capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root

Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user id. Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the unnecessary record. Ref: commit 3fc689e ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS") See: linux-audit/audit-kernel#16 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> Acked-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
niw · Oct 20, 2017 · 588fb2c · 588fb2c
1 parent c0d1ade
commit 588fb2c
Showing 1 changed file with 2 additions and 3 deletions.
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
  *
  * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
  *   1) cap_effective has all caps
- *   2) we are root
+ *   2) we became root *OR* are were already root
  *   3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
  * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
  *
@@ -783,8 +783,7 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
 
 	if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
 	    !(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
-	      __is_eff(root, cred) &&
-	      __is_real(root, cred) &&
+	      (__is_eff(root, cred) || __is_real(root, cred)) &&
 	      root_privileged()))
 		ret = true;
 	return ret;