Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linu…

…x/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 core updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Note that in this cycle most of the x86 topics interacted at a level
  that caused them to be merged into tip:x86/asm - but this should be a
  temporary phenomenon, hopefully we'll back to the usual patterns in
  the next merge window.

  The main changes in this cycle were:

  Hardware enablement:

   - Add support for the Intel UMIP (User Mode Instruction Prevention)
     CPU feature. This is a security feature that disables certain
     instructions such as SGDT, SLDT, SIDT, SMSW and STR. (Ricardo Neri)

     [ Note that this is disabled by default for now, there are some
       smaller enhancements in the pipeline that I'll follow up with in
       the next 1-2 days, which allows this to be enabled by default.]

   - Add support for the AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) CPU
     feature, on top of SME (Secure Memory Encryption) support that was
     added in v4.14. (Tom Lendacky, Brijesh Singh)

   - Enable new SSE/AVX/AVX512 CPU features: AVX512_VBMI2, GFNI, VAES,
     VPCLMULQDQ, AVX512_VNNI, AVX512_BITALG. (Gayatri Kammela)

  Other changes:

   - A big series of entry code simplifications and enhancements (Andy
     Lutomirski)

   - Make the ORC unwinder default on x86 and various objtool
     enhancements. (Josh Poimboeuf)

   - 5-level paging enhancements (Kirill A. Shutemov)

   - Micro-optimize the entry code a bit (Borislav Petkov)

   - Improve the handling of interdependent CPU features in the early
     FPU init code (Andi Kleen)

   - Build system enhancements (Changbin Du, Masahiro Yamada)

   - ... plus misc enhancements, fixes and cleanups"

* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (118 commits)
  x86/build: Make the boot image generation less verbose
  selftests/x86: Add tests for the STR and SLDT instructions
  selftests/x86: Add tests for User-Mode Instruction Prevention
  x86/traps: Fix up general protection faults caused by UMIP
  x86/umip: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention at runtime
  x86/umip: Force a page fault when unable to copy emulated result to user
  x86/umip: Add emulation code for UMIP instructions
  x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions
  x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 16-bit address encodings
  x86/insn-eval: Handle 32-bit address encodings in virtual-8086 mode
  x86/insn-eval: Add wrapper function for 32 and 64-bit addresses
  x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 32-bit address encodings
  x86/insn-eval: Compute linear address in several utility functions
  resource: Fix resource_size.cocci warnings
  X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
  X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active
  percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED
  x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
  x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  ...

Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt

@@ -1,29 +1,44 @@
-Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
+Secure Memory Encryption (SME) and Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) are
+features found on AMD processors.
 
 SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
 the standard x86 page tables.  A page that is marked encrypted will be
 automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
 DRAM.  SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
 attacks on the system.
 
+SEV enables running encrypted virtual machines (VMs) in which the code and data
+of the guest VM are secured so that a decrypted version is available only
+within the VM itself. SEV guest VMs have the concept of private and shared
+memory. Private memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared
+memory may be encrypted with hypervisor key. When SME is enabled, the hypervisor
+key is the same key which is used in SME.
+
 A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
 below on how to determine its position).  The encryption bit can also be
 specified in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each
 successive level of page tables can also be encrypted by setting the encryption
 bit in the page table entry that points to the next table. This allows the full
 page table hierarchy to be encrypted. Note, this means that just because the
-encryption bit is set in cr3, doesn't imply the full hierarchy is encyrpted.
+encryption bit is set in cr3, doesn't imply the full hierarchy is encrypted.
 Each page table entry in the hierarchy needs to have the encryption bit set to
 achieve that. So, theoretically, you could have the encryption bit set in cr3
 so that the PGD is encrypted, but not set the encryption bit in the PGD entry
 for a PUD which results in the PUD pointed to by that entry to not be
 encrypted.
 
-Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
-function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
+When SEV is enabled, instruction pages and guest page tables are always treated
+as private. All the DMA operations inside the guest must be performed on shared
+memory. Since the memory encryption bit is controlled by the guest OS when it
+is operating in 64-bit or 32-bit PAE mode, in all other modes the SEV hardware
+forces the memory encryption bit to 1.
+
+Support for SME and SEV can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The
+CPUID function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
 
 	0x8000001f[eax]:
 		Bit[0] indicates support for SME
+		Bit[1] indicates support for SEV
 	0x8000001f[ebx]:
 		Bits[5:0]  pagetable bit number used to activate memory
 			   encryption
@@ -39,6 +54,13 @@ determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
 		Bit[23]   0 = memory encryption features are disabled
 			  1 = memory encryption features are enabled
 
+If SEV is supported, MSR 0xc0010131 (MSR_AMD64_SEV) can be used to determine if
+SEV is active:
+
+	0xc0010131:
+		Bit[0]	  0 = memory encryption is not active
+			  1 = memory encryption is active
+
 Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
 in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
 CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource

Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ ORC unwinder
 Overview
 --------
 
-The kernel CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER option enables the ORC unwinder, which is
+The kernel CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC option enables the ORC unwinder, which is
 similar in concept to a DWARF unwinder.  The difference is that the
 format of the ORC data is much simpler than DWARF, which in turn allows
 the ORC unwinder to be much simpler and faster.

Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ ff92000000000000 - ffd1ffffffffffff (=54 bits) vmalloc/ioremap space
 ffd2000000000000 - ffd3ffffffffffff (=49 bits) hole
 ffd4000000000000 - ffd5ffffffffffff (=49 bits) virtual memory map (512TB)
 ... unused hole ...
-ffd8000000000000 - fff7ffffffffffff (=53 bits) kasan shadow memory (8PB)
+ffdf000000000000 - fffffc0000000000 (=53 bits) kasan shadow memory (8PB)
 ... unused hole ...
 ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits) %esp fixup stacks
 ... unused hole ...

Makefile

@@ -934,8 +934,8 @@ ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
   ifeq ($(has_libelf),1)
     objtool_target := tools/objtool FORCE
   else
-    ifdef CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER
-      $(error "Cannot generate ORC metadata for CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER=y, please install libelf-dev, libelf-devel or elfutils-libelf-devel")
+    ifdef CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC
+      $(error "Cannot generate ORC metadata for CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC=y, please install libelf-dev, libelf-devel or elfutils-libelf-devel")
     else
       $(warning "Cannot use CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y, please install libelf-dev, libelf-devel or elfutils-libelf-devel")
     endif

arch/powerpc/kernel/machine_kexec_file_64.c

@@ -91,11 +91,13 @@ int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
  * and that value will be returned. If all free regions are visited without
  * func returning non-zero, then zero will be returned.
  */
-int arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
+int arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf,
+			int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	u64 i;
 	phys_addr_t mstart, mend;
+	struct resource res = { };
 
 	if (kbuf->top_down) {
 		for_each_free_mem_range_reverse(i, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0,
@@ -105,7 +107,9 @@ int arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
 			 * range while in kexec, end points to the last byte
 			 * in the range.
 			 */
-			ret = func(mstart, mend - 1, kbuf);
+			res.start = mstart;
+			res.end = mend - 1;
+			ret = func(&res, kbuf);
 			if (ret)
 				break;
 		}
@@ -117,7 +121,9 @@ int arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
 			 * range while in kexec, end points to the last byte
 			 * in the range.
 			 */
-			ret = func(mstart, mend - 1, kbuf);
+			res.start = mstart;
+			res.end = mend - 1;
+			ret = func(&res, kbuf);
 			if (ret)
 				break;
 		}

arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
 	select HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
 	select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
-	select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE		if X86_64 && FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER && STACK_VALIDATION
+	select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE		if X86_64 && UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER && STACK_VALIDATION
 	select HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION		if X86_64
 	select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
 	select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
@@ -303,7 +303,6 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 config KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET
 	hex
 	depends on KASAN
-	default 0xdff8000000000000 if X86_5LEVEL
 	default 0xdffffc0000000000
 
 config HAVE_INTEL_TXT
@@ -1803,6 +1802,16 @@ config X86_SMAP
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
+config X86_INTEL_UMIP
+	def_bool n
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	prompt "Intel User Mode Instruction Prevention" if EXPERT
+	---help---
+	  The User Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) is a security
+	  feature in newer Intel processors. If enabled, a general
+	  protection fault is issued if the instructions SGDT, SLDT,
+	  SIDT, SMSW and STR are executed in user mode.
+
 config X86_INTEL_MPX
 	prompt "Intel MPX (Memory Protection Extensions)"
 	def_bool n

arch/x86/Kconfig.debug

@@ -359,28 +359,14 @@ config PUNIT_ATOM_DEBUG
 
 choice
 	prompt "Choose kernel unwinder"
-	default FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER
+	default UNWINDER_ORC if X86_64
+	default UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER if X86_32
 	---help---
 	  This determines which method will be used for unwinding kernel stack
 	  traces for panics, oopses, bugs, warnings, perf, /proc/<pid>/stack,
 	  livepatch, lockdep, and more.
 
