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Merge pull request kubernetes#1771 from aledbf/verifyHostname
Add additional check for old SSL certificates
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Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
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@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ | ||
package controller | ||
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import ( | ||
"crypto/x509" | ||
"net" | ||
"strings" | ||
"unicode/utf8" | ||
) | ||
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// Please check https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22922 | ||
// | ||
// Since Go 1.9 the common name field is not used anymore. | ||
// We copy the code to not break existing clusters that doesn't have certificates with SAN yet | ||
// TODO: Remove this helpers in the future. | ||
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// verifyHostname returns nil if c is a valid certificate for the named host. | ||
// Otherwise it returns an error describing the mismatch. | ||
func verifyHostname(h string, c *x509.Certificate) error { | ||
// IP addresses may be written in [ ]. | ||
candidateIP := h | ||
if len(h) >= 3 && h[0] == '[' && h[len(h)-1] == ']' { | ||
candidateIP = h[1 : len(h)-1] | ||
} | ||
if ip := net.ParseIP(candidateIP); ip != nil { | ||
// We only match IP addresses against IP SANs. | ||
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#appendix-B.2 | ||
for _, candidate := range c.IPAddresses { | ||
if ip.Equal(candidate) { | ||
return nil | ||
} | ||
} | ||
return x509.HostnameError{Certificate: c, Host: candidateIP} | ||
} | ||
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lowered := toLowerCaseASCII(h) | ||
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if len(c.DNSNames) > 0 { | ||
for _, match := range c.DNSNames { | ||
if matchHostnames(toLowerCaseASCII(match), lowered) { | ||
return nil | ||
} | ||
} | ||
// If Subject Alt Name is given, we ignore the common name. | ||
} else if matchHostnames(toLowerCaseASCII(c.Subject.CommonName), lowered) { | ||
return nil | ||
} | ||
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return x509.HostnameError{Certificate: c, Host: h} | ||
} | ||
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// toLowerCaseASCII returns a lower-case version of in. See RFC 6125 6.4.1. We use | ||
// an explicitly ASCII function to avoid any sharp corners resulting from | ||
// performing Unicode operations on DNS labels. | ||
func toLowerCaseASCII(in string) string { | ||
// If the string is already lower-case then there's nothing to do. | ||
isAlreadyLowerCase := true | ||
for _, c := range in { | ||
if c == utf8.RuneError { | ||
// If we get a UTF-8 error then there might be | ||
// upper-case ASCII bytes in the invalid sequence. | ||
isAlreadyLowerCase = false | ||
break | ||
} | ||
if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' { | ||
isAlreadyLowerCase = false | ||
break | ||
} | ||
} | ||
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if isAlreadyLowerCase { | ||
return in | ||
} | ||
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out := []byte(in) | ||
for i, c := range out { | ||
if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' { | ||
out[i] += 'a' - 'A' | ||
} | ||
} | ||
return string(out) | ||
} | ||
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func matchHostnames(pattern, host string) bool { | ||
host = strings.TrimSuffix(host, ".") | ||
pattern = strings.TrimSuffix(pattern, ".") | ||
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if len(pattern) == 0 || len(host) == 0 { | ||
return false | ||
} | ||
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patternParts := strings.Split(pattern, ".") | ||
hostParts := strings.Split(host, ".") | ||
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if len(patternParts) != len(hostParts) { | ||
return false | ||
} | ||
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for i, patternPart := range patternParts { | ||
if i == 0 && patternPart == "*" { | ||
continue | ||
} | ||
if patternPart != hostParts[i] { | ||
return false | ||
} | ||
} | ||
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return true | ||
} |
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