Fix all sign/unsigned warnings with Clang and GCC.

Change-Id: If2a83698236f7b0dcd46701ccd257a85463d6ce5 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4992 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
weijun910909 · Oct 27, 2015 · 96c2a28 · 96c2a28
1 parent 0dc2a8a
commit 96c2a28
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Showing 16 changed files with 30 additions and 22 deletions.
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ if (NOT GO_EXECUTABLE)
 endif()
 
 if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCXX OR CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "Clang")
-  set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -ggdb -fvisibility=hidden")
-  set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -ggdb -std=c++0x -fvisibility=hidden")
+  set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -Wsign-compare -ggdb -fvisibility=hidden")
+  set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -Wsign-compare -ggdb -std=c++0x -fvisibility=hidden")
 elseif(MSVC)
   set(MSVC_DISABLED_WARNINGS_LIST
       "C4100" # 'exarg' : unreferenced formal parameter

diff --git a/crypto/bio/bio.c b/crypto/bio/bio.c
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ int BIO_read_asn1(BIO *bio, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_len) {
   uint8_t header[6];
 
   static const size_t kInitialHeaderLen = 2;
-  if (BIO_read(bio, header, kInitialHeaderLen) != kInitialHeaderLen) {
+  if (BIO_read(bio, header, kInitialHeaderLen) != (int) kInitialHeaderLen) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -559,7 +559,8 @@ int BIO_read_asn1(BIO *bio, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_len) {
       return 0;
     }
 
-    if (BIO_read(bio, header + kInitialHeaderLen, num_bytes) != num_bytes) {
+    if (BIO_read(bio, header + kInitialHeaderLen, num_bytes) !=
+        (int)num_bytes) {
       return 0;
     }
     header_len = kInitialHeaderLen + num_bytes;
@@ -585,7 +586,8 @@ int BIO_read_asn1(BIO *bio, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_len) {
   }
 
   if (len + header_len < len ||
-      len + header_len > max_len) {
+      len + header_len > max_len ||
+      len > INT_MAX) {
     return 0;
   }
   len += header_len;
@@ -597,7 +599,7 @@ int BIO_read_asn1(BIO *bio, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_len) {
   }
   memcpy(*out, header, header_len);
   if (BIO_read(bio, (*out) + header_len, len - header_len) !=
-      len - header_len) {
+      (int) (len - header_len)) {
     OPENSSL_free(*out);
     return 0;
   }

diff --git a/crypto/bio/bio_mem.c b/crypto/bio/bio_mem.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int mem_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl) {
   if (INT_MAX - blen < inl) {
     goto err;
   }
-  if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, blen + inl) != (blen + inl)) {
+  if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, blen + inl) != ((size_t) blen) + inl) {
     goto err;
   }
   memcpy(&b->data[blen], in, inl);

diff --git a/crypto/bio/printf.c b/crypto/bio/printf.c
@@ -87,7 +87,11 @@ int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...) {
   }
 #endif
 
-  if (out_len >= sizeof(buf)) {
+  if (out_len < 0) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if ((size_t) out_len >= sizeof(buf)) {
     const int requested_len = out_len;
     /* The output was truncated. Note that vsnprintf's return value
      * does not include a trailing NUL, but the buffer must be sized

diff --git a/crypto/dh/params.c b/crypto/dh/params.c
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ DH *DH_get_2048_256(const ENGINE *engine) {
 }
 
 void DH_check_standard_parameters(DH *dh) {
-  int i;
+  unsigned i;
 
   if (dh->p == NULL ||
       dh->g == NULL ||

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params) {
     for (i = 0; OPENSSL_built_in_curves[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) {
       curve = &OPENSSL_built_in_curves[i];
       const unsigned param_len = curve->data->param_len;
-      if (ecparams->order->length == param_len &&
+      if ((unsigned) ecparams->order->length == param_len &&
           memcmp(ecparams->order->data, &curve->data->data[param_len * 5],
                  param_len) == 0) {
         nid = curve->nid;