-config FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER
-	bool "Frame pointer unwinder"
-	select FRAME_POINTER
-	---help---
-	  This option enables the frame pointer unwinder for unwinding kernel
-	  stack traces.
-
-	  The unwinder itself is fast and it uses less RAM than the ORC
-	  unwinder, but the kernel text size will grow by ~3% and the kernel's
-	  overall performance will degrade by roughly 5-10%.
-
-	  This option is recommended if you want to use the livepatch
-	  consistency model, as this is currently the only way to get a
-	  reliable stack trace (CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE).
-
-config ORC_UNWINDER
+config UNWINDER_ORC
 	bool "ORC unwinder"
 	depends on X86_64
 	select STACK_VALIDATION
@@ -396,7 +382,22 @@ config ORC_UNWINDER
 	  Enabling this option will increase the kernel's runtime memory usage
 	  by roughly 2-4MB, depending on your kernel config.
 
-config GUESS_UNWINDER
+config UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER
+	bool "Frame pointer unwinder"
+	select FRAME_POINTER
+	---help---
+	  This option enables the frame pointer unwinder for unwinding kernel
+	  stack traces.
+
+	  The unwinder itself is fast and it uses less RAM than the ORC
+	  unwinder, but the kernel text size will grow by ~3% and the kernel's
+	  overall performance will degrade by roughly 5-10%.
+
+	  This option is recommended if you want to use the livepatch
+	  consistency model, as this is currently the only way to get a
+	  reliable stack trace (CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE).
+
+config UNWINDER_GUESS
 	bool "Guess unwinder"
 	depends on EXPERT
 	---help---
@@ -411,7 +412,7 @@ config GUESS_UNWINDER
 endchoice
 
 config FRAME_POINTER
-	depends on !ORC_UNWINDER && !GUESS_UNWINDER
+	depends on !UNWINDER_ORC && !UNWINDER_GUESS
 	bool
 
 endmenu

arch/x86/boot/.gitignore

@@ -7,3 +7,6 @@ zoffset.h
 setup
 setup.bin
 setup.elf
+fdimage
+mtools.conf
+image.iso

arch/x86/boot/Makefile

@@ -123,63 +123,26 @@ image_cmdline = default linux $(FDARGS) $(if $(FDINITRD),initrd=initrd.img,)
 $(obj)/mtools.conf: $(src)/mtools.conf.in
 	sed -e 's|@OBJ@|$(obj)|g' < $< > $@
 
+quiet_cmd_genimage = GENIMAGE $3
+cmd_genimage = sh $(srctree)/$(src)/genimage.sh $2 $3 $(obj)/bzImage \
+			$(obj)/mtools.conf '$(image_cmdline)' $(FDINITRD)
+
 # This requires write access to /dev/fd0
 bzdisk: $(obj)/bzImage $(obj)/mtools.conf
-	MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mformat a:			; sync
-	syslinux /dev/fd0					; sync
-	echo '$(image_cmdline)' | \
-		MTOOLSRC=$(src)/mtools.conf mcopy - a:syslinux.cfg
-	if [ -f '$(FDINITRD)' ] ; then \
-		MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy '$(FDINITRD)' a:initrd.img ; \
-	fi
-	MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy $(obj)/bzImage a:linux	; sync
+	$(call cmd,genimage,bzdisk,/dev/fd0)
 
