Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel…

…/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  security: enhance DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR description
  SELinux: add netport.[ch]
  SELinux: Add network port SID cache
  SELinux: turn mount options strings into defines
  selinux/ss/services.c should #include <linux/selinux.h>
  selinux: introduce permissive types
  selinux: remove ptrace_sid
  SELinux: requesting no permissions in avc_has_perm_noaudit is a BUG()
  security: code cleanup
  security: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrences
  SELinux: create new open permission
  selinux: selinux/netlabel.c should #include "netlabel.h"
  SELinux: unify printk messages
  SELinux: remove unused backpointers from security objects
  SELinux: Correct the NetLabel locking for the sk_security_struct

security/Kconfig

@@ -113,10 +113,12 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
 	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
 
-	  For most users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is
-	  reasonable and should cause no problems.  Programs which use vm86
-	  functionality would either need additional permissions from either
-	  the LSM or the capabilities module or have this protection disabled.
+	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+	  Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
+	  permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
+	  this protection disabled.
 
 	  This value can be changed after boot using the
 	  /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.

security/commoncap.c

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
 	if (rc)
 		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
-			__FUNCTION__, rc, bprm->filename);
+			__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
 
 out:
 	dput(dentry);
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
 	if (ret)
 		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_file_caps returned %d for %s\n",
-			__FUNCTION__, ret, bprm->filename);
+			__func__, ret, bprm->filename);
 
 	/*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 	 *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three

security/keys/internal.h

@@ -22,16 +22,16 @@ void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
 
 #ifdef __KDEBUG
 #define kenter(FMT, ...) \
-	printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __FUNCTION__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #define kleave(FMT, ...) \
-	printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __FUNCTION__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
 	printk(KERN_DEBUG "xxx" FMT"yyy\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #else
 #define kenter(FMT, ...) \
-	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __FUNCTION__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #define kleave(FMT, ...) \
-	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __FUNCTION__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
 	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG FMT"\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #endif

security/root_plug.c

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ module_param(debug, bool, 0600);
 	do {							\
 		if (debug)					\
 			printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %s: " fmt ,	\
-				MY_NAME , __FUNCTION__ , 	\
+				MY_NAME , __func__ , 	\
 				## arg);			\
 	} while (0)
 

security/security.c

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 
 	if (verify(&dummy_security_ops)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s could not verify "
-		       "dummy_security_ops structure.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		       "dummy_security_ops structure.\n", __func__);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	if (verify(ops)) {
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify "
-		       "security_operations structure.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		       "security_operations structure.\n", __func__);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ int mod_reg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	if (verify(ops)) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s could not verify "
-		       "security operations.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		       "security operations.\n", __func__);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (ops == security_ops) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s security operations "
-		       "already registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		       "already registered.\n", __func__);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 

security/selinux/Kconfig

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 	int "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version value"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
-	range 15 22
+	range 15 23
 	default 19
 	help
 	  This option sets the value for the maximum policy format version

security/selinux/Makefile

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ selinux-y := avc.o \
 	     nlmsgtab.o \
 	     netif.o \
 	     netnode.o \
+	     netport.o \
 	     exports.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o

security/selinux/avc.c

@@ -871,6 +871,8 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	int rc = 0;
 	u32 denied;
 
+	BUG_ON(!requested);
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested);
@@ -890,13 +892,14 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 	denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
 
-	if (!requested || denied) {
-		if (selinux_enforcing || (flags & AVC_STRICT))
+	if (denied) {
+		if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 			rc = -EACCES;
+		else if (!selinux_enforcing || security_permissive_sid(ssid))
+			avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
+					tsid, tclass);
 		else
-			if (node)
-				avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT,requested,
-						ssid,tsid,tclass);
+			rc = -EACCES;
 	}
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();