diff --git a/crypto/err/err_test.cc b/crypto/err/err_test.cc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static bool TestOverflow() {
     /* Errors are returned in order they were pushed, with the least recent ones
      * removed, up to |ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1| errors. So the errors returned are
      * |ERR_NUM_ERRORS + 2| through |ERR_NUM_ERRORS * 2|, inclusive. */
-    if (err == 0 || ERR_GET_REASON(err) != i + ERR_NUM_ERRORS + 2) {
+    if (err == 0 || ((unsigned)ERR_GET_REASON(err)) != i + ERR_NUM_ERRORS + 2) {
       fprintf(stderr, "ERR_get_error failed at %u\n", i);
       return false;
     }

diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_info.c b/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pe
 	if (xi != NULL) X509_INFO_free(xi);
 	if (!ok)
 		{
-		for (i=0; ((int)i)<sk_X509_INFO_num(ret); i++)
+		for (i=0; i<sk_X509_INFO_num(ret); i++)
 			{
 			xi=sk_X509_INFO_value(ret,i);
 			X509_INFO_free(xi);

diff --git a/crypto/pkcs8/p5_pbev2.c b/crypto/pkcs8/p5_pbev2.c
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
   }
 
   const size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
-  if (iv->value.octet_string->length != iv_len) {
+  if ((size_t) iv->value.octet_string->length != iv_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS);
     goto err;
   }

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_impl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_impl.c
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ static int keygen_multiprime(RSA *rsa, int bits, int num_primes,
       if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) {
         goto err;
       }
-      if (BN_num_bits(r1) == bits) {
+      if (BN_num_bits(r1) == (unsigned) bits) {
         break;
       }
 

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
 	int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
 	size_t i;
 
-	if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+	if ((size_t) cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
 		cidx++;
 
 	crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);

diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
 		{
 		/* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */
 		STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
-		if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset))
+		if ((size_t) node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset))
 			return 1;
 		/* Locate unmatched nodes */
 		for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++)

diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/tab_test.c b/crypto/x509v3/tab_test.c
@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@
 int main(void)
 {
 #if !defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY)
-	int i, prev = -1, bad = 0;
+	unsigned i;
+	int prev = -1, bad = 0;
 	const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *tmp;
         CRYPTO_library_init();
 	i = sizeof(standard_exts) / sizeof(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *);
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ int main(void)
 		tmp = standard_exts;
 		fprintf(stderr, "Extensions out of order!\n");
 		for(i = 0; i < STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT; i++, tmp++)
-		printf("%d : %s\n", (*tmp)->ext_nid, OBJ_nid2sn((*tmp)->ext_nid));
+			printf("%d : %s\n", (*tmp)->ext_nid, OBJ_nid2sn((*tmp)->ext_nid));
 		return 1;
 	} else {
 		printf("PASS\n");

diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int dtls1_discard_fragment_body(SSL *s, size_t frag_len) {
   while (frag_len > 0) {
     size_t chunk = frag_len < sizeof(discard) ? frag_len : sizeof(discard);
     int ret = dtls1_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, discard, chunk, 0);
-    if (ret != chunk) {
+    if (ret != (int) chunk) {
       return 0;
     }
     frag_len -= chunk;
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ static int dtls1_process_fragment(SSL *s) {
   /* Read the body of the fragment. */
   ret = dtls1_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment + frag_off,
                          frag_len, 0);
-  if (ret != frag_len) {
+  if (ret != (int) frag_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return -1;

diff --git a/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -171,7 +171,8 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,
     const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
 
     col = strchr(ptr, ':');
-    if (find_profile_by_name(ptr, &p, col ? col - ptr : strlen(ptr))) {
+    if (find_profile_by_name(ptr, &p,
+                             col ? (size_t)(col - ptr) : strlen(ptr))) {
       sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles, p);
     } else {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
  *     compressionMethod       [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
  *     srpUsername             [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, */
 
-static const int kVersion = 1;
+static const unsigned kVersion = 1;
 
 static const int kTimeTag =
     CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1;