 # These require being root or having syslinux 2.02 or higher installed
 fdimage fdimage144: $(obj)/bzImage $(obj)/mtools.conf
-	dd if=/dev/zero of=$(obj)/fdimage bs=1024 count=1440
-	MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mformat v:			; sync
-	syslinux $(obj)/fdimage					; sync
-	echo '$(image_cmdline)' | \
-		MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy - v:syslinux.cfg
-	if [ -f '$(FDINITRD)' ] ; then \
-		MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy '$(FDINITRD)' v:initrd.img ; \
-	fi
-	MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy $(obj)/bzImage v:linux	; sync
+	$(call cmd,genimage,fdimage144,$(obj)/fdimage)
+	@$(kecho) 'Kernel: $(obj)/fdimage is ready'
 
 fdimage288: $(obj)/bzImage $(obj)/mtools.conf
-	dd if=/dev/zero of=$(obj)/fdimage bs=1024 count=2880
-	MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mformat w:			; sync
-	syslinux $(obj)/fdimage					; sync
-	echo '$(image_cmdline)' | \
-		MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy - w:syslinux.cfg
-	if [ -f '$(FDINITRD)' ] ; then \
-		MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy '$(FDINITRD)' w:initrd.img ; \
-	fi
-	MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy $(obj)/bzImage w:linux	; sync
+	$(call cmd,genimage,fdimage288,$(obj)/fdimage)
+	@$(kecho) 'Kernel: $(obj)/fdimage is ready'
 
 isoimage: $(obj)/bzImage
-	-rm -rf $(obj)/isoimage
-	mkdir $(obj)/isoimage
-	for i in lib lib64 share end ; do \
-		if [ -f /usr/$$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin ] ; then \
-			cp /usr/$$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin $(obj)/isoimage ; \
-			if [ -f /usr/$$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 ]; then \
-				cp /usr/$$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 $(obj)/isoimage ; \
-			fi ; \
-			break ; \
-		fi ; \
-		if [ $$i = end ] ; then exit 1 ; fi ; \
-	done
-	cp $(obj)/bzImage $(obj)/isoimage/linux
-	echo '$(image_cmdline)' > $(obj)/isoimage/isolinux.cfg
-	if [ -f '$(FDINITRD)' ] ; then \
-		cp '$(FDINITRD)' $(obj)/isoimage/initrd.img ; \
-	fi
-	mkisofs -J -r -o $(obj)/image.iso -b isolinux.bin -c boot.cat \
-		-no-emul-boot -boot-load-size 4 -boot-info-table \
-		$(obj)/isoimage
-	isohybrid $(obj)/image.iso 2>/dev/null || true
-	rm -rf $(obj)/isoimage
+	$(call cmd,genimage,isoimage,$(obj)/image.iso)
+	@$(kecho) 'Kernel: $(obj)/image.iso is ready'
 
 bzlilo: $(obj)/bzImage
 	if [ -f $(INSTALL_PATH)/vmlinuz ]; then mv $(INSTALL_PATH)/vmlinuz $(INSTALL_PATH)/vmlinuz.old; fi

arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile

@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += $(obj)/early_serial_console.o
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += $(obj)/kaslr.o
 ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += $(obj)/pagetable.o
+	vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/mem_encrypt.o
 endif
 
 $(obj)/eboot.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar -mno-red-zone

arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S

@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
  /*
   * Build early 4G boot pagetable
   */
+	/*
+	 * If SEV is active then set the encryption mask in the page tables.
+	 * This will insure that when the kernel is copied and decompressed
+	 * it will be done so encrypted.
+	 */
+	call	get_sev_encryption_bit
+	xorl	%edx, %edx
+	testl	%eax, %eax
+	jz	1f
+	subl	$32, %eax	/* Encryption bit is always above bit 31 */
+	bts	%eax, %edx	/* Set encryption mask for page tables */
+1:
+
 	/* Initialize Page tables to 0 */
 	leal	pgtable(%ebx), %edi
 	xorl	%eax, %eax
@@ -141,12 +154,14 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
 	leal	pgtable + 0(%ebx), %edi
 	leal	0x1007 (%edi), %eax
 	movl	%eax, 0(%edi)
+	addl	%edx, 4(%edi)
 
 	/* Build Level 3 */
 	leal	pgtable + 0x1000(%ebx), %edi
 	leal	0x1007(%edi), %eax
 	movl	$4, %ecx
 1:	movl	%eax, 0x00(%edi)
+	addl	%edx, 0x04(%edi)
 	addl	$0x00001000, %eax
 	addl	$8, %edi
 	decl	%ecx
@@ -157,6 +172,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
 	movl	$0x00000183, %eax
 	movl	$2048, %ecx
 1:	movl	%eax, 0(%edi)
+	addl	%edx, 4(%edi)
 	addl	$0x00200000, %eax
 	addl	$8, %edi
 	decl	%ecx