x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix

Add a fix for the Zen2 VZEROUPPER data corruption bug where under certain circumstances executing VZEROUPPER can cause register corruption or leak data. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix using a chicken bit. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
kawasaki · Jul 17, 2023 · 522b1d6 · 522b1d6
1 parent 8b6f687
commit 522b1d6
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Showing 5 changed files with 66 additions and 0 deletions.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/earlycpio.h>
 #include <linux/initrd.h>
+#include <asm/microcode_amd.h>
 
 struct ucode_patch {
 	struct list_head plist;

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h
@@ -48,11 +48,13 @@ extern void __init load_ucode_amd_bsp(unsigned int family);
 extern void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int family);
 extern int __init save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int family);
 void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu);
+extern void amd_check_microcode(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init load_ucode_amd_bsp(unsigned int family) {}
 static inline void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int family) {}
 static inline int __init
 save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int family) { return -EINVAL; }
 static inline void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu) {}
+static inline void amd_check_microcode(void) {}
 #endif
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_MICROCODE_AMD_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -545,6 +545,7 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG		0xc0011029
 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT	 1
 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT 9
 
 #define MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2		0xc001102a
 #define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL		0xc0011030

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ static const int amd_erratum_383[] =
 static const int amd_erratum_1054[] =
 	AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0, 0, 0x2f, 0xf));
 
+static const int amd_zenbleed[] =
+	AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x30, 0x0, 0x4f, 0xf),
+			   AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x60, 0x0, 0x7f, 0xf),
+			   AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf));
+
 static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum)
 {
 	int osvw_id = *erratum++;
@@ -978,6 +983,47 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 }
 
+static bool cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode(void)
+{
+	u32 good_rev = 0;
+
+	switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+	case 0x30 ... 0x3f: good_rev = 0x0830107a; break;
+	case 0x60 ... 0x67: good_rev = 0x0860010b; break;
+	case 0x68 ... 0x6f: good_rev = 0x08608105; break;
+	case 0x70 ... 0x7f: good_rev = 0x08701032; break;
+	case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: good_rev = 0x08a00008; break;
+
+	default:
+		return false;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_data.microcode < good_rev)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_zenbleed))
+		return;
+
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return;
+
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AVX))
+		return;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode()) {
+		pr_notice_once("Zenbleed: please update your microcode for the most optimal fix\n");
+		msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT);
+	} else {
+		msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT);
+	}
+}
+
 static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	early_init_amd(c);
@@ -1082,6 +1128,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
 	    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS));
+
+	zenbleed_check(c);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -1230,3 +1278,15 @@ u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void)
 	return 255;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_get_highest_perf);
+
+static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused)
+{
+	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id());
+
+	zenbleed_check(c);
+}
+
+void amd_check_microcode(void)
+{
+	on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -2287,6 +2287,8 @@ void microcode_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *prev_info)
 
 	perf_check_microcode();
 
+	amd_check_microcode();
+
 	store_cpu_caps(&curr_info);
 
 	if (!memcmp(&prev_info->x86_capability, &curr_info.x86_capability,