Update token-utility-whitepaper.md

token-utility-whitepaper.md

@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ There is an occasion where tokens are slashed although this is expected to be ve
 ### Token Staking and Delegated Staking
 Aggregator nodes must stake OBX when they initially join Obscuro Mainnet as a means for the node operator to demonstrate their intention to maintain privacy, ledger integrity and not attempt to disrupt the safety of the network. The stake is intentionally set at a high value so the loss of stake is material to the operator. 
 The number of tokens required to stake will be reviewed and set by the Obscuro DAO as the Obscuro Mainnet total value locked (TVL) increases. Increasing the minimum stake as TVL increases continues to economically disincentivise would-be malicious actors from disrupting the network as the theoretical gain from a malicious event becomes more attractive. Locked tokens can be staked. The size of an Aggregator node’s stake influences the probability of that node winning the lottery for the rollup submission round. 
+
+<!-- with a centralised model with only verifiers being decentralised, there is no reason for a validator to be hacked because the only outcome that can be achieved would be to instigate a false challenge and triggering human intervention. Therefore its debatable whether a stake is required (in the original model verifiers do not need to put down a stake, only the aggregators do. This makes delegated staking a non-starter.
+There might, however, be an argument for using staking so validators prove their willingness to respond to user queries in an accurate and timely manner. Underperforming validators would have their stake slashed. This could help offset the 'race to the bottom' where node operators run their validators as cheaply as possible to get the most upside from the node hosting reward. Is it possible to measure a validators performance? Whether they respond / how quickly they respond to user information requests? -->
+
 Delegated staking could also be made available to allow others without access to large amounts of OBX to participate in Obscuro Mainnet. Delegated staking could be available across Aggregator nodes but not available for Verifier nodes because there is not a staking requirement for Verifier nodes to join the Obscuro network. Delegates could be in a position to take a proportion of the rollup reward issued to the Aggregator node that wins the rollup submission lottery. Delegates might be free to choose which Aggregator node they contribute a stake for, this being an incentive for Aggregator node operators to provide healthy nodes with good uptime, performance and reliability guarantees. This would contribute to the good health of the overall Obscuro network. The Obscuro DAO could monitor the Obscuro network checking for clustering of stakes and a skew towards centralisation from decentralisation in which case additional measures could be proposed to maintain an appropriate degree of decentralisation. Ultimately it is a decision of the Obscuro community how delegated staking does, or does not, get implemented.
 The diagram below summarises the different types of staking and the potential distribution of delegated stakes.
 
@@ -130,6 +134,7 @@ _This section is non-normative_
 ### Initial Token Price
 Value can be thought of in many different ways and the price of OBX fulfils several requirements. First, Obscuro node operators are remunerated for their operational costs.
 Second, Obscuro’s decentralisation depends, in part, on the ability to make it economically unviable to control the majority of nodes in the Obscuro network. This is achieved through a staking model where OBX is used.  Delegated staking provides the opportunity for members of the Obscuro community with limited capital to engage with Obscuro.
+<!-- this only makes sense when the aggregators are decentralised, i.e. after phase 1 -->
 Third, the value early contributors bring to Obscuro to help build the momentum within the community and provide feedback on the project needs to be recognised.
 Contributor Whitelist tokens will be excluded from the Public Sale. An unlocking schedule helps mitigate downward pressure on the token price by Contributor Whitelist members trying to gain an economic advantage.
 
@@ -149,6 +154,7 @@ Fourth, OBX is a governance token. There is interest in holding governance token
 A revenue generation model employed by some L2 solutions is to charge a fee on transactions. For example this can be done by applying a fee scalar to the gas fee for submitting a rollup to the L1 thereby generating an income.
 In theory Obscuro could use the same model with the operator of the Obscuro network, the Obscuro Foundation, charging a fee each time Obscuro is used. Those fees could be used to pay for the next tranche of development, run competitions and fund incentive schemes, for example. There are 2 main reasons why fees do not fit with Obscuro.
 First, and most crucially, how are fees charged in a decentralised environment? There is no central sequencer or aggregator therefore no single “weigh station” to analyse smart contracts and determine the correct fee.
+<!-- in a centralised model this argument goes away but should be replaced with the fact the transaction information is encrypted / private therefore to determine the correct fee based on the smart contract activity, e.g. size of token exchange, would be impossible. -->
 Second, Obscuro software is open source therefore anyone is able to fork the code and create a competing product. It would be possible to emulate Obscuro and charge a lower fee and undercut the original implementation of Obscuro.
 
 ## Appendix B - Contributors