Merge tag 'asoc-v5.5-2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kerne…

…l/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: More updates for v5.5

Some more development work for v5.5.  Highlights include:

 - More cleanups from Morimoto-san.
 - Trigger word detection for RT5677.

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

.mailmap

@@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Javi Merino <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Jayachandran C <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Jayachandran C <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Jayachandran C <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Jayachandran C <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Jean Tourrilhes <[email protected]>
 <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Jeff Garzik <[email protected]>
@@ -196,7 +200,8 @@ Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <[email protected]>
 Patrick Mochel <[email protected]>
-Paul Burton <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Paul Burton <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Paul Burton <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Peter A Jonsson <[email protected]>
 Peter Oruba <[email protected]>
 Peter Oruba <[email protected]>
@@ -229,6 +234,7 @@ Shuah Khan <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Shuah Khan <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Shuah Khan <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Shuah Khan <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Simon Arlott <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Simon Kelley <[email protected]>
 Stéphane Witzmann <[email protected]>
 Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>

CREDITS

@@ -1637,6 +1637,10 @@ S: Panoramastrasse 18
 S: D-69126 Heidelberg
 S: Germany
 
+N: Simon Horman
+M: [email protected]
+D: Renesas ARM/ARM64 SoC maintainer
+
 N: Christopher Horn
 E: [email protected]
 D: Miscellaneous sysctl hacks

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <[email protected]>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities

Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v2.rst

@@ -615,8 +615,8 @@ on an IO device and is an example of this type.
 Protections
 -----------
 
-A cgroup is protected to be allocated upto the configured amount of
-the resource if the usages of all its ancestors are under their
+A cgroup is protected upto the configured amount of the resource
+as long as the usages of all its ancestors are under their
 protected levels.  Protections can be hard guarantees or best effort
 soft boundaries.  Protections can also be over-committed in which case
 only upto the amount available to the parent is protected among
@@ -1096,7 +1096,10 @@ PAGE_SIZE multiple when read back.
 	is within its effective min boundary, the cgroup's memory
 	won't be reclaimed under any conditions. If there is no
 	unprotected reclaimable memory available, OOM killer
-	is invoked.
+	is invoked. Above the effective min boundary (or
+	effective low boundary if it is higher), pages are reclaimed
+	proportionally to the overage, reducing reclaim pressure for
+	smaller overages.
 
        Effective min boundary is limited by memory.min values of
 	all ancestor cgroups. If there is memory.min overcommitment
@@ -1118,7 +1121,10 @@ PAGE_SIZE multiple when read back.
 	Best-effort memory protection.  If the memory usage of a
 	cgroup is within its effective low boundary, the cgroup's
 	memory won't be reclaimed unless memory can be reclaimed
-	from unprotected cgroups.
+	from unprotected cgroups.  Above the effective low boundary (or
+	effective min boundary if it is higher), pages are reclaimed
+	proportionally to the overage, reducing reclaim pressure for
+	smaller overages.
 
 	Effective low boundary is limited by memory.low values of
 	all ancestor cgroups. If there is memory.low overcommitment
@@ -2482,8 +2488,10 @@ system performance due to overreclaim, to the point where the feature
 becomes self-defeating.
 
 The memory.low boundary on the other hand is a top-down allocated
-reserve.  A cgroup enjoys reclaim protection when it's within its low,
-which makes delegation of subtrees possible.
+reserve.  A cgroup enjoys reclaim protection when it's within its
+effective low, which makes delegation of subtrees possible. It also
+enjoys having reclaim pressure proportional to its overage when
+above its effective low.
 
 The original high boundary, the hard limit, is defined as a strict
 limit that can not budge, even if the OOM killer has to be called.

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -12,3 +12,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    spectre
    l1tf
    mds
+   tsx_async_abort
+   multihit.rst

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+iTLB multihit
+=============
+
+iTLB multihit is an erratum where some processors may incur a machine check
+error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU lockup, when an
+instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the instruction TLB. This can
+occur when the page size is changed along with either the physical address
+or cache type. A malicious guest running on a virtualized system can
+exploit this erratum to perform a denial of service attack.
+
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Variations of this erratum are present on most Intel Core and Xeon processor
+models. The erratum is not present on:
+
+   - non-Intel processors
+
+   - Some Atoms (Airmont, Bonnell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus, Saltwell, Silvermont)
+
+   - Intel processors that have the PSCHANGE_MC_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this issue:
+
+   ==============  =================================================
+   CVE-2018-12207  Machine Check Error Avoidance on Page Size Change
+   ==============  =================================================
+
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+Privileged software, including OS and virtual machine managers (VMM), are in
+charge of memory management. A key component in memory management is the control
+of the page tables. Modern processors use virtual memory, a technique that creates
+the illusion of a very large memory for processors. This virtual space is split
+into pages of a given size. Page tables translate virtual addresses to physical
+addresses.
+
+To reduce latency when performing a virtual to physical address translation,
+processors include a structure, called TLB, that caches recent translations.
+There are separate TLBs for instruction (iTLB) and data (dTLB).
+
+Under this errata, instructions are fetched from a linear address translated
+using a 4 KB translation cached in the iTLB. Privileged software modifies the
+paging structure so that the same linear address using large page size (2 MB, 4
+MB, 1 GB) with a different physical address or memory type.  After the page
+structure modification but before the software invalidates any iTLB entries for
+the linear address, a code fetch that happens on the same linear address may
+cause a machine-check error which can result in a system hang or shutdown.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the iTLB multihit erratum can be mounted from malicious
+guests in a virtualized system.
+
+
+iTLB multihit system information
+--------------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current iTLB
+multihit status of the system:whether the system is vulnerable and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+     * - Not affected
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages
+       - Software changes mitigate this issue.
+     * - KVM: Vulnerable
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+
+
+Enumeration of the erratum
+--------------------------------
+
+A new bit has been allocated in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) msr
+and will be set on CPU's which are mitigated against this issue.
+
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR                Not present   Possibly vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '0'           Likely vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '1'           Not vulnerable
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+This erratum can be mitigated by restricting the use of large page sizes to
+non-executable pages.  This forces all iTLB entries to be 4K, and removes
+the possibility of multiple hits.
+
+In order to mitigate the vulnerability, KVM initially marks all huge pages
+as non-executable. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages,
+the page is broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+If EPT is disabled or not available on the host, KVM is in control of TLB
+flushes and the problematic situation cannot happen.  However, the shadow
+EPT paging mechanism used by nested virtualization is vulnerable, because
+the nested guest can trigger multiple iTLB hits by modifying its own
+(non-nested) page tables.  For simplicity, KVM will make large pages
+non-executable in all shadow paging modes.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line and KVM - module parameter
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism for marking huge pages as
+non-executable can be controlled with a module parameter "nx_huge_pages=".
+The kernel command line allows to control the iTLB multihit mitigations at
+boot time with the option "kvm.nx_huge_pages=".
+
+The valid arguments for these options are:
+
+  ==========  ================================================================
+  force       Mitigation is enabled. In this case, the mitigation implements
+              non-executable huge pages in Linux kernel KVM module. All huge
+              pages in the EPT are marked as non-executable.
+              If a guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
+              broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+  off	      Mitigation is disabled.
+
+  auto        Enable mitigation only if the platform is affected and the kernel
+              was not booted with the "mitigations=off" command line parameter.
+	      This is the default option.
+  ==========  ================================================================
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source, you may assume that the guest will
+   not attempt to maliciously exploit these errata and no further action is
+   required.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+   If the guest comes from an untrusted source, the guest host kernel will need
+   to apply iTLB multihit mitigation via the kernel command line or kvm
+   module parameter.