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Add language about storing CVRs and about bar codes
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carl3 authored and catrope committed Dec 12, 2018
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Expand Up @@ -164,6 +164,58 @@ Machines used by all non-mail voters Cons:
_[Question & answer edited: April 12, 2018 meeting.]_


### 8.4. If voters use machines to print ballots, should the machine store CVRs of ballots printed?

Background: When a machine is used by voters to select choices that are
then printed on a voter verified ballot, the machine could save the
printed choices as a Cast Voter Record and used as an audit record
or for unofficial election night results. (Actually the machine might
record vote records with uncertain cast status, so would need to be linked
to a scan of an ID for a ballot when cast and inserted into the ballot box.)

The recommendation is for the voter-verified paper ballot to be the
official record counted. However, machine-stored CVRs could be used as
official data if validated by a 100% scan of the cast paper record, or
else a reliable audit of the paper record.

Voting machine stored CVRs Pros:
* Provides a separate audit record created election day
* Digital signatures can prove data was created by that machine on election day
* Preliminary results can be obtained without needing to scan ballots
* Most secure data records electronic+paper, both authenticate each other

Voting machine stored CVRs Cons:
* Need ballot ID scan to distinguish a cast CVR from discarded CVR
* Need to collect data from each machine, possible extra hardware
* Extra high-sensitivity software might be needed
* Discrepancy doesn't prove paper is wrong
* Hacking CVR storage in voting machine software could disrupt elections

### 8.4. Should a machine-printed ballot contain a bar code with a digital signature and/or CVR?

Background: Machines that record voter selections and print a ballot can
easily add a bar code (e.g. 2D QR code) that could contain a digital
signature of the electronic representation of the printed choices,
possibly with the electronic CVR. A digital signature would function
as a check for accurate interpretation of a scanned ballot, and also
could validate the printout as being created on a particular machine
on election day (or early voting period). The signature prevents anyone
from replacing the paper ballot with a substitute, provided appropriate
digital signature protocols are implemented.

The electronic CVR could be printed as a bar code as well, either as
a separate check or to assist the optical scan interpretation.

\[Note, a digital signature could be printed as text, e.g. base64 letters
and numbers, but a pile of numbers is no more human readable than a bar code.]

Ballots with digital signature bar codes Pros:
* Prevents tampering of paper ballots, either alterations or substitution
* Proves this paper was printed by a particular machine on particular day(s)

Ballots with digital signature bar codes Cons:
* Some people dislike (do not trust) printing that is not human readable and verifiable

### 8.5. If voting machines are used at a precinct, should there be one printer per voting station?

Background: Each electronic voting station could be configured with a
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