Move EIP-3607 to review (#4340)

* Move EIP-3607 to review

* 3607: fix review comments

EIPS/eip-3607.md

@@ -1,18 +1,15 @@
 ---
 eip: 3607
 title: Reject transactions from senders with deployed code
+description: Do not allow transactions for which `tx.sender` has any code deployed.
 author: Dankrad Feist (@dankrad), Dmitry Khovratovich (@khovratovich), Marius van der Wijden (@MariusVanDerWijden)
 discussions-to: https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/3608
-status: Draft
+status: Review
 type: Standards Track
 category: Core
 created: 2021-06-10
 ---
 
-## Simple Summary
-
-Do not allow transactions for which `tx.sender` has any code deployed, i.e. `tx.sender` has a `CODEHASH != EMPTYCODEHASH`
-
 ## Abstract
 
 Ethereum addresses are currently only 160 bits long. This means it is possible to create a collision between a contract account and an Externally Owned Account (EOA) using an estimated `2**80` computing operations, which is feasible now given a large budget (ca. 10 billion USD). The fix in this EIP prevents the worst possible attack, where a safe looking contract (e.g. a token wrapper or an AMM-type contract) is deployed to attract user funds, which can then be spent using the EOA key for the same address. The fix is to never allow to use an address that already has code deployed as an EOA address.
@@ -40,6 +37,8 @@ This EIP is to specify this behaviour to always forbid such transactions. This f
 
 Any transaction where `tx.sender` has a `CODEHASH != EMPTYCODEHASH` MUST be rejected as invalid.
 With `EMPTYCODEHASH = 0xc5d2460186f7233c927e7db2dcc703c0e500b653ca82273b7bfad8045d85a470`.
+The invalid transaction MUST be rejected by the client and not be included in a block.
+A block containing such a transaction MUST be considered invalid.
 
 ## Rationale
 
@@ -58,6 +57,8 @@ It is unlikely that an attack like this has already occurred on the Ethereum mai
 
 Private networks may have deployed contracts which also work as EOAs at genesis and should check that this upgrade does not impact their workflows.
 
+Clients might choose to disable this rule for RPC calls like `eth_call` and `eth_estimateGas` as some Multi-Sig contracts use these calls to create transactions as if they originated from the multisig contract itself. 
+
 ## Test Cases
 
 Given a genesis allocation of  
@@ -67,14 +68,14 @@ Balance: 1000000000000000000 // 1 ether
 Nonce:   0,
 Code:    0xB0B0FACE",
 ```
-Every transaction send by the private key corresponding to `0x715656...` (
-`b71c71a67e1177ad4e901695e1b4b9ee17ae16c6668d313eac2f96dbcda3f291`) fails.
-
-A set of test cases can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum/tests/pull/879)
+Every transaction sent by the private key corresponding to `0x715656...` (
+`b71c71a67e1177ad4e901695e1b4b9ee17ae16c6668d313eac2f96dbcda3f291`) should be rejected.
+These transaction must be rejected and not included in a block.
 
 ## Reference Implementation
 
 The following check must be added to the state transition checks after checking that the nonce of the sender is correct.
+The sender is the address recovered from the signature of the transaction.
 ```
 // Make sure the sender is an EOA
 Set ch to the CodeHash of the sender account
@@ -83,7 +84,7 @@ if cs is not equal to EmptyCodeHash then
 end if
 ```
 
-An diff to implement EIP-3607 in go-ethereum can be found [here](../assets/eip-3607/geth.diff)
+A diff to implement EIP-3607 in go-ethereum can be found [here](../assets/eip-3607/geth.diff)
 
 ## Security Considerations