
-POS development as well as larger algorithim changes to be well analyzed by
+POS development as well as larger algorithm changes to be well analyzed by
 experts.
 
 The choice of FNV constants is made based on the formal specification at

assets/eip-3448/MetaProxyFactory.sol

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ contract MetaProxyFactory {
         }
       }
       ptr := add(ptr, length)
-      // store the siz of the metadata at the end of the bytecode
+      // store the size of the metadata at the end of the bytecode
       mstore(ptr, length)
       ptr := add(ptr, 32)
 

assets/eip-4886/contracts/ProxyRegister.sol

@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ contract ProxyRegister is EPS, Ownable {
   }
 
   /**
-  * @dev The nominator initiaties a proxy entry
+  * @dev The nominator initiates a proxy entry
   */
   function makeNomination(address _proxy, uint256 _provider) external payable isNotCurrentNominator(msg.sender) isNotCurrentProxy(_proxy) isNotCurrentProxy(msg.sender) {
     require (_proxy != address(0), "Proxy address must be provided");
@@ -344,4 +344,4 @@ contract ProxyRegister is EPS, Ownable {
   receive() external payable {
     revert();
   }
-}
+}