chanbackup: implement crypto operations for serialized static channel…

… baackups

In this commit, we implement a series of new crypto operations that will
allow us to encrypt and decrypt a set of serialized channel backups.
Their various backups may have distinct encodings when serialized, but
to the functions defined in this file, we treat them as simple opaque
blobs.

For encryption, we utilize chacha20poly1305 with a random 24 byte nonce.
We use a larger nonce size as this can be safely generated via a CSPRNG
without fear of frequency collisions between nonces generated. To
encrypt a blob, we then use this nonce as the AD (associated data) and
prepend the nonce to the front of the ciphertext package.

For key generation, in order to ensure the user only needs their
passphrase and the backup file, we utilize the existing keychain to
derive a private key. In order to ensure that at we don't force any
hardware signer to be aware of our crypto operations, we instead opt to
utilize a public key that will be hashed to derive our private key. The
assumption here is that this key will only be exposed to this software,
and never derived as a public facing address.

chanbackup/crypto.go

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+package chanbackup
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+
+	"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/keychain"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
+)
+
+// TODO(roasbeef): interface in front of?
+
+// baseEncryptionKeyLoc is the KeyLocator that we'll use to derive the base
+// encryption key used for encrypting all static channel backups. We use this
+// to then derive the actual key that we'll use for encryption. We do this
+// rather than using the raw key, as we assume that we can't obtain the raw
+// keys, and we don't want to require that the HSM know our target cipher for
+// encryption.
+//
+// TODO(roasbeef): possibly unique encrypt?
+var baseEncryptionKeyLoc = keychain.KeyLocator{
+	Family: keychain.KeyFamilyStaticBackup,
+	Index:  0,
+}
+
+// genEncryptionKey derives the key that we'll use to encrypt all of our static
+// channel backups. The key itself, is the sha2 of a base key that we get from
+// the keyring. We derive the key this way as we don't force the HSM (or any
+// future abstractions) to be able to derive and know of the cipher that we'll
+// use within our protocol.
+func genEncryptionKey(keyRing keychain.KeyRing) ([]byte, error) {
+	//  key = SHA256(baseKey)
+	baseKey, err := keyRing.DeriveKey(
+		baseEncryptionKeyLoc,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	encryptionKey := sha256.Sum256(
+		baseKey.PubKey.SerializeCompressed(),
+	)
+
+	// TODO(roasbeef): throw back in ECDH?
+
+	return encryptionKey[:], nil
+}
+
+// encryptPayloadToWriter attempts to write the set of bytes contained within
+// the passed byes.Buffer into the passed io.Writer in an encrypted form. We
+// use a 24-byte chachapoly AEAD instance with a randomized nonce that's
+// pre-pended to the final payload and used as associated data in the AEAD. We
+// use the passed keyRing to generate the encryption key, see genEncryptionKey
+// for further details.
+func encryptPayloadToWriter(payload bytes.Buffer, w io.Writer,
+	keyRing keychain.KeyRing) error {
+
+	// First, we'll derive the key that we'll use to encrypt the payload
+	// for safe storage without giving away the details of any of our
+	// channels.  The final operation is:
+	//
+	//  key = SHA256(baseKey)
+	encryptionKey, err := genEncryptionKey(keyRing)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Before encryption, we'll initialize our cipher with the target
+	// encryption key, and also read out our random 24-byte nonce we use
+	// for encryption. Note that we use NewX, not New, as the latter
+	// version requires a 12-byte nonce, not a 24-byte nonce.
+	cipher, err := chacha20poly1305.NewX(encryptionKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	var nonce [chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX]byte
+	if _, err := rand.Read(nonce[:]); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Finally, we encrypted the final payload, and write out our
+	// ciphertext with nonce pre-pended.
+	ciphertext := cipher.Seal(nil, nonce[:], payload.Bytes(), nonce[:])
+
+	if _, err := w.Write(nonce[:]); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if _, err := w.Write(ciphertext); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// decryptPayloadFromReader attempts to decrypt the encrypted bytes within the
+// passed io.Reader instance using the key derived from the passed keyRing. For
+// further details regarding the key derivation protocol, see the
+// genEncryptionKey method.
+func decryptPayloadFromReader(payload io.Reader,
+	keyRing keychain.KeyRing) ([]byte, error) {
+
+	// First, we'll re-generate the encryption key that we use for all the
+	// SCBs.
+	encryptionKey, err := genEncryptionKey(keyRing)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Next, we'll read out the entire blob as we need to isolate the nonce
+	// from the rest of the ciphertext.
+	packedBackup, err := ioutil.ReadAll(payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if len(packedBackup) < chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("payload size too small, must be at "+
+			"least %v bytes", chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX)
+	}
+
+	nonce := packedBackup[:chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX]
+	ciphertext := packedBackup[chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX:]
+
+	// Now that we have the cipher text and the nonce separated, we can go
+	// ahead and decrypt the final blob so we can properly serialized the
+	// SCB.
+	cipher, err := chacha20poly1305.NewX(encryptionKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	plaintext, err := cipher.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nonce)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return plaintext, nil
+}

