kernel/sys.c: fix potential Spectre v1 issue

`resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

  kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
  kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index
current->signal->rlim

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to
kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

kernel/sys.c

@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
+/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #include "uid16.h"
 
 #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
@@ -1453,6 +1456,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
 	if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
 	task_lock(current->group_leader);
 	x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
 	task_unlock(current->group_leader);
@@ -1472,6 +1476,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
 	if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
 	task_lock(current->group_leader);
 	r = current->signal->rlim[resource];
 	task_unlock(current->group_leader);