exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP

With previous changes every location that tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
kawasaki · Jan 23, 2017 · 9227dd2 · 9227dd2
1 parent 2052313
commit 9227dd2
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Showing 6 changed files with 7 additions and 13 deletions.
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1426,12 +1426,8 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct task_struct *p = current, *t;
 	unsigned n_fs;
 
-	if (p->ptrace) {
-		if (ptracer_capable(p, current_user_ns()))
-			bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP;
-		else
-			bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE;
-	}
+	if (p->ptrace)
+		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE;
 
 	/*
 	 * This isn't strictly necessary, but it makes it harder for LSMs to

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -140,8 +140,7 @@ struct request_sock;
 /* bprm->unsafe reasons */
 #define LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE	1
 #define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE	2
-#define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP	4
-#define LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS	8
+#define LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS	4
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		;
 	}
 
-	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
 		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new_profile);
 		if (error)
 			goto audit;

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	if ((is_setid ||
 	     !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
-	    ((bprm->unsafe & ~(LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) ||
+	    ((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
 	     !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
 		/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
 		if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SETUID) ||

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2404,8 +2404,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 		/* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
 		 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
-		if (bprm->unsafe &
-		    (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
 			u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(current);
 			if (ptsid != 0) {
 				rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	    isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
 		struct task_struct *tracer;
 		rc = 0;