chanbackup/crypto_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+package chanbackup
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/btcsuite/btcd/btcec"
+	"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/keychain"
+)
+
+var (
+	testWalletPrivKey = []byte{
+		0x2b, 0xd8, 0x06, 0xc9, 0x7f, 0x0e, 0x00, 0xaf,
+		0x1a, 0x1f, 0xc3, 0x32, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x63, 0xa9,
+		0x26, 0x97, 0x23, 0xc8, 0xdb, 0x8f, 0xac, 0x4f,
+		0x93, 0xaf, 0x71, 0xdb, 0x18, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x90,
+	}
+)
+
+type mockKeyRing struct {
+	fail bool
+}
+
+func (m *mockKeyRing) DeriveNextKey(keyFam keychain.KeyFamily) (keychain.KeyDescriptor, error) {
+	return keychain.KeyDescriptor{}, nil
+}
+func (m *mockKeyRing) DeriveKey(keyLoc keychain.KeyLocator) (keychain.KeyDescriptor, error) {
+	if m.fail {
+		return keychain.KeyDescriptor{}, fmt.Errorf("fail")
+	}
+
+	_, pub := btcec.PrivKeyFromBytes(btcec.S256(), testWalletPrivKey)
+	return keychain.KeyDescriptor{
+		PubKey: pub,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// TestEncryptDecryptPayload tests that given a static key, we're able to
+// properly decrypt and encrypted payload. We also test that we'll reject a
+// ciphertext that has been modified.
+func TestEncryptDecryptPayload(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	payloadCases := []struct {
+		// plaintext is the string that we'll be encrypting.
+		plaintext []byte
+
+		// mutator allows a test case to modify the ciphertext before
+		// we attempt to decrypt it.
+		mutator func(*[]byte)
+
+		// valid indicates if this test should pass or fail.
+		valid bool
+	}{
+		// Proper payload, should decrypt.
+		{
+			plaintext: []byte("payload test plain text"),
+			mutator:   nil,
+			valid:     true,
+		},
+
+		// Mutator modifies cipher text, shouldn't decrypt.
+		{
+			plaintext: []byte("payload test plain text"),
+			mutator: func(p *[]byte) {
+				// Flip a byte in the payload to render it invalid.
+				(*p)[0] ^= 1
+			},
+			valid: false,
+		},
+
+		// Cipher text is too small, shouldn't decrypt.
+		{
+			plaintext: []byte("payload test plain text"),
+			mutator: func(p *[]byte) {
+				// Modify the cipher text to be zero length.
+				*p = []byte{}
+			},
+			valid: false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	keyRing := &mockKeyRing{}
+
+	for i, payloadCase := range payloadCases {
+		var cipherBuffer bytes.Buffer
+
+		// First, we'll encrypt the passed payload with our scheme.
+		payloadReader := bytes.NewBuffer(payloadCase.plaintext)
+		err := encryptPayloadToWriter(
+			*payloadReader, &cipherBuffer, keyRing,
+		)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("unable encrypt paylaod: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		// If we have a mutator, then we'll wrong the mutator over the
+		// cipher text, then reset the main buffer and re-write the new
+		// cipher text.
+		if payloadCase.mutator != nil {
+			cipherText := cipherBuffer.Bytes()
+
+			payloadCase.mutator(&cipherText)
+
+			cipherBuffer.Reset()
+			cipherBuffer.Write(cipherText)
+		}
+
+		plaintext, err := decryptPayloadFromReader(&cipherBuffer, keyRing)
+
+		switch {
+		// If this was meant to be a valid decryption, but we failed,
+		// then we'll return an error.
+		case err != nil && payloadCase.valid:
+			t.Fatalf("unable to decrypt valid payload case %v", i)
+
+		// If this was meant to be an invalid decryption, and we didn't
+		// fail, then we'll return an error.
+		case err == nil && !payloadCase.valid:
+			t.Fatalf("payload was invalid yet was able to decrypt")
+		}
+
+		// Only if this case was mean to be valid will we ensure the
+		// resulting decrypted plaintext matches the original input.
+		if payloadCase.valid &&
+			!bytes.Equal(plaintext, payloadCase.plaintext) {
+			t.Fatalf("#%v: expected %v, got %v: ", i,
+				payloadCase.plaintext, plaintext)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInvalidKeyEncryption tests that encryption fails if we're unable to
+// obtain a valid key.
+func TestInvalidKeyEncryption(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var b bytes.Buffer
+	err := encryptPayloadToWriter(b, &b, &mockKeyRing{true})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected error due to fail key gen")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInvalidKeyDecrytion tests that decryption fails if we're unable to
+// obtain a valid key.
+func TestInvalidKeyDecrytion(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var b bytes.Buffer
+	_, err := decryptPayloadFromReader(&b, &mockKeyRing{true})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected error due to fail key gen")
+	}
+}